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Abstract 
The growth of Chinese MNEs has stimulated great interest in their outward foreign direct 
investment (FDI) strategies.  This thesis attempts to contribute to the theoretical debate as to 
the usefulness of extant MNE conceptual and theoretical models. Theoretical frameworks are 
tested through the analysis of Chinese MNE FDI to developed economies, which are rich in 
strategic assets. The thesis is broken down into five main chapters. Chapter one examines the 
literature on Chinese MNEs and the conceptual frameworks used to understand their 
international investment behaviour in developed economies. Chapter two contributes to the 
rapidly growing theoretical literature set on Chinese MNEs which argues they use aggressive 
acquisitions, often to psychically distant, developed host countries, to obtain the strategic 
assets that they themselves lack.  My results are broadly supportive of the growing theoretical 
literature on Chinese MNEs, arguing acquisitions are the primary mode of strategic asset 
seeking in developed markets. Chapter three evaluates the outcomes of strategic asset 
acquisitions. This chapter focuses specifically on the extent to which Chinese MNEs are able 
to absorb and productively harness the intangible strategic assets of their developed market 
acquisitions. In this chapter, I find no significant results for target country patent generation. 
Domestic (Chinese market) patents, however, rise significantly in the wake of acquiring an 
innovative firm from Japan, the US or Europe. Chapter four analyses the efficacy of developed 
market policies in generating FDI from China. I find that the presence of investment 
promotion agencies significantly increases the propensity for a Chinese firm to locate in a 
given location. Chapter five provides the conclusion for this thesis. 
  
 II
Foreign direct investment from China to 
developed economies: do extant 
conceptual and policy frameworks explain 
the cross-border investment behaviour of 
Chinese MNEs? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
John Robert Anderson III 
 
 
 
 
Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of a Doctor of Philosophy in 
Management 
 
Durham University 
Durham University Business School 
October 2014 
 
 
The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has been 
given where reference has been made to the work of others. 
This copy has been supplied to Durham University Business School with the understanding that it is 
copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper 
acknowledgement.
 III
Detailed Abstract 
 
The growth of Chinese MNEs has stimulated great interest in their outward foreign direct 
investment (FDI) strategies, particularly among academics in business and management 
studies.  This thesis attempts to contribute to the theoretical debate as to the usefulness of 
extant MNE conceptual and theoretical models. Theoretical frameworks are tested through 
the analysis of Chinese MNE FDI to developed economies, which are rich in strategic assets. 
The thesis is broken down into five main chapters. While each chapter talks to the other, and 
the chapters as a whole build from a distinct conceptual and empirical body of literature on 
Chinese MNEs, there are also standalone conclusions found within each chapter.  
Chapter one examines the literature on Chinese MNEs and the conceptual frameworks used 
to understand their international investment behaviour in developed economies. This chapter 
first considers the term ‘emerging market’ and which economies fall under its purview.  It 
then discusses whether China falls under this definition and, further, whether Chinese FDI 
behaviour is different from past (developed economy) MNE behaviour due, for example, to 
their rapid pace of internationalisation (Luo & Tung, 2007), cross-border strategic asset 
exploration rather than exploitation investments (Child & Rodrigues, 2005), the coupling of 
home country complementary resources with acquired strategic assets (Hennart, 2009, 
2012), and the institutional context within which Chinese MNEs expand globally (Peng, 2012).  
This, in turn, questions whether new theories or extension to old theories is necessary to 
understand Chinese MNEs. Macro-level FDI growth trends from China are then analysed. This 
leads to a nuanced analysis of the methodological appropriateness of past Chinese FDI 
location choice studies. It was found that many studies use (official) data which do not 
necessarily account for the ultimate ownership of Chinese MNE FDI projects. This, it is argued, 
may have unintentionally led to geographical and volume biases in the results of several 
studies on Chinese FDI. 
Chapter two contributes to the rapidly growing theoretical literature set on Chinese MNEs 
which argues they use aggressive acquisitions, often to psychically distant, developed host 
countries, to obtain the strategic assets that they themselves lack.  The use of acquisitions as 
the dominant entry mode for strategic asset seeking stands at heart of current EM MNE 
theorizing. To date, however, systematic empirical testing of the motivations for different 
entry modes by EM MNEs is limited.  I address this gap by exploring the motivations for 
greenfield and acquisition investments in a developed market. For important methodological 
reasons I draw my sample from a single host (the United States) and source country (China). 
My results are broadly supportive of the growing theoretical literature on EM MNEs, arguing 
acquisitions are the primary mode of strategic asset seeking in developed markets.  This work 
does not, however, address the outcomes of these strategic asset acquisitions. 
Chapter three builds upon chapter two by looking at the outcomes of SAS acquisitions, as the 
extent to which Chinese MNEs are able to absorb and productively harness the intangible 
strategic assets of their developed market acquisitions is currently poorly understood. I tailor 
event study methodologies, often used in finance, to analyse trends in the pre and post-
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acquisition patent applications of Chinese MNEs that acquire strategic-asset rich developed 
market businesses in Japan, the US and Europe. I consider both domestic (Chinese) and target 
(host) country patent applications to explore whether Chinese MNEs are capable of absorbing 
strategic-assets for the purpose of developing their own long-term innovative capability or, 
rather, whether they use such acquisitions primarily for domestic market exploitation.  In 
doing so I cast further light on the question of whether such Chinese MNEs use outward FDI 
to develop firm-specific-advantages or not, and thus whether new theories are also required. 
While I find no significant results for target country patent applications, domestic (Chinese 
market) patents do rise significantly in the wake of acquiring an innovative firm from Japan, 
the US or Europe. This strongly suggests technological transfer from acquired to domestic 
subsidiaries and a form of ‘technological looting’, as opposed to long-term capacity building, 
in Chinese MNEs when they acquire developed market businesses. This finding is consistent 
with Hennart's (2012) ‘bundling model’, which directly challenges a basic tenet of the OLI 
paradigm, that ‘locational’ advantages are available to all. 
Chapter four takes the host country perspective in analysing how to efficaciously generate 
FDI from China. In light of the perceived benefits derived from generating FDI, many 
developed economies have systematically implemented policies which target foreign MNEs.  
Chief among these policies is the establishment of investment promotion agencies (IPA).  
While the source of IPAs have traditionally been heterogeneous across global economies, the 
target economies have overwhelmingly been developed economies. The rise of EM MNEs has 
fundamentally changed the once one-way stream of FDI from developed economies to the 
rest of the world. Several past studies have analytically analysed IPAs, but in no cases have 
the impact of IPAs been investigated with a focus on attracting EM FDI into a developed 
economy. I address this gap by analysing the following research question: Are developed 
economy IPAs a major determinant in the location choice of Chinese MNE FDI projects? I 
explore this question from a transaction cost economics perspective by estimating random 
effects GLS and negative binomial models on an unbalanced panel data set from 2003-2011 
of Chinese FDI into Canadian provinces.  I find that the presence of IPAs significantly increases 
the propensity for a Chinese firm to locate in a given province. This chapter, complementing 
the previous two, is directly relevant to contemporary policy-making.  
Chapter five provides the conclusion for this thesis.  It first discusses and links the results of 
each paper and then assesses this thesis’s contribution to current international business 
conceptualization and theorization.  I also discuss the limitations of this research and make 
suggestions for future research. 
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1. Introduction 
The common tread throughout this research project is the evaluation of the appropriateness of 
current conceptual frameworks for understanding foreign direct investment (FDI) behaviour of 
Chinese multinational enterprises (MNE). More specifically, I focus on those from the People’s 
Republic of China, not including special autonomous regions Hong Kong and Macau or Taiwan, 
(henceforth: China). 
Understanding the internationalisation strategies of Chinese MNEs has become a major focus 
area in international business research (Deng, 2012; Ramasamy, Yeung, & Laforet, 2012). This 
interest stems largely from the argument that standard conceptual models of the MNE may not 
be applicable to emerging market (EM) MNEs (Buckley, Cross, Tan, Xin, & Voss, 2009; Stephen 
Chen & Tan, 2012; Luo & Tung, 2007; Mathews, 2006; Rui & Yip, 2008; Yiu, Lau, & Bruton, 2007). 
A key bone of contention, for example, regards the question of whether asset augmenting 
strategies, as opposed to exploitation strategies, are common in EM MNEs (Buckley et al., 2007; 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012; Deng, 2012; Hennart, 2012; C. Wang, Hong, Kafouros, & Wright, 2012). 
The idea that EM MNEs, such as those from China, have an ‘asset augmentation’ approach to FDI, 
involving strategic asset seeking behaviour, has gained considerable traction within EM MNE 
specific theories (Deng, 2012; Luo & Rui, 2009; Luo & Tung, 2007; Wei, 2010).  Many now argue 
that MNEs from China do in fact ‘deviate from the predictions of existing theories’ (Cui & Jiang, 
2012, p. 266). Chinese MNEs, in particular, have been identified as being strongly driven by 
aggressive acquisitions, predominantly in developed markets, in their pursuit of strategic assets 
(Kedia, Gaffney, & Clampit, 2012; Luo & Tung, 2007; Peng, 2012; Sun, Peng, Ren, & Yan, 2012).  
The analysis of Chinese outward foreign direct investment (henceforth: Chinese FDI), has 
attracted rapidly increasing academic interest over the last decade.  Early studies on Chinese FDI 
primarily evaluated governmental influence on the investment choice in terms of both 
geographic and sectorial distribution (Taylor, 2002; Y. Wang, 2002; Wei, 2010; Wu & Chen, 2001).  
Subsequent studies from the mid 2000’s to early 2010’s proliferated from this foundation to 
analyse myriad different attributes of Chinese FDI. In a recent review of the Chinese (an EM) 
outward FDI literature, Deng (2013) identified 138 articles on the subject.  He proceeds to 
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successfully disaggregate this literature into ‘four primary research streams: the latecomer 
perspective; Chinese state and government influences; the dynamics of firms and institutions; 
and the liability of foreignness’ (p. 513).  One of the more heavily utilized quantitative mediums 
for investigating the aforementioned research streams throughout the 2000’s and early 2010’s is 
the location choice study (Armstrong, 2011; Buckley et al., 2007; Cheng & Ma, 2007; Cheung & 
Qian, 2009; Duanmu & Guney, 2009; Duanmu, 2012; X. Liu & Buck, 2007; Yiu et al., 2007). Up to 
2013, however, many of these studies have used data which did not account for the use of tax 
havens.  This may cause serious methodological issues due to ‘onward journeying’ (Sutherland & 
Ning, 2011) and ‘round tripping’ (Ning & Sutherland, 2012) considerations. Round-tripping 
involves moving capital offshore to a tax haven only to bring it back onshore disguised as genuine 
FDI. Onward-journeying, in contrast, involves using a tax haven as a conduct for further FDI in 
third countries (Ning & Sutherland, 2012). Kolstad and Wiig's (2012), for example, conclude, ‘the 
highly challenging question of how to account for investment flows through tax havens is 
important for a more complete understanding of Chinese FDI’ (p. 33). Further, there are still no 
studies which explore the impact of entry mode (greenfield versus acquisition) on the location 
choice or empirically addresses the strategic asset seeking (SAS) behaviour of Chinese MNEs.  
Moreover, while there are qualitative papers on SAS, there are few papers which analyse the 
results of such behaviour. Finally, the efficacy of developed host countries to generate FDI from 
China has not been analysed to any significant degree in past studies.  This thesis attempts to 
address these conceptual gaps in the understanding of Chinese FDI in developed economies. 
The primary impetus driving this research is, therefore, to contribute to the theoretical debate 
on the applicability of historically dominant MNE frameworks and conceptual models to Chinese 
MNE investment behaviours. Precluding this pursuit is the dearth of reliable empirical evidence 
of the determinants of Chinese FDI.  This, in turn, spurs more nuanced questions within the 
location choice literature about the SAS behaviour of Chinese MNEs in developed markets.  I find 
that Chinese MNEs do engage in SAS behaviour in the US via acquisitions.  This creates the 
question of whether or not these SAS acquisitions are successful.  I find when a Chinese company 
acquires a firm from Europe, Japan or the US, innovative activity in the home country (China) 
significantly improves, while innovation in the host country (EU, JP, US) stays flat. 
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I then attempt to give the thesis a holistic perspective of Chinese outward FDI in developed 
economies by taking the host country perspective.  This section evaluates the efficacy of 
developed economy foreign investment promotion agencies (IPA) in attracting Chinese FDI.  I find 
the presence of a provincial-level (Canadian) IPA to be a significant determinant to the location 
decision of Chinese FDI.  This thesis closes with an evaluation of how this research positively and 
significantly contributes to theory and pushes the field of international business forward. 
This is, therefore, a papers-based thesis. I first motivate my work within the literature and then 
move forward to present three separate papers in the main sections of this dissertation.  Each 
paper represents a significant, but distinct, contribution to the burgeoning Chinese FDI literature 
set and has important implication for current EM FDI theorising. The following introductory 
chapter sets out to motivate the rest of the research project.  It briefly discusses what constitutes 
being classified as an ‘emerging market’ and how China falls under this heading. I then review 
the literature on the outward foreign direct investment behaviour of Chinese MNEs. The short-
comings of past empirical work are then described and the research agenda for the thesis is 
briefly discussed. 
 
1.1 Motivation of the research 
1.1.1 Is China an Emerging Market? 
The term emerging market (also referred to as developing market) elicits different definitions 
and presumptions depending on its contextual use.  Some authors define EMs as fast growing 
economies with large populations and significant resource endowment, such as Brazil, Russia, 
India, China (i.e. BRIC countries) (Holtbrügge & Kreppel, 2012). Other authors, such as Mody 
(2004), take a broader approach by defining EMs according to the salient features EMs exhibit 
such as the transitional nature of a country’s economic, political, social and demographic 
environment.  Official agencies such as the United Nations and the World Bank remove much of 
the abstraction surrounding which countries are considered to be classified as ‘developing’. Out 
of around 200 countries in the world the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) (2013a), for example, classifies 163 countries to be ‘developing economies’. This list, 
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however, covers a wide swath of countries of various economic and political prowess. It groups 
together places such as Singapore and Qatar which boast gross domestic product per capita levels 
of around $60,000 and $100,000, respectively, with places such as Burundi and Democratic 
Republic of the Congo with gross domestic product per capita levels of $600 and $400, 
respectively (UNCTAD, 2013a).  Thus, official definitions of ‘emerging’ or ‘developing’ markets 
are quite broad.  When excluding ‘least developed countries’ UNCTAD still designates over 100 
countries as ‘developing’.  Thus, further disaggregation is useful.  When UNCTAD separates 
countries into low, middle and high income developing countries, countries such as Bahamas and 
Chile are classified as ‘high income’, countries such as China and Jamaica are classified as ‘middle 
income’, and countries such as Chad and Haiti are classified as ‘low-income’ developing countries.  
Many other official government agencies follow similar classification patterns. 
For the purposes of this thesis, I discuss EMs within the scope of classifications by official agencies 
(such as the United Nations, World Bank and International Monetary Fund) as well as 
incorporating more nuanced perspectives such as the transitional nature of a country’s 
economic, political, social and demographic environment and growth rates. When the term EM 
is used, therefore, I am largely referring to middle and high income developing countries.  More 
specifically, I am referring to middle and high income developing countries with rapid economic 
growth rates and increasingly substantial FDI stocks and flows.  In this way, the use of EM in this 
thesis refers to BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) countries primarily and Next-Eleven1 countries 
to a slightly lesser degree.  Under this rather narrow, but academically well-received, definition 
of EMs, China has become one of the most actively researched emerging market economies.  This 
is especially true regarding its MNEs, which are seen to have several peculiarities compared to 
MNEs from developed countries.  One area in which Chinese MNEs have displayed abnormalities 
compared to developed country MNEs is the behaviour and patterns of their cross-border 
investments.  One key area of interest is Chinese MNEs expansion into developed economies for 
the purpose of, for example, strategic asset seeking (Deng, 2009).  For the purposes of this thesis, 
developed economies are considered to have high levels of gross domestic product (GDP) per 
                                                            
1 Next-Eleven countries consist of: Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
the Philippines, Turkey, South Korea, and Vietnam. 
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capita, well endowed with intangible assets, such as strategic assets, and have strong institutions 
(International Monetary Fund, 2011). As a result of recent work in the area of Chinese FDI many 
scholars have called into question traditional MNE theories and frameworks (Child & Rodrigues, 
2005; Hennart, 2009; Luo & Tung, 2007; Mathews, 2002). 
 
1.1.2 Traditional MNE theoretical frameworks 
Traditionally, cross-border investment flows have been dominated by firms from economically 
advanced economies, such as those in Europe and the United States.  As such, many of the extant 
international business (IB) theoretical frameworks are based on the experience of cross-border 
transactions, especially FDI, of firms from developed economies.  More recently, however, the 
precipitous rise of EM firms as sources of FDI has called into question the usefulness of extant 
theories, such as the Ownership-Location-Internalisation (OLI) paradigm.  This argument is made, 
for example, due to peculiarities in EM MNEs cross-border investment patterns and behaviour 
(Luo & Tung, 2007; Mathews, 2002) which may not conform to traditional IB theories (Ramasamy 
et al., 2012). Understanding and accounting for the behaviour of EM MNEs in IB theory is of great 
importance as EM MNEs now constitute a substantial amount of FDI flows worldwide.  As of 
2012, for example, EM firms constitute around one-quarter of all outward FDI flows globally 
(Contractor, 2013; UNCTAD, 2013a). 
According to traditional theories of the MNE, firms internationalise based on specific 
characteristics, such as firm-specific ownership advantages, home and host country locational 
advantages and the ability to orchestrate internal and external resources in a given location in 
order to deliver value to customers.  The most dominant theoretical framework used in 
international business studies today is Dunning's (1988) eclectic (also known as OLI) paradigm 
(Cantwell, 2014).  This framework is based on three main tenets.  The first tenet requires an 
organization to maintain ownership (O) advantages.  Originally, the ownership advantage argued 
a firm must have advantages which are unique and inimitable in order to successfully compete 
abroad (Dunning, 1988).  Under this definition, the ‘O’ in OLI was largely in congruence with other 
dominant theories, such as the resource base perspective, which is applied to organizations 
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generally (i.e. both MNEs and domestic-only operating firms). In recent years, however, the scope 
of the ‘O’ advantage has been broadened to cover not only firm-specific resource-based 
advantages, but also the home network in which the MNE operates (Cantwell, Dunning, & 
Lundan, 2009; Dunning & Lundan, 2008). In this way, the ‘O’ advantage is two-pronged as it now 
appropriates consideration for the home institutional context from which an MNE expands 
globally as well as the traditional assumption of firm-based resource advantages (Cantwell, 
2014).  
Locational (L) advantages are seen to be derived by locating in an advantageous host country 
location.  Theoretically, ‘L’ host-country advantages are complementary to ‘O’ home-country, 
firm-specific advantages which create a combination of advantages from which rents are derived 
(in both home and host countries). It should also be noted that the ‘L’ advantage is what gives 
the OLI paradigm its international (rather than domestic only) focus (Cantwell, 2014).  
The third and final tenet of the OLI paradigm is the internalisation (I) advantage. The ‘I’ advantage 
stems from a transaction cost economics foundation and argues firms internalise transactions 
across national borders due to market failures stemming from contracting problems. In a recent 
survey of and proposal for extension to international business and management theoretical 
frameworks Teece (2014) suggests internalisation theory requires a second prong which accounts 
for the ‘dynamic capabilities’ fostered by, ‘resource transfer cost savings and learning issues, 
which are facilitated when technology transfers occur inside the MNE’ (p. 10).  While Teece 
(2014) argues this is the most serious drawback of the OLI paradigm (and other dominant 
international business frameworks), other, equally staunch, reservations have been expressed as 
to the usefulness of the OLI paradigm as a theoretical framework (Hennart, 2009, 2012). 
Hennart (2009, 2012) argues the primary drawback of the OLI paradigm is not due to ‘ownership’ 
issues as argued by some (Mathews, 2002, 2006), or ‘internalisation’ issues as recently outlined 
by Teece (2014).  Rather, Hennart's (2012) assertion is based on the assumption of ‘locational’ 
advantages being freely available to all. He argues that better access to ‘complementary local 
resources’, plus the growing and highly competitive markets for technology, potentially 
strengthen the bargaining power of EM MNEs. Such local complementary resources (also 
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achieved via participation in domestic business groups and strong state/business relationships) 
also allow for rents appropriable only by domestic firms and thus cross-subsidisation of SAS FDI. 
Hennart (2012), therefore, questions a central tenet in OLI thinking – the assumption that host 
country locational advantages are freely available to all. He argues, instead, that EM MNEs are in 
fact able to generate rents associated with the bundling of intangible strategic assets with 
‘complementary local resources’ (CLRs) (Hennart, 2012).  These resources include ‘the knowledge 
of how to incorporate these intangibles into products that meet the needs and tastes of local 
consumers, the logistics necessary to put products within their reach, and all the other inputs 
necessary for local production’ (Hennart, 2012, p. 183). The fact such resources are only 
accessible to domestic EM MNEs in their home markets also provides strong incentives for them 
to acquire intangible strategic assets from foreign markets for deployment in their home market.  
These same barriers and market imperfections (including weak IPR protection and enforcement) 
also deter foreign MNEs from successfully entering Chinese markets. An implication of the 
bundling model is that EM MNEs will look to benefit, at least initially, from their domestic market 
rents. Only later may they be able leverage these CLRs (and the size and rapid growth of the 
domestic market) to also innovate and create their own first-specific advantages (FSA) for further 
internationalisation/FDI). 
There are, of course, many other traditional theories which describe the behaviour of MNEs. In 
his recent review of IB theoretical frameworks, for example, Cuervo-Cazurra (2012) identified 
several other prominent frameworks used in IB and their applicability, or lack thereof, to EM 
MNEs such as: product life cycle, incremental internationalisation, internalisation theory, 
integration/differentiation and legitimation models, as well as resource-based and knowledge-
based views. See Table 1. 
1.1.2.1 Product Life Cycle Theory 
The product life cycle theory argues products and services are initially created in markets with 
highly sophisticated consumers, such as developed countries, and only later as the product or 
service becomes standardized, and of lower cost, will that product or service be offered to other, 
less sophisticated consumer markets, such as developing markets. As the product or service 
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moves into the maturity and decline stages of the product life cycle, production is shifted to low-
cost production economies (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012). As the product life cycle model speaks 
directly to innovative activity, one aspect of the strategic asset-seeking debate, this theory may 
provide an interesting lens through which to view the behaviour or Chinese MNEs.  Past studies 
have found that Chinese MNEs are motivated to upgrade their technological capability rapidly, 
and thus tend to prefer the acquisition mode of entry to gain access to strategic assets (Deng, 
2009).  These firms are not willing to wait until products and services are fully standardised, 
competing primarily on cost. Rather, Chinese MNEs look to rapidly ‘springboard’ (Luo & Tung, 
2007) from a position of competitive disadvantage to the technological frontier.   
This finding does not bode well with the assumption that consumers from economically less 
advanced markets, such as China, are not interested or otherwise capable of purchasing cutting-
edge products and services.  If Chinese consumers are not willing or able to purchase cutting-
edge products and services, there would be little incentive to exploit those technologies in the 
home country.  In fact, the opposite seems to be true. In many cases, Chinese MNEs engage in 
FDI primarily to compete against globally dominate MNEs at home (Child & Rodrigues, 2005). 
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Table 1: Key theories of the MNC and their extension from the analysis of [EM MNEs] 
 
 
Theory 
 
Product life cycle 
 
Incremental 
internationalization 
 
OLI framework 
 
Internalization  
theory 
 
Integration/differentiation 
and 
 
Resource-based view 
and      legitimation models knowledge-based view 
Initial argument                       Vernon (1966)                                     Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul 
   (1975) 
Dunning (1977)                                 Buckley and Casson (1976)              Prahalad and Doz (1987)                  Penrose (1959)
Assumption on 
individuals’  behavior 
 
 
Assumption on objective 
of foreign expansion 
 
 
Assumption on impact of 
home country 
conditions 
Assumption on impact of 
host country conditions 
 
 
Key question on MNC 
behavior 
Full rationality 
Imperfect information 
Information asymmetry 
 
 
Increase sales by using 
innovations developed at 
home and benefit from 
lower production cost 
abroad 
Firms innovate to satisfy 
demanding high-income 
consumers 
High-income  consumers abroad 
induce export of innovation 
Lowering costs induce 
production abroad 
Where does the MNC move 
sales and production 
around the world? 
Bounded rationality 
Imperfect information 
Information asymmetry 
 
 
Increase sales by using 
knowledge developed at 
home 
 
 
Managers develop 
knowledge specific to 
home country 
 
Differences in conditions 
between home and host 
country limit transfer of 
information between 
countries 
How does an MNC 
internationalize? 
Full rationality 
Imperfect information 
Information asymmetry 
 
 
Increase sales by building on 
home-based  ownership 
advantage and obtain 
location advantage abroad 
Firm creates home-based 
ownership advantages 
 
Host country location 
advantages induce 
entry 
 
 
Why does an MNC set 
production facilities 
abroad? 
Bounded rationality 
Imperfect information 
Information asymmetry 
Asset specificity 
Opportunism 
Increase sales by using 
technology developed at 
home 
 
 
Firm develops technology to 
compete at home 
 
Transaction protection in 
host country determines 
use of firm or market 
 
How does an MNC internalize 
cross-border transactions? 
Bounded rationality 
Imperfect information 
Information asymmetry 
 
 
Increase sales by gaining and 
using knowledge from 
multiple operations, achieving 
legitimation 
Home-based  headquarters 
pressures to standardize 
and achieve legitimacy 
Host country pressures firm to 
adapt to local conditions 
 
 
How does an MNC solve the 
tension between global 
integration and local 
differentiation? 
Bounded rationality 
Imperfect information 
Information asymmetry 
Asset specificity 
 
Grow and increase sales by 
using already-developed 
firm-specific resources, 
especially knowledge 
Home country provides inputs 
that determine resources and 
knowledge created by the 
firm 
Host country inputs and 
competitive conditions 
determine applicability  of 
home-based  resources 
How does an MNC expand and 
compete across countries?
Key answer                                MNC moves sales and 
production from developed 
to developing countries as an 
innovation and associated 
production process become 
standardized 
 
 
Differing DMNC behavior     DMNC sells innovations in 
advanced economies to 
benefit from higher income or 
in developing countries to 
benefit from similar consumer 
needs 
DMNC is already operating in 
low-cost countries and 
does not move production 
MNC internationalizes 
incrementally  to minimize 
risks and obtain experiential 
knowledge from abroad 
 
 
 
DMNC chooses between a 
similar country but small 
market or dissimilar country 
but large market 
DMNC has higher tolerance for 
risk 
MNC sets up production 
facilities abroad when it has 
ownership advantages (O) at 
home, location advantages (L) 
abroad, and internalization 
advantages (I) of keeping the 
foreign operation within the 
firm 
DMNC is more likely to expand 
in search of O advantages 
DMNCs is more likely to 
expand in search of L 
advantages without 
moving production abroad 
MNC uses a hierarchy in a 
cross-border transaction 
when the costs of using 
contracts exceed the costs of 
internalizing  the transaction 
 
 
DMNC has higher tendency to 
internalize operations 
because of higher transaction 
costs at home 
MNC organizes decision making 
to benefit from economies 
of scale and from adaptation 
to local conditions, achieving 
legitimation 
 
 
DMNC follows new strategies to 
take into account the 
pressures of the country 
of origin 
MNC creates firm-specific assets 
whose services are used to 
create products and 
services, with management  
being the key constraint to 
growth at some point in 
time 
 
 
DMNC internationalizes  using 
resources/ knowledge that 
cannot be protected via 
institutions 
DMNC internationalizes  to 
access missing 
resources/knowledg
e
Potential theoretical 
extension from the 
analysis of DMNCs 
Separate similarity in needs 
from level of income needed 
to pay for innovation 
 
Production does not move 
abroad to ensure 
proximity 
Separate psychic distance from 
market attractiveness  in 
the selection of countries 
 
Managers have levels of risk 
aversion influenced by home 
country that affect country 
selection and entry mode 
selection 
Different types of O and L 
advantages depending on 
the country of origin 
determine 
internationalization 
Firms not only enjoy advantages 
but suffer from 
disadvantages that induce 
internationalization 
Managers from different 
countries have different 
attitudes toward 
transaction costs 
Home country exerts pressures 
in addition to 
headquarters and host 
country pressures 
Create advantages that do not 
rely on institutions to 
protect them 
Build advantages using 
acquisitions
Source: Cuervo-Cazurra (2012, p. 159) 
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1.1.2.2 Incremental Internationalisations Theory 
The incremental internationalisation theory argues firms engage in cross-border transactions 
first in psychically near markets and over time to increasingly psychically distant markets.  As 
the firm gains experience in international transactions, it subsequently engages in higher risk 
and exposure internationalisation activities, for example, from exporting to sales subsidiary 
to manufacturing facilities (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009). Past studies have found Chinese MNEs 
do engage in the high-risk acquisition entry mode when seeking resources, such as strategic 
assets (Deng, 2007; Ramasamy et al., 2012; Rui & Yip, 2008).  These firms do so in many cases 
with little or no previous experience in regional (psychically near) markets or by first setting 
up sales offices to gain understanding of the host economy.  In fact, some studies find many 
Chinese MNEs internationalise based solely to repatriate intangible assets and do not seem 
interested or otherwise capable of competing globally (Child & Rodrigues, 2005).  In a recent 
article on the subject, Wang, Luo, Lu, Sun and Maksimov (2014) argue, ‘foreign subsidiary 
autonomy is a strategic mechanism to overcome the EMNE’s weakness in managing globally 
dispersed businesses and their home-country disadvantages after foreign entry’ (p. 111).   
 
1.1.2.3 Internalisation Theory 
The internalisation theory is an integral argument of the broader transaction cost approach 
which,  
assumes pre-existing markets, which “fail” under certain conditions (e.g., where asset 
specificity or complex know-how transfers are involved), necessitating the emergence 
of the MNE and FDI to address these failures by internalizing (under a management 
structure) transactions that would otherwise likely evolve in an unfavourable way for 
one of the parties  
(Teece, 2014, p. 12) 
Chinese MNEs tend to internalise transaction costs differently from developed economy 
MNEs due to the poor institutional environment in which Chinese MNEs are accustom to 
operating (i.e. poor legal protection of intellectual property and contractual rights) (Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2012). It is tacitly assumed, therefore, that as psychic distance between the home 
and host economy increases, so too does the cost of locating in that host economy due, for 
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example, to information asymmetries (Puthusserry, Child, & Rodrigues, 2013).  In this case 
internalising the additional costs of doing business in a psychically distant economy may be 
reduced through internalisation of external costs.  In other words, according to the 
internalisation theory, the relative fixed and variable costs experienced by firms when serving 
a foreign market will be internalised by the firm depending on the relative stage of product 
market development. It is argued, for example, when an export market is small, minimising 
fixed costs through exporting yields good results, but as the market size increases, and in turn 
variable costs increase, FDI may be a better option (Blonigen, 2005; Buckley & Casson, 1981). 
 
1.1.2.4 Integration/Differentiation Model of the MNE 
The integration/differentiation model of the MNE explains the decision to centralise 
operations across national borders or, conversely, to localise operations. The former strategy 
looks to capitalise on economies of scale and scope while the latter focuses on customer 
responsiveness (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012). A recent extension of this theory addresses the 
tension between headquarters and foreign subsidiary (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999) and 
subsequently questions whether extension is necessary due to the isomorphic pressures (EM) 
home institutions sometimes instil upon their MNEs, especially state owned ones (Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2012). It has been found, for example, state-owned Chinese firms may have certain 
advantages over privately held Chinese firms due to soft loans, lower expatriate insurance 
premiums, streamlined investment procedures, etc. (Buckley et al., 2007).  
1.1.2.5 Resource-Based View 
‘The resource-based view…argues that firms have firm-specific resources/capabilities that 
managers use to create products that solve the needs of customers in competition with the 
offers of competitors’ (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012, p. 161).  This theory has been extended multiple 
times within an IB framework, most recently by Teece (2014) when he argued the importance 
of understanding and engaging with the idea of ‘dynamic capabilities’ of the firm. The 
dynamic capabilities theoretical framework stresses ‘the importance of (signature) business 
processes, both inside and outside the firm and also in linking the firm to external partners’ 
(Teece, 2014, p. 14). Past studies have argued Chinese MNEs engage in strategic asset-seeking 
acquisitions not necessarily to compete with traditional global champions internationally. 
Rather, they expatriate intangible resources for domestic use (Child & Rodrigues, 2005). This, 
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in turn, may indicate either most Chinese MNEs are not willing or are otherwise incapable of 
competing globally, even in the case of possessing world leading technologies (Rugman & Li, 
2007).  Under the resource-based view, anecdotal evidence suggests, therefore, Chinese 
MNEs may not have the dynamic capabilities necessary to effectively harness the intangible 
resources they acquire from developed economy MNEs (De Beule & Duanmu, 2012; Narula & 
Dunning, 2010). 
1.1.3 Is EM MNE FDI different? 
Academic interest in EM MNEs has rapidly accelerated in the last several years. Deng (2013), 
for example, recently undertook a detailed survey of the Chinese outward FDI literature 
where he identified 138 articles published in 41 peer-reviewed journals from 2001 to mid-
2012 on the subject.  The 138 articles included in his literature review is certainly  lower than 
the true number of studies on the topic due to papers being written on the topic prior to 2001 
and papers which were published after the July 2012 cut off point. Further, his survey includes 
only studies which involve Chinese MNEs, rather than EM MNEs generally. Among surveyed 
articles, Deng (2013) identified ‘Four primary research themes assembled by scholars … (see, 
e.g., Buckley et al., 2007; Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Ramamurti & Singh, 2009): (a) the 
latecomer perspective; (b) Chinese state and government influences; (c) the dynamics of firms 
and institutions; and (d) the liability of foreignness’ (p. 514). The bulk of studies on EM MNE 
FDI, therefore, concentrate on the potential differences between the behaviour of EM MNEs 
compared to (developed economy) MNEs globally (Ramamurti, 2008, 2012b). Further, some 
recent studies have investigated how differences between EM and non-EM MNEs were 
impacted by the recent financial crisis (X. Yang & Stoltenberg, 2014). Contractor (2013) also 
recently undertook a major review of the EM MNE literature.  He did so, however, with the 
sole intent of evaluating the strategic advantages EM MNEs maintain due to their unique 
attributes and behaviours. These advantages, therefore, provide insight on the impact of 
perceived differences between outward FDI from EM and historically dominant MNEs. 
 
1.1.3.1 The latecomer perspective 
The first major potential difference in behaviour between traditional and EM investors 
revolves around EM MNEs being forced to ‘catch up’ with established global champions 
(Deng, 2013).  This idea was first put forward by Child & Rodrigues (2005) and further 
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popularized by Luo & Tung's (2007) springboard and Rui & Yip's (2008) strategic intent 
perspectives. At the heart of this strand of conceptual theorization stands the argument that 
EM MNEs are latecomers to the global market and are subsequently at a disadvantage 
compared to established MNEs, typically from developed economies (Guillen & Carcia-Canal, 
2009).  Most established MNEs, for example, have many decades of research and 
development, and subsequent patents, on which their current products and services are 
based.  Firms from EMs have not typically had time to organically create globally competitive 
firm-specific advantages such as these.  Rather, Chinese firms, for example, tend to 
internationalize far more rapidly than developed market firms (Deng, 2009; Luo & Tung, 2007) 
and are less apt to exploit pre-established firm-specific advantages when engaging in cross-
border investment.  Rather, FDI from EM MNEs tend to be exploratory in nature, especially 
when investing in developed economies (Makino, Lau, & Yeh, 2002). 
Many scholars argue this behaviour exhibited by EM MNEs does not conform to traditional 
internationalisation path theories. Thus, extension to established theory was deemed 
necessary, namely the strategic-asset augmentation approach.  Under this approach it has 
been argued FDI from EM MNEs into developed economies takes place primarily to rapidly 
‘catch up’ with established champions via acquisition mode of entry (Huang & Wang, 2011).  
Buying strategic assets, it is argued, offers a faster method of obtaining the strategic assets 
EM firms themselves lack compared to organic domestic growth or spillovers from greenfield 
FDI (Rui & Yip, 2008).  Within the literature, however, it is not clear whether EM MNEs engage 
in strategic-asset seeking behaviour via greenfield investment.  It has only been found, via 
case studies (i.e. Deng, 2009; Sun, Peng, Ren, & Yan, 2012), that  SAS most likely takes place 
via the acquisition mode of entry.  These case studies tend to focus on large EM firms, 
primarily from China and India, with significant ties to the home government.  Deng (2013), 
for example, state ‘Such strategic asset-seeking FDI is orchestrated mostly through large 
state-controlled business groups and is well informed by in-depth case studies of some high-
profile Chinese firms, including Haier, Lenovo, Huawei, Galanz, BOE, and TCL (see, e.g., 
Duysters, Jacob, Lemmens, & Yu, 2009; Ge & Ding, 2008; Li & Kozhikode, 2011; Sun, 2009)’ (p. 
517).  Further, the very concept of what ‘strategic assets’ entail is highly contentious in the 
literature.   
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Some scholars (i.e. Teece, Pisano, & Shuen (1997)) argue strategic assets relate to internally 
accessible resources from which difficult to trade and imitate competitive advantages are 
derived (see also Amit & Schoemaker (1993)).  In this extension of the resource-based 
perspective, strategic assets are broadly described as, for example, brands, distribution 
channels, proprietary technology and managerial competency (Deng, 2009; Sutherland, 
2009).  Many past studies on the propensity for EM MNEs to engage in cross-border SAS 
investment, however, simplify this complex construct by using aggregated patenting activity, 
usually on a national level, to represent SAS activity in a given host economy (Buckley et al., 
2007; Kang & Jiang, 2012; Ramasamy et al., 2012).  Other studies analysing EM MNEs proxy 
SAS in equally, albeit different, overly-simplistic manners such as property rights (Hurst, 2011) 
and research and development spending (T. Alon, 2010).  It seems, therefore, the theoretical 
construct of strategic assets are quite well defined, but the method for measuring this 
construct is still highly contentious in the literature. Further restricting theoretical 
understanding of EM MNE SAS activity stems from the largely unexplored area of the 
outcomes of SAS, especially in terms of technological advancement via cross-border 
acquisitions. 
Recently, some studies (i.e. Huang and Wang (2011); Luo and Wang (2012)) have questioned 
the strategic intent of Chinese SAS FDI.  They argue Chinese SAS activity is not carried out 
primarily in hopes of creating firm-specific advantages which can be exploited globally as was 
originally surmised.  Rather, they find evidence of Chinese firms acquiring strategic assets 
primarily for home market exploitation. Huang & Wang (2011) conclude, ‘The motivation for 
the “China Model” is strengthening domestic industry (or production) through ODI. ODI does 
this through the acquisition of management skills, technology, brands or raw material supply’ 
(p. 19). This makes intuitive sense as China has a massive domestic market which is currently 
under-developed in many areas. While opening up the Chinese economy relatively early in its 
development path has increased competition, primarily from large foreign MNEs, there is still 
a substantial amount of low-hanging fruit in the Chinese domestic market. Chinese firms 
invest in strategic assets abroad, it is argued, primarily to compete in their home market. 
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1.1.3.2 Home government influences 
The role of the state is another salient feature which differentiates EM FDI from developed 
economy FDI (Peng, 2012).  Many argue state support, especially among state owned 
enterprises (SOE), represents a marked advantage for EM MNEs, such as those from China 
(Sauvant, Maschek, & McAllister, 2010). Supportive measures include such things as 
discounted loans, low expatriate insurance premiums, tax credits, investment information 
and streamlined application procedures, all of which reduce the real and perceived risks of 
expanding abroad (Buckley et al., 2007; Luo, Xue, & Han, 2010).  In this way, the home country 
government plays an important role in administering outward FDI. According to Cui & Jiang 
(2012), for example, state owned MNEs bow to home country regulatory and normative 
pressures, which places intense isomorphic pressure on firms to abide by norms acceptable 
to the government. State owned firms are also highly dependent on their home governments 
for, for example, financing options so are less willing to defy home institutions (Cui & Jiang, 
2012). Moreover, SOEs may expand across boarders for non-economic reasons which may 
have direct political undertones (Cui & Jiang, 2012).  This causes many developed economies 
to scrutinize the ‘net benefit’ of Chinese FDI all the more carefully. Deng (2013), for example, 
conclude ‘The dramatic rise in Chinese FDI has sparked intense political, economic, and 
developmental debates in the global community regarding active state involvement 
envisioned by the thesis of state corporatism’ (p. 519). 
Others argue preference is also given to EM firms engaging in high profile acquisitions and 
prestige projects, which can build national pride (Morck, Yeung, & Zhao, 2008). A further 
refinement of this argument takes account of the heterogeneity among different state actors, 
including the government level. Nonetheless, this viewpoint still argues that strong coercive 
pressures ‘increase [EM MNEs] willingness to invest in developed countries, where they can 
innovate and address competitive disadvantages. Such location choices are in line with the 
central government’s aim to access foreign technology, generate spillovers at home and 
nurture indigenous global champions’ (C. Wang et al., 2012, p. 663).  More specifically, it is 
often argued SOEs are embedded and part of the domestic institutional fabric and owing to 
their resource dependency upon the state, that they are likely to follow state policy (Stan, 
Peng, & Bruton, 2013).  The domestic institutional environment, therefore, in general may 
play a central role in determining outward FDI (OFDI) strategies (Buckley et al., 2007). 
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Further, Luo et al. (2010) developed the idea policies which promote outward FDI, such as the 
Chinese government’s ‘Go Global’ initiative, is a legitimate and appropriate approach to 
encouraging Chinese MNEs to expand globally even though they may have significant 
competitive disadvantages. This view has been echoed in a large number of recent academic 
contributions to the discussion on EM MNEs. Thus, in the Chinese case, it is suggested ‘the 
evidence supports the view that government lays the foundations for the international 
expansion of Chinese firms (Peng et al., 2008)’ (C. Wang et al., 2012, p. 668). 
 
1.1.3.3 The dynamics of firms and institutions 
In addition to the impact of government-controlled SOEs, EM firms of all ownership types are 
influenced to various degrees by their home institutional environment (Contractor, 2013; 
Deng, 2013).  In a recent article on the institutional factors which impact outward investment 
of EM MNEs, Luo et al. (2010) state ‘researchers agree that institutional factors in home 
countries play an important part in shaping international expansion behaviour and the 
trajectory of emerging market enterprises’ (p. 68).  They go on to elucidate why and how EM 
governments, such as the Chinese government, stimulate outward FDI through such actions 
as promotional and monitoring measures. Promotional measures include policies which 
provide indirect financial assistance for EM MNEs investing abroad, while monitoring 
measures provide expedited administrative assistance and accountability measures (Luo et 
al., 2010). 
The impact of institutions on EM FDI is not, however, limited to the promotion efforts of 
officially sanctioned government initiatives. Another strand of research on this topic 
investigates the internationalisation of EM firms which are constrained rather than supported 
by home institutions.  In other words, institutional escapism (Luo & Rui, 2009) or institutional 
arbitrage (Boisot & Meyer, 2008).  Under this view,  
institutions are defined as, humanly devised constraints that structure human 
interaction.  They are made up of formal constraints (e.g., rules, laws, constitutions), 
informal constraints (e.g., norms of behavior, conventions, self-imposed rules of 
conduct), and their enforcement characteristics (North, 1994: 360) 
(Nielsen & Vedsmand, 1999 in Witt & Lewin, 2007, p. 581)  
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The idea of institutional escapism argues, therefore, EM firms ‘go global to avoid poor 
institutional environments at home’ (Luo & Rui, 2009: 50).  Institutional escapism is likened 
to ‘pushing’ firms to internationalize, while home country promotional efforts ‘pull’ firms 
across borders.  Push factors in the case of China, for example, ‘such as weak intellectual 
property rights (IPR) and inefficient legal frameworks discourage Chinese firms from pursuing 
R&D and innovation in China. Unable to domestically develop technology, they use OFDI as 
an alternative to acquire strategic resources not easily developed in China (Deng, 2009)’ 
(Deng, 2013, p. 520).   
Boisot & Meyer (2008) describe these situations as ‘institutional arbitrage’ which they define 
as ‘a process that allows firms whose domestic growth is constrained by domestic 
transactions and operating costs to exploit the ready availability of low-cost institutional and 
cultural assets located outside their domestic space’ (p. 350).  The use of tax havens by EM 
firms for the purpose of ‘round tripping’ and ‘onward journeying’ is an excellent example of 
institutional arbitrage (Ning & Sutherland, 2012).  Round-tripping involves moving capital 
offshore to a tax haven only to bring it back onshore disguised as genuine FDI. Peng (2012), 
for example correctly identify the British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands and Hong Kong as top 
destinations of Chinese outward FDI and sources of FDI into China. He goes on to argue, ‘The 
only way to explain these puzzling FDI patterns is capital round-tripping’ (Peng, 2012, p. 98). 
Onward-journeying, in contrast, involves using a tax haven as a conduct for further FDI in third 
countries. Situations such as this indicate institutions have effectively failed, or are otherwise 
grossly misaligned (Luo et al., 2010), with the needs of some, especially small (Lin, 2010), EM 
MNEs. Boisot & Meyer (2008) argue ‘the opportunity and need for Chinese firms to practice 
institutional arbitrage, I believe, make China an important exception to received theories of 
internationalization’ (p. 356). 
It is justifiable to surmise, therefore, that Chinese MNEs international expansion is 
‘institutionally embedded’. This, in turn, points to the ‘importance of looking beyond firm 
boundaries to understand the origins of OFDI from emerging markets’ (C. Wang et al., 2012, 
p. 671).  In other words, ‘The case of China strongly suggests that institutional business theory 
needs to take fuller account of the potential relevance of domestic institutional factors’ (Child 
& Rodrigues, 2005, p. 404). 
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The institutional theory, therefore, has become increasingly important to the current 
conceptualisation of Chinese FDI behaviour. This robust theory is gaining traction in the area 
of international business theorisation and has been used in several recent important studies 
(Deng, 2009; Peng, Sun, Pinkham, & Chen, 2009; Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008; Xu & Meyer, 
2012; J. Zhang, Zhou, & Ebbers, 2011). Peng et al. (2008) argue, for example, that most 
traditional theories ‘can be criticized for largely ignoring the formal and informal institutional 
underpinning that provides the context of competition among industries and firms studied 
with these lenses’ (p. 920). 
 
1.1.3.4 Liability of foreignness 
The home institutional environment from which EM MNEs internationalize is, in many cases, 
quite different from the host economy institutional environment.  This is especially true for 
EM MNEs expanding into developed economies. Differences such as the institutional 
environment between the home and host country can serve to increase the cost of 
conducting business across borders.  These ‘institutional voids’ therefore comprise one 
important aspect of the liabilities of foreignness (LOF) debate. 
LOF has been defined as, ‘all additional costs a firm operating in a market overseas incurs that 
a local firm would not incur’ (Zaheer, 1995, p. 343).  Zaheer (1995) goes on to categorize these 
costs based on other similarities, such as unfamiliarity with the local environment and the 
lack of legitimacy in the host economy. A key thread throughout the extensive LOF literature 
set is that LOF raises the cost of conducting investment in a qualitatively dissimilar economy.  
Further, there is a positive relationship between cost and psychic distance of the home and 
host economies (Ellis, 2008). Determining the psychic distance between two economies, 
however, is not a straight forward calculation.  Rather, it is multifaceted interpretation of 
macro socio-economic factors such as language, religion and level of economic development 
(Blomkvist & Drogendijk, 2013).  
In a recent review of the EM literature, Contractor, (2013) notes, 
[EM MNEs] suffer not only from the LOF (Eden and Miller, 2004; Zaheer, 1995) that 
all internationally expanding firms face, but do so to a greater degree.  This is because 
EMMs have only recently internationalized, and because EMMs operating in 
advanced nation markets face larger institutional and cultural distance, than in the 
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traditional patterns of FDI flows when a multinational from one developed nation 
invested in another developed country 
(Contractor, 2013, p. 321) 
This is seen to be true as the level of economic development is a major factor in determining 
psychic distance and, in turn, the extra transaction costs involved in international expansion 
(i.e. LOF). Blomkvist & Drogendijk (2012) note, ‘…the importance of differences in the degree 
of industrialization…will affect the intensity of the activities of the firms in a foreign market’ 
(p. 667). Firms from economies such as the United States, for example, will have 
comparatively lower levels of LOF, and in turn transaction costs, when entering psychically 
near Australia compared to firms from psychically distant China (Ronen & Shenkar, 2013).  
One important reason for this is the different home institutional environments from which 
EM and developed economy firms expand (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008).  Contractor (2013) 
comment, ‘institutions are less-developed in emerging nations, so that their firms face an 
environment of “institutional voids” (Khanna and Palepu, 2006). Hence successful ventures 
by EMMs abroad – and particularly EMM expansion into advanced nations – would seem 
fraught with obstacles’ (p. 316).  Institutional voids increase the transaction costs of 
expanding from an EM to a developed economy due to increased levels of LOF. 
 
1.1.3.5 Advantages of EM MNEs 
Recently some authors see many of the above differences between Chinese and developed 
economy firms as strategic competitive advantages for Chinese MNEs which can be 
subsequently exploited in cross-border transactions.  Contractor (2013) argue, for example, 
institutional voids between EM and developed economies can be seen as a decided advantage 
for EM MNEs expanding into other emerging markets.  Others (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; 
Guillen & Carcia-Canal, 2009; Khanna & Palepu, 2010; Ramamurti, 2012b) echo this view citing 
EM MNEs enhanced ability to cope with the inefficient capital markets, poor enforcement of 
local and international laws, capricious bureaucrats and erratic regulations which typify EM 
institutional environments. 
In a recent review of the sources of competitive strength of EM MNEs, Contractor (2013) 
identify seven comparative advantages EM MNEs hold over MNEs from developed 
economies: (a) Patience and long-term orientation; (b) Greater tolerance or acceptance of 
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ambiguity; (c) Relationship-based home culture; (d) Greater propensity to learn from 
alliance/supply chain/outsourcing partners; (e) Greater humility or a servant-leadership style 
of top management; (f) Frugal mindset; (g) Maintaining a global mindset.  These non-
traditional advantages, therefore, constitute a yet another major difference between EM 
MNEs and their developed economy counterparts. 
 
1.1.3.6 EM MNEs and the financial crisis 
A quite widely held view in the EM MNE literature is that the global financial crisis has 
facilitated the rapid growth of Chinese MNEs, especially in augmenting perceived strategic 
asset deficiencies compared to developed economy MNEs (Luo et al., 2010; X. Yang & 
Stoltenberg, 2014). The financial crisis created a prolonged downturn in developed markets 
and a collapse in the valuations of many western-based MNEs. This, it is suggested, is 
‘triggering a new wave of organizational restructuring for western companies which urgently 
need capital to fund their operations' (Luo et al., 2010, p. 77). This, in turn, 'generates more 
opportunities than before for EMEs to venture abroad through mergers and acquisitions’ 
(ibid).   
 
Further accentuating the increased propensity for EM MNEs to rapidly acquire strategic assets 
in the post crisis period, it is argued, was the preferred mode of entry in the pre-crisis period, 
which was greenfield FDI.  Historically, FDI by EM MNEs has ‘taken the form of greenfield 
investment for the most part, while developed country MNEs have relied more on M&As' 
(McAllister & Sauvant, 2013, p. 30).  The financial crisis, however, has caused a collapse in 
valuations of many Western firms and capital availability subsequently became very tight. 
This, in turn, caused the rapid decline in acquisition activity by Western MNEs.  The opposite 
seems to have been true for EM MNES, partly because of their pre-crisis behaviours. Prior to 
the financial crisis EM MNEs were, for example, more likely than developed economy MNEs 
to invest via greenfield mode of entry, pay cash for international investments, and be 
controlled by family or state actors (McAllister & Sauvant, 2013).  Some argue, therefore, the 
nature of the prudent pre-crisis investment behaviour shown by EM MNEs has put them in a 
strong position to undertake aggressive investment in the post crisis period, especially via the 
acquisition mode of entry (Beule & Bulcke, 2012; X. Yang & Stoltenberg, 2014).  While there 
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have been a few recent contributions which discuss the impact of the financial crisis on EM 
MNEs (i.e. Beule & Bulcke (2012); Luo et al. (2010); McAllister & Sauvant (2013); X. Yang & 
Stoltenberg (2012)), this is still seen to be an under-researched area ripe for further analysis. 
 
1.1.3.7 EM MNEs and theoretical extension 
I seek to contribute to the current theoretical debate of the usefulness of extant theories in 
the context of EM MNE FDI in developed economies.  More specifically, due to the 
peculiarities of EM MNE investment behaviour outlined above, current theoretical 
frameworks may require extension (Ramasamy et al., 2012) or possibly outright rejection 
(Hennart, 2009, 2012).  This may be, for example, due to the explorative nature of cross-
border acquisitions (Deng, 2009; Luo & Tung, 2007), the influence of state actors in the 
(home) institutional environment (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008), high levels of LOF (Guillen 
& Carcia-Canal, 2009), or the restrictive availability of locationally (L) dependant 
‘complementary local resources’ (Hennart, 2009, 2012). The latter critique argues EM MNEs 
are able to generate rents associated with the bundling of intangible strategic assets with 
CLRs (Hennart, 2012).  The fact such CLRs are only accessible to domestic EM MNEs in their 
home markets indicates the OLI paradigm may not be a particularly useful framework in the 
case of EM MNEs. This argument will be expounded upon in Chapter 3. 
 
1.1.4 Different types of FDI 
Much discussion has taken place on the firm and country-level determinants which drive the 
entry mode decisions of MNE cross-border investments. Within this extensive literature set, 
much discussion has taken place on equity (i.e. greenfield, acquisition and joint venture) and 
non-equity-based (i.e. export and alliance) modes of entry (Canabal & White, 2008; Shimizu, 
Hitt, Vaidyanath, & Pisano, 2004). As cross-border trade and investment flows increase, firms 
are forced to strategize on how best to serve foreign markets. The two most fundamental, 
and least risky, method of serving foreign markets is through exportation of a firm’s products 
and services and/or forming strategic alliances with local firms in the host market. When 
exporting takes place production of a product or service typically takes place in a location 
other than the market where it is consumed. ‘International alliances provide access to 
important resources, along with the opportunity to share the costs and risks of entering new 
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foreign markets’ (Shimizu et al., 2004, p. 311). The level of control in non-equity-based 
methods of serving foreign markets are, therefore, typically much lower than equity-based 
approaches. As previously expounded upon, according to the internalisation theory, the 
relative fixed and variable costs experienced by firms when serving a foreign market will be 
internalised by the firm depending on the relative stage of product market development. 
When an foreign market is small, minimising fixed costs through exporting yields good results, 
but as the market size increases, and in turn variable costs increase, equity-based FDI may be 
a better option (Blonigen, 2005; Buckley & Casson, 1981). While non-equity-based behaviour 
and intensity is certainly important, this thesis focuses primarily the equity-based FDI 
component MNEs’ international engagement.  
A second method of serving foreign markets is local production. Under the purview of local 
production falls three primary methods of engagement: greenfield, acquisition and joint 
venture investments. Greenfield investment describes the investment strategy of building a 
new establishment while the acquisition mode of entry entails purchasing a pre-existing 
company (Hennart & Park, 1993). The idea of joint ventures indicates there an organisation is 
owned by more than one firm. Joint ventures are seen to be advantageous over wholly owned 
ventures when local resources are not equally accessible to all firms (Hennart, 2012) or assets 
within an acquired firm are ‘indigestible’ (Hennart & Reddy, 1997; Shimizu et al., 2004).  
The decision to engage in greenfield versus acquisition FDI is also of fundamental importance. 
In a recent study on the role of firm heterogeneity on the choice of greenfield versus 
acquisition FDI, Nocke & Yeaple (2007), for example, argue, ‘While most of the empirical and 
theoretical literature has not distinguished between the two modes of FDI, greenfield and 
cross-border M&A, both are quantitatively important’ (p. 337). They go on to argue 
‘acquisitions arise as firms can exploit complementarities among their capabilities … thus 
allow(ing) a firm to get costly access to the country-specific capabilities of the acquired firm’ 
as well as latent ‘intangible technological advantages’ (ibid). Conversely, greenfield FDI 
implies a firm brings components of it tacit and explicit organisational competencies to a new 
market for exploitation. As such, organisations with strong pre-existing firm-specific 
advantages are more likely to engage in the greenfield mode of entry (X. Liu & Zou, 2008). 
From a strategic perspective, ‘Acquisitions have two main advantages over greenfields: they 
permit faster entry, since it takes longer to build a subsidiary from scratch than to buy a going 
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concern. In contrast to greenfield plants, acquisitions also do not add capacity’ (Hennart & 
Reddy, 1997, p. 5). Thus, the decision to undertake greenfield versus acquisition entry modes 
is highly dependent not only on firm-level competencies, but also on the overall industrial-
level environment (i.e. acquisitions are more likely in rapidly or slowly growing industries) 
(Hennart & Reddy, 1997). The important topic of greenfield versus acquisition entry mode is 
explored in detail in Chapter two. 
Regardless of the mode of entry, FDI is seen, on the whole, to provide myriad benefits to the 
host economy. Benefits may vary depending on the strategic intent of the investing foreign 
firm, but are generally seen to be increased employment, increased competition and positive 
knowledge spillovers which culminate in economic growth for the host economy (Bobonis & 
Shatz, 2007). In a study on the host country benefits of FDI, Harrison (1994) find ‘More foreign 
investment at the enterprise level is associated with improved performance and higher 
productivity … MNEs act as export catalysts, helping domestic firms to break into export 
markets … MNEs pay much higher wages’ (p. 10). In most cases, FDI has been found to have 
more benefits than drawbacks. 
1.1.4.1 Why is entry mode important to emerging market MNEs? 
In a recent critical review of the literature on foreign establishment/entry mode it was noted 
that the ‘choice of foreign entry mode is one of the core topics in international management 
research’ (Slangen & Hennart, 2007, p. 404). To date, the majority of such studies have 
focused on the decision to undertake joint ventures or wholly owned operations (Brouthers 
& Hennart, 2007). Those on the choice between greenfield and acquisition entry mode, 
however, are also not uncommon. Slangen & Hennart (2007), for example, recently identified 
23 empirical studies exploring the determinants of the choice between greenfield and 
acquisition entry mode.  None of these 23 studies, however, involved what could be 
considered emerging market economies.2   Instead, for example, they looked at the likes of 
Swedish, Finnish, British and Dutch MNEs. To date, therefore, empirical study of the 
motivations for greenfield or acquisition entry modes for EM MNEs has still received limited 
attention. This is of interest, however, because at a conceptual level quite strong predictions 
have been made about the use of specific entry modes by EM MNEs.  As ‘latecomers’ requiring 
                                                            
2 Indeed, to my knowledge only Cui and Jiang (2009) have touched upon EM MNE entry mode choice. They do 
so, however, primarily from the perspective of the choice between joint venture or wholly owned subsidiary. 
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aggressive ‘springboard’ strategies to rapidly catch-up, it is often argued EM MNEs use 
acquisitions to psychically distant developed markets to acquire the ‘strategic assets’ they 
themselves lack (Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Deng, 2009; Luo & Tung, 2007; Mathews, 2006). 
Strategic asset-seeking therefore involves augmenting areas of perceived competitive 
disadvantage through the acquisition of a variety of intangible and other assets, such as brand 
names, technologies or managerial competency (Dunning, 2009; Mathews, 2006; Sun et al., 
2012). These OFDI strategies, moreover, are often thought to be different to those found in 
advanced market MNEs, which are considered to rely more upon exploiting existing 
ownership advantages (Luo & Tung, 2007, p. 485). EM MNEs, which are thought in many cases 
to lack such capabilities (Luo & Tung, 2007; Rui & Yip, 2008), are also prepared to make high 
risk investments to markets typified by large psychic distances (i.e. developed markets). They 
are thought to do so, moreover, very rapidly (i.e. predominantly via acquisition) (Luo & Tung, 
2007; Mathews, 2006; Yiu et al., 2007).  
Such strategies, it is believed, are distinct from incremental process models of 
internationalization (c. f. Johanson & Vahlne, 1977, 2009), in so far as they consider the 
accelerated pace of internationalization as a central component (Luo & Tung, 2007, p. 490). 
Child & Rodrigues (2005), among the first to popularize this idea, for example, stress that in 
internalizing strategic assets via FDI ‘acquisition provides a fast route’ for Chinese MNEs (p. 
392) (emphasis added). Kedia et al. (2012), in a review article that conceptually explores EM 
MNEs location and entry mode choice, make a similar point: ‘EMNEs are often latecomers to 
the industry in which they compete, forcing them into accelerated internationalization with 
the explicit goal of gaining access to assets, resources, or capabilities not found in their home 
market (Mathews, 2002)’ (p. 158) (emphasis added).  Following from this, it is argued ‘EMNEs 
will try to overcome their latecomer disadvantage through aggressive, proactive and risk-
taking acquisitions’ (Kedia et al., 2012, p. 159) (emphasis added).  In contrast to conventional 
process theory, therefore, which argues a firm's involvement in international markets occurs 
in stages (from exports, for example, to sales subsidiaries and eventually manufacturing), a 
commonly held view is that EM MNEs, as latecomers to global competition, ‘need to 
accelerate their pace of internationalization so as to catch up with that of incumbents’ (Luo 
& Tung, 2007, p. 490) (emphasis added). When investing in developed countries it is generally 
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argued that EM MNEs ‘overwhelmingly look to rapidly catch-up via aggressive acquisitions' 
(Luo & Tung, 2007, p. 485).  
EM MNEs can and do, of course, also acquire strategic assets from developed markets via 
greenfield investments.  The physical location of a firm, for example, can influence managerial 
competency via knowledge spillovers (Jing Li, Chen, & Shapiro, 2013). These take place when 
competencies such as manufacturing practices, R&D ideas, and management techniques are 
transferred between firms usually in close physical proximity (Branstetter, 2006; Giroud & 
Scott-Kennel, 2009; Halvorsen, 2012; Jaffe, Trajtenberg, & Henderson, 1993).  While highly 
competitive firms (i.e. with the best technology, human capital, supply chains and the like) 
will gain little from joining a cluster and may even suffer as technology and employees spill 
over to competitors (Jing Li, Chen, & Shapiro, 2009; Shaver & Flyer, 2000), less competitive 
firms and those lacking ownership advantages (i.e. EM MNEs) may gain by joining a 
geographic cluster (where innovation tends to thrive). It has been emphasized, however, that 
‘EMNE specific perspectives suggest that EMNEs differ from traditional MNEs in one key 
respect: the accelerated pace of EMNE internationalization’ (Kedia et al., 2012, p. 159) 
(emphasis added).3  So while Chinese MNEs could conceivably also use greenfield investments 
to target strategic assets, current EM MNE thinking generally discounts this possibility as the 
main way of seeking strategic assets, stressing the relatively slower processes of capturing 
spillovers from technological clusters makes them comparatively unattractive for firms 
looking to ‘springboard’ their way to success (Luo & Tung, 2007). Indeed, greenfield 
investment strategies are often thought to indicate an organization has decided to take 
aspects of its tacit and explicit knowledge, corporate culture, and physical property to the 
host economy, indicating the pre-existence of its own firm specific ownership advantages 
(Hennart & Park, 1993; Huallacháin & Reidb, 1997). At a conceptual level the choice between 
acquisition or greenfield entry mode for Chinese MNEs is undoubtedly of central importance 
in current theoretical discussion of Chinese MNEs’ FDI strategies (Kedia et al., 2012).  
                                                            
3 Sun et al. (2012), for example, who also place entry mode at the centre of their theory of EM MNEs, also note 
MNEs from China and India exhibit ‘a more aggressive global strategy in cross-border M&A’s than before’ and 
further that international M&A is the ‘primary mode of internationalization’ for Chinese and Indian MNEs (p. 5). 
Similarly, it has also been argued that learning can be achieved through repetition of linkage and leverage 
(Mathews, 2006) but such learning processes are generally slow. Hence, it is argued, ‘EM MNEs often 
aggressively acquire knowledge through more risk-taking acquisitions instead of traditional partnerships’ (Luo & 
Rui, 2009, p. 52). 
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Next, the current FDI trends of one specific EM, China, are analysed.  China was chosen as an 
appropriate focus for much of the content of this thesis as it is the largest and arguably most 
economically and geopolitically important EM in the world today.  Further, the international 
investment behaviour of Chinese MNEs provides an ideal foundation from which to explore 
potential conceptual diversions from traditional theoretical frameworks and epistemology, 
many of which were discussed above. Finally, due to methodological short-comings of past 
empirical work on Chinese MNEs, comparatively little is clearly understood about the 
determinants and motivations of their cross-border investments. 
 
1.1.5 China as an emerging market 
1.1.5.1 Macro-level trends of Chinese FDI 
One of the largest outward investors among EMs is China.  Prior to China’s joining the World 
Trade Organization in late 2001, Chinese FDI was dominated by state owned enterprises 
(Nolan, 2002).  Major reforms, such as China’s ‘Open Door’ policy announced in 1979, paved 
the way for (Chinese SOEs) outward FDI, but engagement in FDI was limited. Much of the FDI 
undertaken by Chinese MNEs in the pre-WTO period was in the area of natural resource 
extraction.  This Chinese central government initiative was largely seen to be an attempt to 
ensure future growth was not seriously inhibited by a lack of domestic natural resources such 
as metals and oil as well as the ability to process these materials.  Zweig and Bi (2005), for 
example, find ‘China’s combined share of the world’s consumption of aluminium, copper, 
nickel, and iron ore more than doubled within only ten years, from 7 percent in 1990 to 15 
percent in 2000’ (p. 25). They go on to report this number has continued to rapidly increase 
reaching 20 percent in 2005. Chinese SOE Capital Iron and Steel’s acquisition of a steel making 
plant from US-based California Steel Industries in 1992 for 20 million dollars is an example of 
a Chinese state-owned MNE acquiring natural resource processing ability during this time 
period. 
In 1999 the ‘Go Global’ initiative was officially announced (Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Hurst, 
2011).  This new policy spurred many Chinese SOEs to invest globally.  In 2003 the ‘Go Global’ 
policy was extended to privately-held Chinese firms (Luo et al., 2010).  2003 is, subsequently, 
the year when Chinese FDI flows commenced rapid acceleration.  See Figure 1.  The industrial 
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composition of Chinese FDI also diversified from primarily natural resource seeking 
investment to also including other areas such as technology, brands and managerial 
competency, among others (Child & Rodrigues, 2005). 
Figure 1: Chinese FDI flows (millions of US dollars) from 1970-2012 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2013) 
 
Although the above figure uses data which may not be appropriate for use in econometric 
location choice studies, reasons for which will be elucidated later, it does provide a general 
sense of the trend of Chinese FDI.  According to UNCTAD data, it is clear the early 2000’s mark 
the beginning of a spectacular growth period for Chinese FDI.  From 2003 to 2012, there has 
been over 48% year-on-year growth in Chinese FDI (UNCTAD, 2013c).  This impressive growth 
rate must, however, be kept in context as even small real increases in FDI flows constitute 
large increases in FDI growth rates.  In other words, while growth trends in Chinese FDI are 
certainly impressive, the physical amount of FDI flowing from China compared to world flows 
must also be kept in mind.  In 2003, Chinese FDI constituted around half a one percent (0.5%) 
of the FDI outflows globally.  As of 2012, this number reached 6.23%.  While 0.5% of FDI flows 
globally is a rather inconsequential amount of FDI, 6.23% constitutes a significant source of 
investment.  See Figure 2.  In fact, in 2012, the most recent year in which FDI flow data are 
available, China was a larger source of FDI flows than any country in Europe.  China had FDI 
outflows of around $84,220 million while the United Kingdom, Germany, Switzerland and 
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France had outflows of $71,415 million; $66,926 million; $44,314 million; and $37,197 million, 
respectively (UNCTAD, 2013c).  Furthermore, many argue the rapid increase in Chinese FDI is 
set to continue into the foreseeable future (Cheng & Ma, 2007).  Thus, the question of how 
to generate FDI from sources such as China is now an important question.  This is an especially 
interesting question for developed economies due to high levels of psychic distance between 
EM and developed economies.  I expounded upon this topic in greater depth in the third main 
section of this thesis (Chapter 4).  
For the first time in modern history, China’s FDI outflows are large enough to warrant world-
wide attention. This is, I believe, the primary impetus driving the massive influx of interest in 
the area of Chinese FDI. For academic researchers, the primary reason for studying Chinese 
FDI is that Chinese MNEs, and EM MNEs generally, international investment behaviour may 
not conform to traditional assumptions and theoretical frameworks (Child & Rodrigues, 2005; 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012; Narula, 2012; Ramamurti, 2012a, 2012b).  In other words, Chinese FDI 
may be different and subsequently require an extension in theorization on the multinational 
enterprise (Luo & Tung, 2007; Mathews, 2006; Rui & Yip, 2008) or, some argue, outright 
rejection of current international business frameworks and theories (Hennart, 2009, 2012).  
 29 
 
Figure 2: Chinese FDI flows as a percentage of world FDI flows: 1970-2012 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2013) 
 
1.1.6 Past research on Chinese MNEs 
Over the last decade a rapidly growing conceptual and empirical literature set has emerged 
on the outward foreign direct investment of Chinese MNEs (Deng, 2013), as well as a more 
general literature on EM MNEs (Ramamurti, 2012b). Three review papers have already been 
published on Chinese FDI alone (Deng, 2012, 2013; Wei, 2010). A dominant theme discussed 
in the research on Chinese MNEs relates to the motivations for outward FDI (i.e. for market; 
efficiency; natural resource; and strategic asset motives) (Wei, 2010). There is considerable 
debate as to whether conventional models of the MNE, based predominantly on the Western 
development experience, are applicable to the Chinese experience (Child & Rodrigues, 2005; 
Luo & Tung, 2007; Mathews, 2006; Rui & Yip, 2008; Warner, Hong, & Xu, 2004; Zhu, Lynch, & 
Jin, 2011). 
A large body of influential empirical studies have employed econometric methods to explore 
these new conceptual issues relating to the FDI strategies of Chinese MNEs. A major 
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motivation for this thesis starts by showing how the overwhelming majority of empirical 
studies on Chinese FDI to date have not adequately understood or addressed the difficulties 
involved in measuring the FDI activity of Chinese MNEs. Official Chinese FDI statistics are 
currently reported in congruence with OECD norms, which dictate only the country of 
immediate investment be recorded, rather than the ultimate beneficial owner (Buckley, 
Sutherland, Voss, & El-Gohair, 2013).  In this way, the use of offshore tax havens and financial 
centres by Chinese MNEs is not taken into account (Ning & Sutherland, 2012). These data may 
not be appropriate for use in empirical location choice studies, it has been argued as  
FDI stocks are a biased measured of [value-adding] activity, because the degree to 
which they overestimate or underestimate affiliate activity varies systematically with 
host-country characteristics…most FDI into countries that serve as tax havens 
generate no actual productive activity; thus FDI stocks in such countries overestimate 
affiliate activity. 
(Beugelsdijk, Hennart, Slangen, & Smeets, 2010, p. 1444)  
Thus, although Chinese FDI statistics are gathered in line with international balance of 
payment norms, using these data for FDI location choice studies may bias econometric results 
(Sutherland & Ning, 2011). In hopes of elucidating these potential methodological limitations, 
I explore how geographical and volume biases are inherent in Chinese FDI data due to the 
common use of special purpose entities (SPE) in tax havens and offshore financial centres 
(THOFC).  Data biases due to the use of SPEs and THOFCs have either not been recognised or 
satisfactorily dealt with in most existing academic research on Chinese FDI (Sutherland & 
Ning, 2011). 
 
1.1.6.1 Methodological considerations in measuring Chinese FDI activity 
MNEs often diversify their investments geographically through various organisational 
structures, including certain types of offshore SPEs (Beugelsdijk et al., 2010; Wade, 2009). 
Although there is ‘no universal definition of SPE, they do share a number of features’ (OECD, 
2012, p. 14). SPEs are all legal entities that ‘have little or no employment, or operations, or 
physical presence in the jurisdiction in which they are created by their parent enterprises. 
These are typically located in other jurisdictions, such as tax havens and/or offshore financial 
centers’ (ibid). They are often used as devices to raise capital (Ning & Sutherland, 2012) or to 
hold assets and liabilities and usually do not undertake significant production (Rasiah & Shari, 
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2001). Indeed, according to the most recent benchmark definition of FDI, ‘The core business 
of SPEs is to channel funds between entities outside the country where they are 
established...The role of these SPEs is merely to serve as a financial turn table for enterprises 
in other countries’ (OECD, 2008, p. 186). As such, compilers of FDI data argue that SPEs ‘hardly 
affect domestic economic activity and do not reflect genuine investment activities in or of the 
reporting country itself’ (OECD, 2008, p. 186) (emphasis added). 
Investment holding companies, financing subsidiaries, conduits, shell companies, shelf 
companies and brass-plate companies are examples of SPEs (OECD, 2012). The currently 
employed OECD guidelines, outlined in the 3rd Edition Benchmark Definition of FDI (1996) 
(revised, though not yet implemented, in the 4th Edition) state that investments in SPEs, even 
though they undertake little physical production, should be incorporated in FDI data (OECD, 
2008, p. 186). 
SPEs have been used by MNEs from diverse backgrounds for many years. Recent estimates, 
taken from UNCTAD’s FDI database, for example, indicate around 25% of global FDI stocks 
reside in OECD recognised THOFCs (UNCTAD, 2013a). In this regard, China has followed a 
similar, if not more extreme, path. Since 2002, China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) has 
compiled China’s FDI statistics in accordance with the OECD/IMF’s balance-of-payment 
guidelines (Cheng & Ma, 2007). THOFCs have consistently figured prominently as major 
recipients of China’s officially compiled outward FDI. The triad of Hong Kong, the British Virgin 
Islands (BVI) and Cayman Islands (CI), in particular, stand out. See Figure 3.  The biases they 
introduce are caused by FDI transfers to SPEs via both ‘round-tripping’, as well as the less 
frequently discussed, though equally serious problem of ‘onward-journeying’ (Sutherland & 
Ning, 2011). Round tripping takes place when, for example, a Chinese firm uses a tax haven, 
such as Hong Kong, BVI or CI, as a conduit for investment back into China.  In this way, 
investment coming from the tax haven to China is considered foreign direct investment in 
China and subsequently receives benefits such as tax holidays and discounted land, which are 
typically only available to foreign firms locating in China. This, subsequently, inflates outward 
(and inward) FDI data. Onward journeying uses a tax haven as a conduit for further investment 
in a third country.  This typically takes place to access capital markets and/or engage in 
transfer pricing strategies (Ning & Sutherland, 2012). Initial investments to SPEs in THOFCs 
may mistakenly be recorded as genuine, value adding activity, particularly in the case of 
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Chinese FDI to Hong Kong.  Investments made via SPEs to third countries, by contrast, are not 
recorded at all in official Chinese FDI data.  These ‘onward-journey’ investments, however, 
are significant in volume (Sutherland & Ning, 2011).   
Figure 3: Geographical composition of China’s outward FDI flows (as % of China’s total), 
2003-2010 
 
Source: MOFCOM, NBS, & SAFE (2008, 2011) 
 
 
Chinese firms’ regular use of SPEs create major problems in using FDI data to measure MNE 
activity in terms of identifying the ultimate geographical destination of FDI. Geographical 
composition biases are created in two ways.  First, initial Chinese FDI to an offshore SPE host 
(i.e. typically in Hong Kong, the BVI or CI) is incorporated in aggregate official FDI statistics.  
Second, FDI is often undertaken to third countries via a Chinese offshore SPE. 
Counting initial Chinese FDI to an offshore SPE will lead to an overestimation of genuine FDI 
(i.e. that associated with productive value adding MNE activities). Once these offshore 
vehicles are established, however, onward-journey FDI will not be recorded in the official FDI 
data of the ultimate beneficial owner’s source country (i.e. China), but rather the immediate 
FDI source (i.e. typically Hong Kong, BVI and CI) (OECD, 1996). This leads to underestimations 
of FDI to ultimate final destinations. These two counteracting investment streams lead to 
volume biases. 
According to official MOFCOM data Chinese FDI to Hong Kong, BVI and CI is significant. 
Between 2003 and 2010 on average around 80% of FDI flows were destined for one of these 
three tax havens.  This gives an indication as to seriousness of the impact of initial Chinese 
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FDI to an offshore SPE host being incorporated in official MOFCOM statistics. Accurate 
estimations on the destination and volume of Chinese FDI flowing from tax havens to third 
countries is not currently available. 
Given the geographical and volume biases inherent in official MOFCOM statistics, care must 
be taken when using both aggregate and firm-level FDI data as an indicator of the genuine 
FDI activities of MNEs (Beugelsdijk et al., 2010; OECD, 2008).  Although these problems are 
relatively well known, statisticians and empirical researchers do not seem to have developed 
consistent methods for handling SPEs.  China’s MOFCOM data, currently the most popular 
source for econometric studies on Chinese FDI, does not, therefore, seem to be a promising 
way of investigating the determinants of Chinese FDI. To date, however, most quantitative 
studies have looked at the country location determinants of Chinese FDI using this aggregated 
official FDI data. See Table 2. Surprisingly, most of these studies incorrectly include FDI to 
THOFCs, including FDI to Hong Kong, BVI and CI in their regression analyses. Huang and Wang 
(2011, p. 9), for example, include tax havens such as Hong Kong, BVI and CI. Duanmu (2012, 
p. appendix A.1), using a provincial level data source, also includes a number of offshore 
subsidiaries, as does Duanmu & Guney (2009) and, Zhang & Daly (2011). Armstrong (2011), 
the exception, acknowledges the problem but simply ignores the identified biases ‘as there 
are no more reliable sources’ (p. 28). 
Some studies on Chinese FDI include Chinese FDI to Hong Kong whilst excluding other THOFCs. 
This also is problematic as Hong Kong is a major OFC and an important location for Chinese 
MNEs to use SPEs. The few studies that use data collected at the firm-level, moreover, do not 
attempt to distinguish between what could be SPEs and real foreign subsidiaries. 
 
1.1.6.2 Geographic biases 
FDI to Hong Kong provides a dilemma for empirical studies on Chinese FDI. Hong Kong seems 
too large a recipient of Chinese FDI to be ignored entirely (accounting for around 60% of all 
Chinese FDI stock by 2010). Some FDI to Hong Kong, moreover, must also clearly be related 
to productive value adding MNE activities (i.e. market-seeking, efficiency-seeking and 
resource-seeking). At the same time, however, it is also a major OFC. Excluding CI and BVI but 
incorporating Hong Kong, therefore, makes little logical sense.  
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Buckley et al. (2007) is one of the earliest and widely accepted (around 775 citations at last 
count) empirical papers to include FDI to Hong Kong. They look at the period 1984 to 2001 
and test some of the ‘general principles of the theory of FDI’ (p. 500). It is surprising that the 
SPE problem and ‘round-tripping’, significant at this time (Fung, Yau, & Zhang, 2010), and its 
possible influence on their FDI data, is not discussed. It is not clear whether any of the 
approved FDI projects included within the study were located in other THOFCs (i.e. BVI and 
CI), as disaggregated data for the actual sample is not given. More recent studies also follow 
this precedent. C. Wang et al. (2012), for example, use more recent MOFCOM data (2006/7). 
They also do not discuss the treatment of FDI to THOFCs. Yet it is clear from their descriptive 
statistics that Hong Kong is again an important host country in their sample. Cheung & Qian 
(2009) also empirically investigate the determinants of Chinese FDI using country-specific 
approved FDI data. Again, they ‘…investigate the linkages between the Chinese overseas 
investment and the characteristics of its host countries’ so as to discover potential 
determinants (p. 319). They are aware ‘of the uncertainty about the quality of China’s ODI 
data’ (p. 336). Discussion of the tax haven issue, however, is still relegated to a sole footnote 
and Hong Kong remains included in their econometric analysis while three THOFCs– Bermuda, 
the Cayman Islands, and the BVI, are explicitly excluded.  A number of other papers also follow 
this strategy and in doing so fail to adequately justify Hong Kong’s inclusion as a host country 
for Chinese FDI (i.e. Hurst, 2011; Kang & Jiang, 2012).   
Matters are further confused by the recording of more than one activity in such SPEs. As well 
as ‘investment holding’ services, for example, a wide variety of other activities are also 
recorded as simultaneously being provided in these SPEs. The provision of consulting, 
marketing, management services and the holding of brands or patents that can be leased back 
to mainland subsidiaries, for example, are all commonly recorded in offshore SPEs. Extrawell 
Pharmaceutical (incorporated in CI, listed in Hong Kong), for example, develops, 
manufactures and sells pharmaceutical products, including commercial exploitation of 
genome related technology and oral insulin products (416 employees). Two professors from 
Fudan University founded and own 42% of the company. It has subsidiaries in the BVI holding 
‘gene invention rights’ (Extrawell Pharmaceutical Holdings Limited, 2011, p. 64). Guangzhou 
based Bawang Group (incorporated in CI, listed in Hong Kong in 2007) designs, manufactures, 
trades and distributes Chinese herbal products (3,390 employees). Bawang reports a Hong 
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Kong subsidiary involved in ‘investment holding’ as well as ‘trading of household and personal 
care products’ (BaWang International Group, 2011, p. 114). Similarly, China Agrotech 
(incorporated in the CI and listed in Hong Kong) manufactures and trades fertilizers, pesticides 
and other agricultural products (1,000 employees). It has an investment holding SPE in Hong 
Kong simultaneously undertaking ‘general trading and export’ (China Agrotech Holdings 
Limited, 2008, p. 71). Longcheer, a very successful privately owned mobile handset designer 
has a Hong Kong subsidiary registered as being involved in both ‘investment holding’ as well 
as ‘manufacturing’ (Longcheer Holdings Limited, 2012) . The above examples of the use of 
offshore companies serving multiple functions, though usually with strong biases towards 
services, makes it very difficult to know exactly how such MNE subsidiaries should be treated. 
Are they actually involved in any real business activities, be it service related or otherwise, or 
are they simply SPE shell companies created for other reasons, like avoiding tax and 
circumventing restrictive domestic regulations?
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Table 2: A sample of 19 statistical studies which incorrectly use official and firm-level FDI data sources to explore Chinese MNE FDI behaviours 
Name and year of Study 
Type of Data used in 
the empirical study 
Tax haven problem 
acknowledged and 
discussed? 
FDI to Hong 
Kong included 
FDI to other tax 
havens included in 
the study? 
Citations as 
of November 
2013 
Duanmu (2012) Province level No Yes BVI and Samoa 17 
Armstrong (2011) MOFCOM and OECD Yes Yes All havens included 4 
Huang & Wang (2011) MOFCOM No Yes All havens included 20 
Zhang & Daly (2011) MOFCOM No Yes All havens included 8 
Duanmu & Guney (2009) 
UN/ASEAN/Ministry of 
Finance Japan/BEA 
No Yes All havens included 20 
Lu, Liu, & Wang (2011) MOFCOM and ARIES No Yes Not clear 44 
Cheung & Qian (2009) MOFCOM Yes Yes No 109 
Cheng & Ma (2010) MOFCOM Yes Yes Yes/No 30 
Buckley et al. (2007) Approved FDI data Yes Yes Probably 703 
X. Liu, Buck, & Shu (2005) UNCTAD/MOFCOM Yes Yes Probably 140 
Kang & Jiang (2012) MOFCOM (FDI stock) No Yes No 25 
Hurst (2011) MOFCOM Yes Yes No 10 
Ramasamy, Yeung, & 
Laforet (2012) 
Firm-level data Briefly Yes Probably 64 
Yiu et al. (2007) Firm-level data No Yes Probably 210 
Cheng & Ma (2007) MOFCOM Yes No/ yes No/yes 77 
Kolstad & Wiig (2012) UNCTAD Yes No No 83 
Rodríguez & Bustillo (2011) OECD/National/ASEAN Yes No No 1 
C. Wang et al. (2012) MOFCOM and ARIES No Yes Probably 29 
Cui & Jiang (2012) MOFCOM No Yes Probably 31 
Source: See column one
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The minority of studies which use firm-level data (i.e. Ramasamy et al., 2012; Yiu et al., 2007) 
may potentially be able to disentangle SPE related FDI by excluding investments in and from SPEs, 
even though this is not always straightforward owing to the aforementioned common use of 
some companies for both SPE and non-SPE related purposes. However, there is no explicit 
mention or recognition of this problem within these studies. The high-levels of FDI to Hong Kong 
recorded in these studies, moreover, suggests the SPE problem exists but may have been 
overlooked. Yiu et al. (2007), for example, do not specify in their sample of Chinese MNEs 
whether SPEs are included as subsidiaries or not and do not discuss the issue. While Ramasamy 
et al. (2012) briefly note the tax haven problem, it is also not clear whether or not the data issues 
involved are completely eradicated. They claim their method allows them to ‘avoid the tax haven 
problem that has plagued other similar studies’ (Ramasamy et al., 2012, p. 18).  Yet in 
constructing their specifically designed dependent variable using company annual reports they 
clearly state that they include ‘any overseas investment’ (p. 22).  It is very unclear whether 
investment holding companies in Hong Kong (or other havens) would fall into this category, 
including SPEs dressed up as ‘services’ or other businesses. Hong Kong, moreover, must have 
been one of the host countries included in their count data, as they note that the 59 countries 
they included accounted for 80% of total outward investment in 2006-08 period (as reported by 
MOFCOM). Such a high proportion would not be possible if Hong Kong were excluded.  
 
1.1.6.3 Volume biases 
Reporting only immediate destination flows will almost certainly lead to positive volume biases 
to THOFCs and negative biases to non-THOFCs. Of the studies reviewed, only three seem to have 
correctly identified the geographical composition biases involved in using Chinese FDI data 
(Cheng & Ma, 2007; Kolstad & Wiig, 2012; Rodríguez & Bustillo, 2011). They all, however, still go 
on to model Chinese FDI, two using the same official data sources. Kolstad and Wiig (2012), for 
example, note the inherent secrecy of THOFCs and argue that the ‘nature and ultimate 
destinations of FDI flows are difficult to discern… For this reason, these flows likely reflect motives 
different from other FDI flows’ (p. 2). Their solution is to simply exclude FDI to all THOFCs in their 
econometric modelling.  Similarly, Cheng & Ma (2007) also acknowledge that Hong Kong should 
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be excluded: ‘Since FDI that goes into “tax havens” and “offshore financial centers” will typically 
be invested elsewhere, they are not the ultimate destination of the FDI’ (p. 11).  While an 
improvement on previous approaches, excluding THOFC FDI still does not adequately incorporate 
onward-journeying FDI undertaken via SPEs. As past studies have shown (i.e. Sutherland and Ning 
(2011)) this is of significant volume. Furthermore, there are also reasons for believing such 
‘onward-journey’ FDI is more strongly associated with private sector Chinese MNEs (Buckley et 
al., 2013; Clegg & Voss, 2011; Ning & Sutherland, 2012). As such, the exclusion of THOFCs when 
using official FDI data systematically excludes certain MNE activity. Rodríguez and Bustillo (2011) 
create their own data set for Chinese FDI. Again, it is not clear how they capture the significant 
volumes of Chinese FDI routed through SPEs in THOFCs, as the sources they draw from primarily 
use the OECD’s 3rd Edition Benchmark Definition of FDI standards. To its credit, this paper does 
seem to move in the positive direction of cross-analysis of data sources culminating in a 
seemingly more holistic dataset than past studies. Although these studies illustrate a marked 
improvement, for the aforementioned reasons, the approaches, and thus results, of all three of 
these studies should still be interpreted with caution due to volume biases. 
 
1.1.6.4 Examples of SPE and THOFC use 
On October 21st 2005, State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) issued its important 
Notice on Issues Related to the Administration of Foreign Exchange in Fund-raising and Round-
trip Investment Activities of Domestic Residents Conducted via Offshore Special Purpose 
Companies (commonly known as ‘Circular 75’). Effective on November 1, 2005, it superseded all 
previous rulings and was one of the first major attempts to clamp down on the use of THOFCs by 
Chinese business.  Circular 75 states that: 
 
PRC residents, which include both legal and natural persons, must register with the 
relevant SAFE branches with respect to their overseas investments in offshore companies 
if they use assets or equity interests in their PRC entities as capital contributions to 
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establish offshore companies or inject assets or equity interests of their PRC entities into 
offshore companies to raise capital overseas.4 
(Mingfa Group International, 2009, p. 24) 
The injection of onshore assets, including equity transfers to offshore SPEs in reverse 
investments, following OECD/IMF guidelines, constitutes outward FDI (OECD, 1996). Circular 75, 
moreover, as it is retrospective, means that all Chinese businesses listed outside the PRC prior to 
October 2005 must refer to the potential impacts of Circular 75 on their businesses in their annual 
reports and/or IPO prospectuses.  Mindray Medical International (MMI) is a typical example.  
MMI is a CI incorporated listing vehicle. It owns four further SPEs, including two in the BVI and 
two in Hong Kong. According to its annual report:  
To enable us to raise equity capital from investors outside of China, we set up a holding 
company structure by establishing our current holding company, Mindray International 
[CI], on June 10, 2005…. Mindray International became our holding company in 
September 2005 when the majority of our existing shareholders transferred, through a 
series of linked transactions, approximately 91.1% of the equity of Shenzhen Mindray to 
Mindray International. In April 2006 we acquired approximately 8.9% of the equity in 
Shenzhen Mindray with the result that our holding company owns approximately 99.9% 
of the equity of Shenzhen Mindray. In May 2006, we changed our name to Mindray 
Medical International Limited. 
(Mindray Medical International Limited, 2011, p. 23) 
MMI illustrates how FDI to the CI, one of the important triad THOFCs already identified, may take 
place. Other examples illustrate how such asset injections and equity transfers to Hong Kong and 
the BVI also take place. 
Another typical case is China Mingfa. It is a large Chinese property developer (of commercial, 
residential and hotel properties) listed in Hong Kong and illustrates FDI to a holding company 
based in Hong Kong.  According to its IPO prospectus, in 2006 it injected the assets of its seven 
PRC subsidiaries valued at RMB 134.6 million into a Hong Kong incorporated investment holding 
company(Mingfa Group International, 2009). China Sunergy, a final example, is a producer of 
solar panels and modules based in Nanjing (2,870 employees). Its major shareholder and founder 
                                                            
4 The annual reports of many Chinese MNEs using tax havens explicitly refer to this circular, often repeating the 
wording reported here.  
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is a Chinese entrepreneur, Lu Tingxiu (owning 28.9% of its shares). It is one of the earliest solar 
cell manufacturers in China (dating to 2004) and now has joint ventures in Turkey and sales 
offices in Mumbai, Rome and Tokyo and Germany, France and Italy (China Sunergy, 2011). It is 
technically, however, a foreign invested company. An investment holding company was 
incorporated in the Cayman Islands prior to its IPO on NASDAQ in 2007.   It undertook its initial 
equity transfer from China to a BVI incorporated investment holding SPE:  
Our operating subsidiary, Sunergy Nanjing, was incorporated in August 2004 in Nanjing, 
China. China Sunergy Co., Ltd., or Sunergy BVI, our holding company incorporated in the 
British Virgin Islands, acquired all of the equity interests in Sunergy Nanjing in April 2006 
through a series of transactions that we have accounted for as a legal reorganization. As 
part of a restructuring in anticipation of our initial public offering, we incorporated China 
Sunergy Co., Ltd., or Sunergy, in the CI on August 4, 2006. Sunergy became our ultimate 
holding company upon its issuance of shares to the existing shareholders of Sunergy BVI 
on August 30, 2006 in exchange for all shares of equivalent classes that these 
shareholders previously held in Sunergy BVI. In December 2007, Sunergy BVI incorporated 
China Sunergy (Hong Kong) Co. Limited., or Sunergy Hong Kong, in Hong Kong. During the 
same month, Sunergy BVI transferred all of the equity interests in Sunergy Nanjing to 
Sunergy Hong Kong, which became the direct holding company of Sunergy Nanjing. We 
conduct substantially all of our operations through Sunergy Nanjing. 
(China Sunergy, 2011, p. 33) 
China Sunergy illustrates again the typical complex use of tax havens by Chinese MNEs.  These 
three examples illustrate how SPEs in the triad of Hong Kong, BVI and the CI are used to receive 
Chinese FDI and also hold and invest in other foreign subsidiaries. 
Many academic studies address the question of what Chinese MNEs are hoping to achieve by 
investing overseas. The majority of these studies, however, are based on FDI data which are 
methodologically questionable for accomplishing this goal.  It is surprising and difficult to explain 
why the burgeoning empirical literature on FDI from Chinese MNEs has yet to acknowledge or 
adequately deal with these methodological issues. Indeed, ‘Although many studies have relied 
on them, FDI stocks do not adequately measure the value-adding activity of MNE affiliates in a 
host country, nor do FDI flows accurately measure changes in such activity’ (Beugelsdijk et al., 
2010, p. 1445). 
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1.2 Research agenda 
Three main factors motivate this research project. First, Chinese MNEs may be qualitatively 
different from traditional, predominantly Western, MNEs in their internationalisation motivation 
and paths.  Traditional frameworks and internationalisation path theories, therefore, may not be 
applicable or otherwise require extension in the case of Chinese FDI (Mathews, 2006). Second, 
from a practical perspective, Chinese FDI is growing rapidly in global importance.  As of 2012, for 
example, Chinese FDI flows outpaced every individual country from Europe (UNCTAD, 2013a).  
Third, salient attributes and behaviours of Chinese MNEs are not clearly understood.  Some have 
argued, for example, official (i.e. OECD, IMF, World Bank, MOFCOM, etc.) methods of  FDI 
statistical reporting may not adequately capture the value-adding nature of cross-border 
investments, and thus should be used with caution (Beugelsdijk et al., 2010; Kedia et al., 2012; 
Ning & Sutherland, 2012; Sutherland & Ning, 2011). 
This PhD thesis includes three papers (Chapters 2, 3 and 4, respectively) which each constitute 
significant, but distinct, contributions to the International Business field generally and the topic 
of Chinese FDI specifically.  I seek to candidly address the three aforementioned motivating 
factors in the first paper (Chapter 2).  I do this through the analysis of Chinese FDI in the United 
States.  More specifically, the strategic asset-seeking behaviour of Chinese MNEs in the US is 
empirically tested. 
In this paper, I first address the growing theoretical literature on EM MNEs which argues they use 
aggressive acquisitions, often to psychically distant, developed host countries, to obtain the 
strategic assets that they themselves lack.  I argue the use of acquisitions as the dominant entry 
mode for strategic asset seeking, therefore, stands at heart of current EM MNE theorizing. To 
date, however, systematic empirical testing of the motivations for different entry modes by EM 
MNEs is limited.  This gap is explored through the analysis of the motivations for greenfield and 
acquisition modes of entry. Results from this section are broadly supportive of the growing 
theoretical literature on EM MNEs, arguing acquisitions are the primary mode of strategic asset 
seeking in developed markets. 
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The second paper in this thesis builds upon these findings.  Although Chinese MNE FDI does seem 
to engage in strategic asset-seeking behaviour through the acquisition mode of entry in 
developed countries, such as the US, the outcomes from such acquisitions are not discussed to 
any significant degree in the literature.  The extent to which Chinese firms are able to absorb and 
productively harness the intangible strategic assets of their developed market acquisitions, 
therefore, is currently poorly understood. I tailor event study methodologies, often used in 
finance, to analyse trends in the pre and post-acquisition patent applications of Chinese MNEs 
that acquire strategic-asset rich developed market businesses in Japan, the US and Europe. Both 
domestic (Chinese) and target (host) country patent applications are considered to explore 
whether Chinese MNEs are capable of absorbing strategic-assets for the purpose of developing 
their own long-term innovative capability or, rather, whether they use such acquisitions primarily 
for domestic market exploitation.  In doing so this work casts further light on the question of 
whether such Chinese MNEs use FDI to develop firm-specific-advantages or not, and thus 
whether new theories are also required. While I find no significant results for target country 
patent applications, domestic (Chinese market) patents do rise significantly in the wake of 
acquiring an innovative firm from Japan, the US or Europe. This strongly suggests technological 
transfer from acquired to domestic subsidiaries and a form of ‘technological looting’, as opposed 
to long-term capacity building, in Chinese MNEs when they acquire developed market 
businesses. This finding is consistent with Hennart's (2012) ‘bundling model’, which directly 
challenges a basic tenet of the OLI paradigm, that ‘locational’ advantages are available to all. 
The third paper switches gears to a certain extent to give the thesis a more holistic perspective.  
This section takes the perspective of the host country in discussing how to generate FDI from 
China.  Developed host economies are eager to stimulate growth through various mediums, such 
as FDI.  Historically, the overwhelming majority of FDI source countries were developed 
economies.  This mandated developed economy FDI generation initiatives be directed toward 
other developed countries. The rising importance of EMs as sources of FDI has necessitated a 
shift in developed economy FDI generation strategy.  A major component of this strategy consists 
of shifting investment promotion agencies, or otherwise expanding their geographic scope, to 
include EM source countries.  Past studies investigate FDI between developed economies and are 
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highly inconclusive on the efficacy of IPAs in generating FDI.  The inconclusive results of past 
studies may be due to relatively low levels of psychic distance, and in turn LOF, between 
developed economies, thus, degrading the value/usefulness of the presence of an IPA.  Emerging 
and developed economies, however, have relatively high levels of psychic distance. Thus, Chinese 
MNEs face significantly higher transaction costs, due to LOF, when investing in developed 
economies compared to their developed economy counterparts. The question of how to mitigate 
the added costs Chinese MNEs face when expanding into developed economies is, therefore, an 
important question for both investing firms and the host economy.  The efficacy of developed 
economy IPAs in generating Chinese FDI presents a suitable lens with which to investigate this 
question. For methodological reasons, I choose to investigate the efficacy of Canadian provincial-
level IPAs in generating FDI from China.  Findings suggest the presence of an IPA is a significant 
and positive determinant for Chinese FDI in Canada. 
The agenda for the rest of this thesis is as follows.  First, I investigate entry mode and strategic 
asset seeking behaviour of Chinese MNEs in the United States.  Second, the outcome of Chinese 
MNE strategic asset seeking acquisitions in developed economies is analysed.  Third, the efficacy 
of provincial-level Canadian IPAs in generating FDI from China is examined.  This is followed by a 
conclusion which discusses the how my aggregated findings contribute to current International 
Business theorization and managerial practice.  
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2. Chinese MNEs, Foreign Establishment Mode and Strategic Asset 
Seeking 
2.1 Introduction 
Much debate has ensued as to the applicability of standard conceptual models of the MNE to EM 
MNEs (Buckley et al., 2009; Stephen Chen & Tan, 2012; Luo & Tung, 2007; Mathews, 2006; Rui & 
Yip, 2008; Yiu et al., 2007). One of the main questions in this debate is whether asset augmenting 
strategies, as opposed to exploitation strategies, are common in EM MNEs (Buckley et al., 2007; 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012; Deng, 2012; Hennart, 2012; C. Wang et al., 2012). The argument that EM 
MNEs have an ‘asset augmentation’ approach to FDI, involving strategic asset seeking behaviour, 
has gained considerable traction within EM MNE specific theories (Deng, 2012; Luo & Rui, 2009; 
Luo & Tung, 2007; Wei, 2010).  Many now argue that MNEs from emerging marks such as China 
warrant the extension of MNE theoretical frameworks to accommodate their investment 
behaviour (Cui & Jiang, 2012). Chinese MNEs, for example, have been identified as being strongly 
driven by aggressive acquisitions, predominantly in developed markets, in their pursuit of 
strategic assets (Kedia et al., 2012; Luo & Tung, 2007; Sun et al., 2012).  
This chapter contributes to earlier research on EM MNEs by looking specifically at the motivations 
for the use of different entry modes by Chinese MNEs, focusing particularly on those between 
greenfield and acquisition foreign establishment modes. As single home and single host country 
studies are most suited for exploring firm-level entry mode motivations (i.e. greenfield versus 
acquisition) (Slangen & Hennart, 2007), for methodological reasons, which I discuss later, I focus 
exclusively on FDI from a single large emerging market, China, to a single large developed market, 
the United States. The findings, while not necessarily surprising, do indeed show systematic 
differences in SAS behaviour as disaggregated by entry mode, ownership and period of 
observation. Chinese MNEs, particularly private ones, do use aggressive acquisitions rather than 
greenfield FDI to rapidly acquire strategic assets in the US. The results are therefore somewhat 
supportive of the widely expressed view that Chinese MNEs specifically use acquisitions to rapidly 
acquire the strategic assets that they themselves lack (Deng, 2009; Hennart, 2012; Luo & Tung, 
2007), which in turn has been used to question whether the OLI model is suitable for explaining 
Chinese MNE expansion (Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Luo & Tung, 2007).  
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First, I review relevant literature, from which I formulate hypotheses.  The data and empirical 
models are then explained and results reported. This is followed by discussion of theoretical and 
managerial implications. 
 
2.2 Literature review and hypotheses 
2.2.1 Strategic asset-seeking and entry mode 
In a recent critical review of the literature on foreign establishment/entry mode it was noted that 
the ‘choice of foreign entry mode is one of the core topics in international management research’ 
(Slangen & Hennart, 2007, p. 404).  To date, the majority of such studies have focused on the 
decision to undertake joint ventures or wholly owned operations (Brouthers & Hennart, 2007). 
Those on the choice between greenfield and acquisition entry mode, however, are also not 
uncommon. Slangen & Hennart (2007), for example, recently identified 23 empirical studies 
exploring the determinants of the choice between greenfield and acquisition entry mode.  None 
of these 23 studies, however, involved what could be considered emerging market economies.5   
Instead, for example, they looked at the likes of Swedish, Finnish, British and Dutch MNEs. To 
date, therefore, empirical study of the motivations for greenfield or acquisition entry modes for 
EM MNEs has still received limited attention. This is of interest, however, because at a conceptual 
level quite strong predictions have been made about the use of specific entry modes by EM 
MNEs.  As ‘latecomers’ requiring aggressive ‘springboard’ strategies to rapidly catch-up, it is often 
argued EM MNEs use acquisitions to psychically distant developed markets to acquire the 
‘strategic assets’ they themselves lack (Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Deng, 2009; Luo & Tung, 2007; 
Mathews, 2006). Strategic asset-seeking therefore involves augmenting areas of perceived 
competitive disadvantage through the acquisition of a variety of intangible and other assets, such 
as brand names, technologies or managerial competency (Dunning, 2009; Mathews, 2006; Sun 
et al., 2012). These outward FDI (OFDI) strategies, moreover, are often thought to be different to 
those found in advanced market MNEs, which are considered to rely more upon exploiting 
                                                            
5 Indeed, to my knowledge only Cui and Jiang (2009) have touched upon EM MNE entry mode choice. They do so, 
however, primarily from the perspective of the choice between joint venture or wholly owned subsidiary. 
  
 
46
existing ownership advantages (Luo & Tung, 2007, p. 485). EM MNEs, which are thought in many 
cases to lack such capabilities (Luo & Tung, 2007; Rui & Yip, 2008), are also prepared to make 
high risk investments to markets typified by large psychic distances (i.e. developed markets). 
They are thought to do so, moreover, very rapidly (i.e. predominantly via acquisition) (Luo & 
Tung, 2007; Mathews, 2006; Yiu et al., 2007).  
Such strategies, it is believed, are distinct from incremental process models of 
internationalization (c. f. Johanson & Vahlne, 1977, 2009), in so far as they consider the 
accelerated pace of internationalization as a central component (Luo & Tung, 2007, p. 490). Child 
& Rodrigues (2005), among the first to popularize this idea, for example, stress that in 
internalizing strategic assets via FDI ‘acquisition provides a fast route’ for Chinese MNEs (p. 392) 
(emphasis added). Kedia et al. (2012), in a review article that conceptually explores EM MNEs 
location and entry mode choice, make a similar point: ‘EMNEs are often latecomers to the 
industry in which they compete, forcing them into accelerated internationalization with the 
explicit goal of gaining access to assets, resources, or capabilities not found in their home market 
(Mathews 2002)’ (p. 158) (emphasis added).  Following from this, it is argued ‘EMNEs will try to 
overcome their latecomer disadvantage through aggressive, proactive and risk-taking 
acquisitions’ (Kedia et al., 2012, p. 159) (emphasis added).  In contrast to conventional process 
theory, therefore, which argues a firm's involvement in international markets occurs in stages 
(from exports, for example, to sales subsidiaries and eventually manufacturing), a commonly held 
view is that EM MNEs, as latecomers to global competition, ‘need to accelerate their pace of 
internationalization so as to catch up with that of incumbents’ (Luo & Tung, 2007, p. 490) 
(emphasis added). When investing in developed countries it is generally argued that EM MNEs 
‘overwhelmingly look to rapidly catch-up via aggressive acquisitions' (Luo & Tung, 2007, p. 485). 
These ideas, of course, are considered somewhat radical, as they challenge the widely accepted 
OLI paradigm and its premise that firms should be endowed with some kind of ownership 
advantages before engaging in foreign internalization activity via FDI.  
EM MNEs can and do, of course, also acquire strategic assets from developed markets via 
greenfield investments.  The physical location of a firm, for example, can influence managerial 
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competency via knowledge spillovers (Jing Li et al., 2013). These take place when competencies 
such as manufacturing practices, R&D ideas, and management techniques are transferred 
between firms usually in close physical proximity (Branstetter, 2006; Giroud & Scott-Kennel, 
2009; Halvorsen, 2012; Jaffe et al., 1993).  While highly competitive firms (i.e. with the best 
technology, human capital, supply chains and the like) will gain little from joining a cluster and 
may even suffer as technology and employees spill over to competitors (Jing Li et al., 2009; Shaver 
& Flyer, 2000), less competitive firms and those lacking ownership advantages (i.e. EM MNEs) 
may gain by joining a geographic cluster (where innovation tends to thrive). It has been 
emphasized, however, that ‘EMNE specific perspectives suggest that EMNEs differ from 
traditional MNEs in one key respect: the accelerated pace of EMNE internationalization’ (Kedia 
et al., 2012, p. 159) (emphasis added).6  So while Chinese MNEs could conceivably also use 
greenfield investments to target strategic assets, current EM MNE thinking generally discounts 
this possibility as the main way of seeking strategic assets, stressing the relatively slower 
processes of capturing spillovers from technological clusters makes them comparatively 
unattractive for firms looking to ‘springboard’ their way to success (Luo & Tung, 2007). Indeed, 
greenfield investment strategies are often thought to indicate an organization has decided to 
take aspects of its tacit and explicit knowledge, corporate culture, and physical property to the 
host economy, indicating the pre-existence of its own firm specific ownership advantages 
(Hennart & Park, 1993; Huallacháin & Reidb, 1997).  
At a conceptual level the choice between acquisition or greenfield entry mode for Chinese MNEs 
is undoubtedly of central importance in current theoretical discussion of Chinese MNEs’ FDI 
strategies (Kedia et al., 2012). If it was to be shown empirically, for example, that strategic asset 
seeking was more commonly associated with greenfield FDI than acquisition entry mode, it would 
bring into question some fundamental assumptions and arguments made in much of the EM MNE 
literature.  Similarly, if it was to be shown that there was a greater propensity to use acquisitions 
                                                            
6 Sun et al. (2012), for example, who also place entry mode at the centre of their theory of EM MNEs, also note MNEs 
from China and India exhibit ‘a more aggressive global strategy in cross-border M&A’s than before’ and further that 
international M&A is the ‘primary mode of internationalization’ for Chinese and Indian MNEs (p. 5). Similarly, it has 
also been argued that learning can be achieved through repetition of linkage and leverage (Mathews, 2006) but such 
learning processes are generally slow. Hence, it is argued, ‘EM MNEs often aggressively acquire knowledge through 
more risk-taking acquisitions instead of traditional partnerships’ (Luo & Rui, 2009, p. 52). 
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rather than greenfield FDI to acquire strategic assets, it would provide support for the growing 
body of work arguing Chinese MNEs are indeed strategic asset seekers, which rush to make-up 
for their lack of firm specific ownership advantages via FDI to developed markets, where such 
assets are believed to be most abundant.  
Hypothesis 1: Chinese MNEs have a greater propensity to use acquisitions as opposed 
to greenfield FDI when acquiring strategic-assets in developed markets.  
 
2.2.2 Strategic asset seeking and entry mode: temporal considerations 
Another quite widely held view in the EM MNE literature is that the global financial crisis has 
facilitated the strategic asset seeking ambitions of EM MNEs (Luo et al., 2010; X. Yang & 
Stoltenberg, 2014). The financial crisis created a prolonged downturn in developed markets and 
a collapse in the valuations of many western based MNEs. This, it is suggested, is ‘triggering a 
new wave of organisational restructuring for western companies which urgently need capital to 
fund their operations' (Luo et al., 2010, p. 77). This, in turn, 'generates more opportunities than 
before for EMEs to venture abroad through mergers and acquisitions’ (ibid). Further accentuating 
the increased propensity of EM MNEs to asset seek via acquisitions in the post crisis period, it is 
argued, was the preferred mode of entry in the pre-crisis period, which was greenfield FDI.  
Historically, it is argued, FDI by EM MNEs has ‘taken the form of greenfield investment for the 
most part, while developed country MNEs have relied more on M&As' (McAllister & Sauvant, 
2013, p. 30).  The financial crisis, however, has caused a collapse in valuations of many Western 
firms and capital availability subsequently became very tight. This, in turn, caused the rapid 
decline in M&A activity by Western MNEs.  The opposite seems to have been true for EM MNES, 
partly because of their pre-crisis behaviours, as noted below: 
   
Emerging market MNEs, especially relatively young firms, have not enjoyed the same 
access to international capital markets, and they and their OFDI activities consequently 
suffered less (during the financial crisis). In those instances in which emerging market 
MNEs do engage in cross-border M&As, they are more likely to pay for them in cash 
rather than in shares (World Bank, 2011: 83-84), a decision linked to the ownership 
nature of these firms and the limitations of their domestic capital markets. Emerging 
market firms are more likely to be family or state-controlled entities that seek to avoid 
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any dilution of their control and so prefer to pay for acquisitions in cash (ibid., Resende 
et al., 2010). 
(McAllister & Sauvant, 2013, p. 30) 
This behaviour has not gone unnoticed by policy makers in large developed economies such as 
the US. The U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission, for example, recently published 
a report arguing ‘As a consequence of the global financial crisis, China has taken advantage of 
lowered prices on overseas investment opportunities to extend its global reach’ (Salidjanova, 
2011, p. 25). It has been argued further government support in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis aided in the purchase of distressed or otherwise undervalued developed economy firms, 
especially in the area of intangible strategic assets and natural resources (Luo et al., 2010; 
Salidjanova, 2011; X. Yang & Stoltenberg, 2014). Rui & Yip (2008) accurately portray this 
behaviour as Chinese firms’ ‘strategic intent’. They argue Chinese firms engage in strategic asset 
seeking behaviour via cross-border acquisitions primarily due to strong institutional support 
coupled with a strategic desire to catch-up with incumbent firms with, for example, advanced 
technology and managerial competency. More specifically, they note, 
Chinese firms strategically use cross-border merger and acquisitions (M&As) to achieve 
specific goals, such as acquiring strategic capabilities to offset their competitive 
weaknesses and leveraging their unique ownership advantages, while making use of 
institutional incentives and minimizing institutional constraints. 
(Rui & Yip, 2008, p. 214) 
The nature of the prudent pre-crisis behaviour shown by EM MNEs coupled with pointed 
governmental support policies has put them in a strong position to undertake aggressive 
acquisitions in the post crisis period (Beule & Bulcke, 2012; X. Yang & Stoltenberg, 2014). The 
systematic shock caused by the onset of the global financial crisis can therefore be seen as a 
naturally occurring structural break, after which the propensity to engage in aggressive asset 
seeking acquisitions by Chinese MNEs should have intensified. To further explore entry mode 
considerations I therefore consider whether the acquisition entry mode for the purposes of 
strategic asset seeking has intensified in the post-crisis period.  
Hypothesis 2: The propensity of EM MNEs to engage in strategic asset acquisitions in 
developed markets increased after the global financial crisis. 
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2.2.3 Psychic distance, strategic asset seeking and entry mode 
A further hypothesis, building from the EM MNE literature, concerns psychic distance, entry 
mode and their relation to strategic asset seeking considerations. As noted, the aggressive asset 
augmentation strategies of EM MNEs, it is argued, means the stages/process model of 
investment is no longer as relevant (Luo & Tung, 2007; Mathews, 2006). The stages model of 
development places greater emphasis on learning and networks than strategic asset seeking. Luo 
& Tung (2007) assert that ‘EM MNEs are at present much less path dependent (i.e. ethnic network 
is no longer the key) and much more risk-taking (i.e. though aggressive acquisitions and mergers) 
than “third-world” multinationals in the 1980s’ (p. 485). They further argue that EM MNEs, as a 
result of their aggressive acquisitions, have: 
a lower dependence on ethnic ties… With  the  exception  of  some  niche  entrepreneurs  
who  prefer  locations  with  strong  ethnic  networks,  many  EM MNEs  may  not  be  path  
dependent  on  ethnic  ties…to  become  global  players,  they  have  to  'spring- board'  
faster  and  be  more  aggressive  in  their  attempt  to  leapfrog  from  their  late  entrant  
position.  
(ibid) 
A further hypothesis, building from this observation, and my first two hypotheses, can therefore 
be built around the need of Chinese MNEs to use existing ethnic networks when undertaking FDI. 
Not only do acquisitions involve entry into markets with greater psychic distance, they are also 
likely, when compared to greenfield FDI, to be motivated less by ethnic ties. Greenfield FDI, as 
noted earlier, is generally thought to indicate an organization has decided to take aspects of its 
tacit and explicit knowledge, corporate culture, and physical property to the host economy. It 
therefore already has its own firm specific ownership advantages (Hennart & Park, 1993; 
Huallacháin & Reidb, 1997). The motives for greenfield FDI are therefore considered less likely to 
be related to asset seeking (i.e. hypothesis 1) and in turn more likely to involve the use of ethnic 
networks and a stages approach, as such FDI is more likely driven by conventional motives, such 
as market seeking.  
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Hypothesis 3:  Chinese MNE acquisitions in developed markets have a lower propensity 
to be influenced by ethnic ties than greenfield FDI.  
 
 
2.2.4 Entry mode and domestic market institutions 
My fourth hypothesis related to Chinese MNE entry mode preferences relates to the idiosyncratic 
nature of domestic markets that is often alluded to in the EM MNE literature. It is frequently 
argued Chinese MNEs are strongly influenced by their domestic market institutions and this, in 
turn, is what makes their OFDI strategies different to those of developed market MNEs (Buckley 
et al., 2007; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012; Hennart, 2012; Kedia et al., 2012). Hennart (2012), for 
example, thinking along these lines, argues that the location advantages of emerging markets are 
not equally accessible by all MNEs. He argues assumptions about the ‘L’ in the ‘OLI’ model, 
therefore, should be questioned for the case of Chinese MNEs. Preferred access by Chinese MNEs 
to what are labelled ‘complementary local resources’, provided by domestic governments, for 
example, may allow them to benefit from domestic market rents. This in turn shapes their OFDI 
strategies, which are to some extent subsidized by this preferential access to local resources 
(Hennart, 2012). 
Extending this line of reasoning, some have argued it is particularly those MNEs with closer 
affiliation to the state (and access to local resources) that are encouraged to internationalize by 
their home country governments, which have active industrial policies to promote their nascent 
MNEs (Cui & Jiang, 2012; Deng, 2009; Luo et al., 2010; C. Wang et al., 2012).  These state 
interventions, moreover, are thought to provide support for strategic asset acquisition (Luo & 
Tung, 2007; Mathews, 2006). Supportive measures include such things as discounted loans, low 
expatriate insurance premiums, tax credits, investment information and streamlined application 
procedures, all of which reduce the real and perceived risks of expanding abroad (Buckley et al., 
2007; Luo et al., 2010; Sun, Peng, Lee, & Tan, 2014). According to Cui & Jiang (2012), for example, 
state owned MNEs bow to home country regulatory and normative pressures, which ‘induces 
isomorphic pressure on firms to follow the practices that have been historically approved by the 
government’ (p. 269). State owned firms are also 'resource dependent on their home country 
governments, which hinders their ability and willingness to “influence or challenge” home 
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institutions’ (Cui & Jiang, 2012, p. 265). Moreover, as they are ‘a part of the home-country 
institutions, SOEs may carry non-commercial objectives driven by the political interests of the 
state (Cui & Jiang, 2012, p. 268). This includes channelling ‘technological resources’ back to the 
home country (ibid). Luo & Tung (2007) and others (Deng, 2009; Lu et al., 2011; C. Wang et al., 
2012) echo this view, noting that the asset seeking behaviours of EM MNEs are supported ‘by 
several critical forces, including: home government support for going global’ (p. 491). Some argue 
preference is also given to high profile acquisitions and prestige projects, which can build national 
pride (Morck et al., 2008). A further refinement of this argument takes account of the 
heterogeneity among different state actors, including the government level (C. Wang et al., 
2012). Nonetheless, this viewpoint still argues that strong coercive pressures ‘increase (EM 
MNEs) willingness to invest in developed countries, where they can innovate and address 
competitive disadvantages. Such location choices are in line with the central government’s aim 
to access foreign technology, generate spillovers at home and nurture indigenous global 
champions  (Cui & Jiang, 2012; Liu, Wang, & Wei, 2009)’ (C. Wang et al., 2012, p. 663) (emphasis 
added).  More specifically, it is often argued SOEs are embedded and part of the domestic Chinese 
institutional fabric and owing to their resource dependency upon the state, that they are likely 
to follow state policy: ‘the government attempts to direct outward FDI to acquire foreign 
technology’ (Cui & Jiang, 2012, p. 268) (emphasis added). For these reasons, in my empirical 
models I use state ownership as a proxy for greater access to domestic institutional supports.  
Hypothesis 4:  Chinese MNEs that are recipients of home country institutional support 
have a greater propensity to engage in strategic asset acquisitions than those that are not 
recipients.  
 
 
2.3 Data and methodology 
There are now numerous empirical studies exploring the location choice of Chinese OFDI using 
international panel data (for example, Buckley et al., 2007; Duanmu, 2012; Kolstad & Wiig, 2012; 
Ramasamy et al., 2012). None of these, however, disaggregates their findings by greenfield and 
acquisition entry mode, making it difficult to use them to explore my current hypotheses. Even if 
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they did, moreover, because these studies use international panel data, there would be 
reservations about the reliability of their findings for commenting on entry mode. This is because, 
as Slangen & Hennart (2007) point out in their recent critical review of the foreign establishment 
mode literature, scholars interested in parent, subsidiary or industry-level determinants of an 
MNE's establishment mode must ‘analyze samples of entries by MNE parents from a single home 
country into a single host country’ (p. 424) (emphasis added). This is because the single country 
research design does not require controls for home and host-country effects, including ‘hard-to 
measure host-country acquisition barriers’ (ibid). Indeed, using numerous host countries, they 
argue, makes controlling for acquisition barriers (i.e. governmental restrictions on acquisitions, 
for example) ‘insuperable’ (p. 425). Such host country acquisition barriers, moreover, are likely 
to be important in the case of inward investment from Chinese MNEs to developed countries, 
which can be politically sensitive. In the case of Chinese outward FDI, for example, which is the 
focus of my empirical analysis, such restrictions are likely to be important. Countries exhibit a 
wide range of reactions (He & Lyles, 2008), from passive acceptance to vehement opposition, to 
China’s support for its MNEs, particularly state owned enterprises (Yao, Sutherland, & Chen, 
2010).  To account for these hard to control for home and host country effects, I therefore focus 
on one host and one source country (the US and China, respectively).  China is a suitable country 
to use for outward FDI as it is the largest source of emerging market OFDI (UNCTAD, 2013c) and 
its MNEs are often discussed in the context of strategic asset seeking (Deng, 2012).  
The US is selected as the host country for three reasons. Firstly, it is the largest developed market 
in the world and is widely accepted as the most important source of intangible strategic assets. 
At the beginning of the period of study (2003), for example, the US (with 192) was home to more 
Fortune Global 500 companies than either Europe (162) or Japan (88) (Fortune Magizine, 2004).  
Likewise, residents of the US have been granted more patents than any other country in the 
world. The cumulative number of patents granted during the period of study, 2003-2011, in the 
US (1,577,425), for instance, was more than either Japan (1,507,326) or Europe (1,404,252) 
(WIPO, 2012). Research and Development expenditures in the US also far outpaced the rest of 
world with spending of $291.30 billion in 2003 compared to the EU ($210.12 billion) and the Asia-
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107 ($215.98 billion) (National Science Foundation, 2011).  Furthermore, by some measures the 
US has been found to have a larger share of the world's top universities (research and/or teaching 
intensive) than Europe and Japan combined.  In fact, in some years, the US is reported to have 
over half of world's top 100 universities (Times Higher Education, 2012).  In short, it has an 
abundance of strategic assets, including globally recognized brands, management know how and 
a wealth of other intangible assets Chinese MNEs are thought to target while asset seeking.  
Secondly, the global financial crisis originated in the US and has had a significant impact on many 
company valuations. For example, the New York Stock Exchange Composite Index went from 
levels over 10,000 at several points in 2007 to lows of less than 4,200 in 2009 (NYSE, 2012). It 
therefore provides a naturally occurring break with which to explore impacts on entry mode and 
strategic asset seeking behaviours in Chinese MNEs. Chinese FDI to the US, for example, 
increased significantly after the global financial crisis. More specifically, the total number of 
Chinese FDI deals in the US has averaged a nearly 23% year-on-year growth rate from 2003 to 
2011 (see Figure 4), but after 2008 it grew at an accelerated over 28%. This post-financial crisis 
growth trend is further magnified in the case of Chinese acquisition activity which boasted year-
on-year growth rates of nearly 35% from 2008-2011 compared with around 19% in the pre-crisis 
period. 
                                                            
7 The Asia-10 consist of China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and 
Thailand. 
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Figure 4: Number of Chinese investment deals in the United States from 2003-2011 
 
  Source: Author’s data 
 
Thirdly, Chinese FDI data in the US is comparatively reliable and detailed. The dependent variable 
data, as a result, is able to account for the use of tax havens and offshore financial centres as 
intermediaries for subsequent FDI into the US (as discussed in chapter 1, section .  In this way, 
ultimate beneficiary ownership, as defined by the OECD’s most current benchmark definition of 
FDI, is used (OECD, 2008).  This is in contrast to much of the current Chinese location choice 
literature, as discussed in chapter one, sections 1.1.6; 1.1.6.1; 1.1.6.2; 1.1.6.3. 
 
2.3.1 Dependent and independent variables 
As it is advantageous to use sub-national level data, because of hard to control for home and host 
country effects, the unit of analysis in this study is the US state, not individual countries as in 
most previous empirical studies. The US offers adequate heterogeneity in its state-level 
economies and good availability of data across state borders. For my dependent variable, I use 
count data to explore differences in motivations and determinants of Chinese investment in a 
given state. Count data have been commonly used in past location choice studies (i.e. Coughlin, 
2012; Ramasamy et al., 2012; Zhou, Delios, & Yang, 2002). By using count data all observations, 
regardless of the size of the investment, are weighted equally. Theoretically, it has been argued, 
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this gives a balanced and holistic view of investments (Ramasamy et al., 2012). I further 
disaggregate my data set by mode of entry (greenfield and acquisition) and ownership structure 
(private and state owned).  Finally, I also investigate temporal effects on investment propensity 
by breaking down my data set into pre and post global financial crisis periods.  
The dependent variable data set is based on commercial databases, including Thomson ONE and 
the Financial Times fDi Markets Database, the Rhodium Group’s China Investment Monitor, 
contact with state investment offices, and companies’ annual reports. As the dependent variable 
dataset was cross referenced against several data sources, it is subsequently believed to 
comprise the majority of non-real estate greenfield and acquisition transactions, following the 
normal 10% ownership threshold for acquisition investment, and minimum values of around 
$500,000 for greenfield investment. From 2003-2011 there were 333 greenfield deals and 180 
acquisition deals providing a total of 513 deals.  
Independent variables included in the balanced panel data set are broken down to represent 
proxies for strategic asset-seeking, market-seeking, efficiency-seeking, natural resource seeking, 
cultural proximity and control variables.  Independent variables are lagged one calendar year (i.e. 
levels of unionized employees in 2005, for instance, are estimated against investment levels in 
2006). For variables with large standard deviations the natural log was taken (represented by ‘L’ 
before the variable abbreviation). 
The majority of location choice studies on Chinese outward FDI use patents to measure SAS. Alon 
(2010) notes, however, that there is no ‘theoretically established variable best suited to capture 
strategic-asset-seeking FDI’ (p. 11). He elects, for example, to use total private and public 
expenditure on research and development instead of patents. Ramasamy et al. (2012), by 
contrast, include SAS variables for the ratio of high tech exports to total exports as well as the 
number of patents registered in the host country. Hurst (2011), on the other hand, use an index 
of property rights to measure SAS motivations.  Other studies (i.e. Kang & Jiang (2012)) have 
elected not to use patents to proxy SAS due to multicollinearity concerns.  
Conceptually, of course, the notion of a strategic asset is rather broad, as reflected in the use of 
different proxies by different studies. It includes such things as proprietary technology, brand 
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names and managerial competency.  Here I attempt to proxy strategic assets by using a broader 
and arguably more comprehensive measure than that found in earlier studies. I construct and 
use a three-way linear additive composite index to proxy SAS. It includes: national share (%) of 
US Fortune 500 companies in a given state (measured by company headquarters);  national share 
(%) of masters of business degrees awarded; and national share (%) of total utility patents 
registered in the US. This additive composite variable incorporates a diverse set of strategic asset 
components, providing a holistic measure of the comparative levels of location-specific strategic 
assets, as well as alleviating possible multicollinearity issues highlighted in other studies (T. Alon, 
2010; Kang & Jiang, 2012). 
For all other explanatory variables I use established proxies (Table 3). Market-seeking variables 
consist of gross state product (LGSP), reflecting absolute market size (T. Alon, 2010; Bobonis & 
Shatz, 2007; Buckley et al., 2007; Cheng & Ma, 2007; Halvorsen, 2012; K. Head, Ries, & Swensonb, 
1995; Kolstad & Wiig, 2012; Ramasamy et al., 2012; Yiping & Bijun, 2013) and gross state product 
per capita (LGSPPC), reflecting spending power (OECD, 2012) (Buckley et al., 2007; Cheng & Ma, 
2007; Duanmu, 2012; Huang & Wang, 2011; Kang & Jiang, 2012; Ramasamy et al., 2012; X. Zhang 
& Daly, 2011).  Efficiency-seeking variables include the percentage of unionized employees in a 
given state (UNION) (Bobonis & Shatz, 2007; C. C. Coughlin, Terza, & Arromdee, 1990; Friedman, 
Gerlowski, & Silberman, 1992; Halvorsen, 2012; C. K. Head, Ries, & Swenson, 1999; Woodward, 
1992) and the highest marginal state corporate tax rate (TAX) (Bobonis & Shatz, 2007; C. C. 
Coughlin et al., 1990; Fox, 1996; C. K. Head et al., 1999; Woodward, 1992).  The former proxies 
relative operating costs, including, for example, working conditions, and the latter reflects real 
tax rates paid to the state government over and above that given to the federal government.  
Following Alon (2010) and Ramasamy et al. (2012) natural resource-seeking is represented as 
state natural resource exports by value (LNR).  Natural resource endowment is measured as state 
raw material exports. Following Alon (2010) and Buckley et al. (2007), a dummy variable is used 
for the cultural proximity (CUL) variable where states with 1% or more of the population equal 1, 
and 0 otherwise.  Seven control variables, following similar approaches to those found in previous 
studies, are also included: trade intensity, gross state product growth, unemployment, 
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manufacturing density, labour price, geographic size and distance (see Table 3). 
 
2.3.2 Model definition 
The model estimated is as follows: 
(1) FDIit = f (β1SAit, β2LGSPit, β3LGSPPCit, β4UNIONit, β5TAXit, β6LNRit, β7CULit, β8LIMPit, 
 β9GSPGROWit, β10UNEMPLYit, β11MANDENit, β12WAGEit, β13LGEOSIZEit, β14LDISit) 
In the balanced panel data set, all 50 states are included for all nine years. I follow the approach 
of Ramasamy et al. (2012), testing the count data using both Poisson and negative binomial 
models.  One important assumption of the Poisson model is that the variance of Nit is the same 
as the mean (Wooldridge, 2002a).  If there is unobserved heterogeneity in the data, the Poisson 
regression will fail (Cameron & Trivedi, 2007).  Indeed, ‘neglecting unobserved heterogeneity 
leads to over dispersion and excess zeros.  In the presence of such over dispersion…standard 
errors will typically be under-estimated, leading to spuriously high levels of significance’ (Beneito, 
Engracia-Rochina-Barrachina, & Sanchis-Llopis, 2009, p. 18).  When over dispersion becomes an 
issue, negative binomial regression can be used (Hilbe, 2011).  In the case of the negative 
binomial model: 
(2)  [] = 	
	
[)* ∣ )* ] = 	 )* + Ø,-. 
where k is typically 0 or 1 (Cameron & Trivedi, 2007).  As noted in Beneito et al. (2009), when 
performing negative binomial regressions in Stata, the program used, it is automatically assumed 
k=0 which means I have: 
(3)  

[)* ∣ )* ] = 	 )* + Ø, 
as the default case.  Which in turn means, ‘as Ø → 0, Var(nit) is inflated and thus over-dispersion 
is addressed; as Ø  →∞, Var(nit) → λit such that it returns to a simple Poisson model if Ø  is 
significantly (different) from zero’ (Ramasamy et al., 2012, p. 22). 
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After estimating both Poisson and negative binomial models, the results of likelihood-ratio tests 
showed the negative binomial models are superior for my data. The existence of significant over 
dispersion also favoured negative binomial over Poisson models.  Using Poisson regressions 
exposed my results to considerable risk of returning spuriously high levels of significance. Indeed, 
after testing several models, it was found that the Poisson models generally returned a larger 
number, or otherwise stronger levels, of statistically significant results than negative binomial 
models. By using the more rigorous negative binomial models reported results, it can be inferred, 
are more robust than those generated using Poisson models. 
Model fit tests were calculated and reported for each model.  Some past studies using count data 
have reported the pseudo-R2 statistic as its goodness of fit test (i.e. Ramasamy et al., 2012). This, 
however, is not to be confused with the R2 statistic and cannot be interpreted in the same way.  
The inherent problem with the pseudo-R2 statistic is that low values indicate a lack of fit, but high 
values do not necessarily represent a good fit (Hilbe, 2011). I therefore use information criteria 
fit tests, in particular the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) fit statistic.  According to Hilbe (2011), 
AIC ‘is now one of the most, if not the most, commonly used fit statistic displayed in statistical 
model output' (p. 68).  More specifically, I report the Swartz AIC.8  A smaller AIC signifies a better 
fitting model (Hilbe, 2011, p. 69).  Finally, results from performing the Hausman Test deemed 
random effects models to be most suitable for my data. 
2.4 Results 
Results are presented in two tables corresponding to three time periods, the entire period 2003-
2011 and pre (2003-2007) and post crisis periods (2008-2011) (Tables 4 and 5). Each table 
presents the full sample, as well as decomposed samples, including sub-samples by mode of entry 
(acquisition (MA in the tables) and greenfield (GF), ownership (PO for private, SO for state owned) 
and entry mode (i.e. private and state-owned MNEs by mode of entry, see Tables 4 and 5) as well 
as the results decomposed by ownership alone. This allows for full exploration of the four 
                                                            
8 Defined as:  AIC2 = (-,34.∗67(8))8   where 3 is the model log-likelihood, k is the number of predictors including the 
intercept, and n is the number of observations in the model. 
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hypotheses. Note, the signs on the control variables are of the expected signs (Table 3), 
suggesting internal consistency in my modelling results. 
 
Regarding Hypothesis 1, in the 2003-2011 period the composite strategic asset proxy was not 
statistically significant for the full sample (Table 4). It was, however, significant for the sub-sample 
of acquisition (MA) deals (at the 1% level), as well as the private (PO) MA sub-sample (5% level) 
(Tables 4 and 5).  On the other hand, the strategic asset variable was not found to be significant 
in any of the greenfield sub-samples (Tables 4 and 5). An identical pattern of results with regards 
to systematic differences between acquisition and greenfield mode of entry and the statistical 
significance of the strategic asset variable was also found for the 2003-2007 (MA and MAPO both 
at the 1% level; all greenfield investments insignificant) and 2008-2011 periods (MA and MAPO 
both at the 1% and 5% level respectively; greenfield investments insignificant). Greenfield FDI 
was in no case found to be statistically significant with regard to the strategic asset variable, 
which appears consistent with the idea that greenfield FDI has a greater propensity to be 
undertaken by MNEs with existing ownership advantages and not for strategic asset seeking. I 
take these results as support for Hypothesis 1, that there is a greater propensity for Chinese MNEs 
to use acquisitions to acquire strategic assets than greenfield investments.  
Our results decomposed by time period (Table 5) show that prior to the financial crisis (2003-
2007) for the full sample Chinese FDI was not attracted by strategic asset rich states (but rather 
by low tax, less unionization, and higher wages in US states) whereas after the crisis strategic 
assets (as well as market size, unemployment and trade links), were important (Table 5). The 
composite SAS variable is statistically significant (5% level) for the full sample in the 2008-2011 
period alone. I take this as support for Hypothesis 2, namely that aggressive strategic asset 
seeking acquisitions have intensified in the wake of the global financial crisis. Furthermore, it has 
been argued (stable) host economy economic conditions increase investment propensity 
(Brouthers, 2002). I also note the impact of state fiscal health (through estimation of GSP growth 
and unemployment levels) shows Chinese investment is driven to locate in economically 
distressed locations. This behaviour intensified in the post-crisis period. These findings are also 
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generally consistent with the idea that aggressive strategic asset seeking is becoming a more 
important motivation in response to lower priced assets. 
Regarding Hypothesis 3, in only one case was the ethnic ties variable significant, and this was for 
greenfield investments (2003-2007 period, and only for private greenfield investment).  It was 
insignificant for all other sub-samples and time periods. This indicates that while network ties 
may have once been relevant, these have become less so. It is also in keeping with the view that 
Chinese MNEs, particularly those engaging in strategic asset related acquisitions, undertake FDI 
to psychically distant countries without recourse to stages type investment processes (Johanson 
& Vahlne, 1977). 
Finally, regarding Hypothesis 4, I used state ownership as a proxy for home market institutional 
support for Chinese MNEs, so capturing an important factor which is believed to lead to the 
idiosyncratic investment behaviour of Chinese MNEs. Interestingly, I find that acquisitions 
orchestrated by Chinese state-owned MNEs were statistically insignificant for the composite 
strategic asset seeking variable in all included periods. I therefore reject Hypothesis 4, that asset 
seeking was more prevalent among Chinese MNEs with domestic institutional support. This 
stands somewhat at odds with a dominant view in the EM MNE literature, that the state 
successfully supports strategic asset seeking acquisitions (Luo et al., 2010). 
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Table 3: Variables, descriptions, expected signs, data sources and justifications 
Variable 
Variable 
Abbreviation Proxy 
Expected 
Sign 
Theoretical 
Justification 
Main or 
Control 
Variable Data Source 
Chinese 
FDI in US 
FDI Frequency count of Chinese 
FDI projects in the host state 
  Dependent Thomson ONE; FT fDi 
Markets Database; 
Rhodium Group; Annual 
Reports; Company 
Websites; State 
Government Offices 
Strategic 
Assets 
SA Three-way Linear Additive 
Composite of 1) state share of 
US (National) Fortune 500 
companies; 2) state share of 
Masters of Business Degrees 
Awarded; 3) state share of 
national Utility Patents 
Registered 
+ Strategic asset-
seeking 
Main Fortune Magazine and 
Company Websites; 
National Centre of 
Education Statistics - 
Digest of Education 
Statistics; National 
Science Foundation – 
Science and Engineering 
State Profiles 
Market 
size 
LGSP Gross State Product + Market-seeking Main US Department of 
Commerce – Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 
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Purchasing 
Power 
LGSPPC Gross State Product Per Capita + Market-seeking Main US Department of 
Commerce – Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 
Unions UNION Percentage of Employees 
Represented by a Union 
- Efficiency-
seeking 
Main US Department of Labor 
– Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 
Taxation TAX State Corporate Tax Rate 
(highest marginal tax rate) 
- Efficiency-
seeking 
Main Tax Foundation; Each 
state's tax forms and 
instructions; Commerce 
Clearing House; 
Federation of Tax 
Administrators 
Natural 
Resources 
LNR Raw material exports  - HTS 
codes for chapters 25, 26, and 
27 (earths and stones, ores, 
and fuels) 
+ Natural 
resource-
seeking 
Main US Bureau of the Census 
– Foreign Trade 
Cultural 
Proximity 
CUL Dummy Variable Where 1 
Equals Host State Ethnic 
Chinese Population is More 
Than 1% of Total State 
Population, 0 Otherwise 
+ Transaction 
costs 
Main US Bureau of the Census 
– Population Estimates 
Trade Intensity LIMP State Exports to China + Trade Control US Bureau of the Census 
– Foreign Trade 
GSP Growth GSPGROW Year-on-Year Growth Rate - State Distress Control US Department of 
Commerce – Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 
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Unemployment UNEMPLY Percentage of the population 
which is unemployed 
+ State Distress Control US Department of Labor 
– Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 
Manufacturing 
Density 
MANDEN Manufacturing Employment 
Per Square Mile of State Land 
Excluding Federal Land 
+ Economies of 
Agglomeration / 
Knowledge 
Spillovers 
Control US Bureau of the Census 
– Annual Survey of 
Manufactures 
Labour Price WAGE Mean hourly wage of all 
occupations 
- Efficiency-
seeking/Market-
seeking 
Control US Department of Labor 
– Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 
Geographic Size GEOSIZE Geographic Size (Scaled Square 
Miles) of State Land Excluding 
Federal Land 
+ Dartboard 
Theory 
Control US Bureau of the Census - 
Geography 
Distance LDIS Geographic distance from 
Beijing to the capital of the 
host state 
- Transaction 
Costs 
Control www.geobytes.com 
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Table 4: Negative Binomial Model Results for time period 2003-2011 
2003-2011 
Full 
Sample Greenfield Acquisition 
Private 
Owned 
State 
Owned 
Greenfield 
Private Owned 
Greenfield 
State Owned 
Acquisition 
Private Owned 
Acquisition 
State Owned 
SA 1.735  
(2.323) 
-4.697  
(3.777) 
5.589 *** 
(1.726) 
2.011  
(2.845) 
2.306 
(2.980) 
-3.394 
(4.656) 
-3.651 
(4.504) 
5.986 ** 
(2.654) 
5.077 
(3.620) 
LGSP 1.477 ** 
(.704) 
3.606 *** 
(1.310) 
.447 
(.657) 
1.868 ** 
(.856) 
.748 
(.969) 
3.821 ** 
(1.571) 
3.066 * 
(1.601) 
.980 
(.829) 
-.799 
(1.284) 
LGSPPC 3.651 
(2.241) 
-4.252  
(3.876) 
7.279 *** 
(2.333) 
3.888 
(2.661) 
3.254 
(3.414) 
-.101 
(4.419) 
-10.084 * 
(5.880) 
5.044 * 
(2.903) 
11.303 ** 
(4.577) 
UNION -.042  
(.027) 
-.059 
(.0366) 
-.0190 
(.021) 
-.056 * 
.032 
.003 
(.035) 
-.078 * 
(.045) 
.007 
(.041) 
-.025 
(.032) 
.037 
(.050) 
 TAX -4.067 * 
(2.196) 
-4.262  
(2.815) 
-4.453  
(2.996) 
-5.316 ** 
(2.465) 
-2.720 
(4.140) 
-4.871 
(3.293) 
-2.330 
(5.043) 
-6.092 * 
(3.479) 
-4.936 
(7.287) 
LNR .1410  
(.179) 
.137 
(.262) 
.247  
(.186) 
.226 
(.213) 
.006 
(.258) 
.102 
(.311) 
.049 
(.331) 
.329 
(.227) 
-.172 
(.429) 
CUL .155 
(.361) 
.6845  
(.488) 
-.336  
(.311) 
.173 
(.413) 
-.087 
(.493) 
.831 
(.562) 
-.078 
(.603) 
-.499 
(.414) 
-.172 
(.724) 
LIMP .553 * 
(.327) 
.6437 
(.484) 
.205 
(.299) 
.371 
(.374) 
.865 * 
(.511) 
.528 
(.563) 
.936 
(.678) 
.020 
(.370) 
.810 
(.665) 
GSPGROW -.0241 
(.0166) 
-.017 
(.021) 
-.031 
(.025) 
-.001 
(.0201) 
-.068 ** 
(.028) 
-.007 
(.026) 
-.040 
(.0357) 
.007 
(.031) 
-.101 ** 
(.045) 
UNEMPLY .0439 
(.035) 
-.011 
(.046) 
.120 ** 
(.049) 
.040 
(.040) 
.064 
(.062) 
.026 
(.055) 
-.072 
(.080) 
.089 
(.057) 
.197 * 
(.113) 
MANDEN -.001  
(.0150) 
.0203 
(.0212) 
-.018  
(.011) 
-.006 
(.018) 
-.001 
(.019) 
.005 
(.025) 
.023 
(.024) 
-.019 
(.016) 
-.030 
(.028) 
WAGE .109 
(.068) 
.176 * 
(.098) 
.049 
(.075) 
.125 
(.081) 
.064 
(.105) 
.122 
(.117) 
.265 * 
(.144) 
.106 
(.098) 
-.035 
(.167) 
GEOSIZE .109 
(.068) 
.176 * 
(.0982) 
.049 
(.075) 
.125 
(.081) 
.064 
(.105) 
.122 
(.117) 
.265 * 
(.144) 
.106 
(.098) 
-.035 
(.167) 
LDIS -1.670  
(5.669) 
-2.570  
(8.663) 
-3.169  
(4.112) 
-4.037 
(6.659) 
7.216 
(7.510) 
-3.386 
(9.939) 
2.312 
(9.425) 
-7.669 
(5.7329) 
19.019 * 
(10.058) 
CONSTANT -21.880  
(24.651) 
16.398  
(39.659) 
-26.349  
(17.847) 
-4.616 
(438.923) 
-44.008 
(748.308) 
1.381 
(772.628) 
20.726 
(626.463) 
11.752 
(24.707) 
-130.841 *** 
(43.031) 
LLH -422.580 -306.424 -269.178 -358.453 -215.178 -249.099 -169.990 -233.751 -94.672 
Swartz AIC 1.966 1.450 1.284 1.681 1.044 1.195 0.843 1.127 0.509 
 Coefficient reported with standard error in parentheses.   LLH = Log Likelihood.  AIC = Akaike Information Criterion (lower values indicate a 
better fitting model).  Asterisks ***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 5: Negative Binomial Model Results for time periods 2003-2007 and 2008-2011 
 Variable 
Full 
Sample Greenfield Acquisition 
Private 
Owned 
State 
Owned 
Greenfield 
Private 
Owned 
Greenfield 
State Owned 
Acquisition 
Private 
Owned 
Acquisition 
State Owned 
'03- SA 1.080 -5.183 13.729 *** 6.724 1.102 2.490 -12.522 14.863 *** 12.153 
'07 LGSP 1.882 3.591 * .305 1.256 2.191 1.951 7.871 ** 1.002 -2.800 
Pre- LGSPPC 4.143 -6.196 10.728 *** 2.612 10.295 * -6.195 -2.876 7.583 21.995 *** 
Crisis UNION -.102 ** -.131 *** -.021 -.131 ** -.049 -.190 *** -.073 -.009 -.027 
 TAX -15.692 ** -9.001 -25.605 *** -24.627 *** 2.578 -19.911 * 10.452 -28.221 -13.383 
 LNR -.089 -.010 -.029 .116 .046 .190 .170 .128 -.531 
 CUL .340 .893 -.628 .468 .152 1.380 * -.271 -1.228 1.484 
 LIMP .400 .304 .467 .618 -.189 .650 -1.042 .316 .879 
 GSPGROW -.083 -.033 -.064 -.021 -.189 ** .030 -.164 -.017 -.172 
 UNEMPLY .052 .192 -.068 -.046 .397 .207 .315 -.331 1.241 ** 
 MANDEN .004 -.006 .012 .004 -.021 -.007 -.018 .022 -.013 
 WAGE .299 * .587 *** -.191 .222 .082 .541 ** .472 -.197 -.237 
 GEOSIZE .011 .054 -.014 ** -.115 .023 -.073 .064 -.194 ** .003 
 LDIS .034 2.073 -1.812 -2.251 8.660 3.496 -9.290 -11.828 38.592 ** 
 CONSTANT -32.224 7.163 -35.400 -2.334 -88.185 2.858 13.671 17.867 -240.743 ** 
 LLH -189.225 -140.975 -105.318 -159.0493 -86.157 -114.609 -67.917 -86.913 -31.116 
 Swartz AIC 0.929 0.929 0.556 0.795 0.471 0.597 0.390 0.474 0.226 
'08- SA 3.673 ** .809 4.722 ** 3.305 * 2.996 -.505 4.139 5.242 ** 5.704 
‘11 LGSP 1.291 ** 2.331 * .443 2.219 *** -.345 3.574 ** .230 1.184 -1.952 
Post- LGSPPC 3.713 -3.201 6.476 ** 5.603 ** -4.781 3.469 -18.497 *** 5.614 4.003 
Crisis UNION -.017 -.006 -.027 -.024 .006 -.004 -3.69e-4 -.037 .0118 
 TAX -3.270 -3.849 -1.927 -3.872 -2.250 -3.187 -5.180 -3.359 -5.268 
 LNR .207 .038 .330 .218 .203 -.032 .244 .330 .514 
 CUL -.163 .181 -.228 -.034 -.606 .242 -.566 .043 -1.456 
 LIMP .450 * 1.192  ** .205 .126 1.474 ** .533 2.720 *** -.036 .988 
 GSPGROW -.028 -.030 -.0310 -.002 -.082 ** -.017 -.058 .011 -.128 ** 
 UNEMPLY .093 ** .021 .109 ** .139 *** -.050 .121 * -.225 ** .126 ** .065 
 MANDEN -.008 .011 -.030 * -2.26e-4 -.023 .007 .006 -.018 -.100 ** 
 WAGE .037 .089 .080 -.101 .458 *** -.094 .645 *** -.027 .556 ** 
 GEOSIZE -.058 *** -.045 -.064 ** -.077 *** -.019 -.043 -.087 -.102 ** -.034 
 LDIS -1.625 2.413 -4.530 -7.257 * 11.851 * -2.057 17.383 ** -9.293 15.054 
 CONSTANT -21.120 -5.596 -17.338 -5.170 -45.821 -13.107 -17.699 4.852 -86.284 
 LLH -230.274 -165.384 -156.710 -193.529 -119.776 -131.292 -92.048 -139.208 -53.136 
 Swartz AIC 1.111 0.8234 0.784 0.948 0.620 0.671 0.497 0.707 0.324 
Coefficient reported with standard error in parentheses.   LLH = Log Likelihood.  AIC = Akaike Information Criterion (lower values indicate 
a better fitting model).  Asterisks ***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
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2.5 Discussion 
2.5.1 Entry mode, strategic-asset-seeking and accelerated internationalisation in Chinese 
MNEs 
Kedia et al. (2012) in summarizing the burgeoning EM MNE literature, argue that: ‘EMNE specific 
perspectives suggest that EMNEs differ from traditional MNEs in one key respect: the accelerated 
pace of EMNE internationalization, in order to develop and/or acquire the capabilities necessary 
to compete on a global level’ (p. 159) (emphasis added). Indeed, despite lacking systematic 
empirical evidence comparing motives for greenfield and acquisition entry modes in EM MNEs, 
the view that they have a greater propensity to use aggressive acquisitions, as opposed to 
greenfield FDI, to buy strategic assets from psychically distant developed markets, has already 
become quite widely accepted (I. Alon, Child, Li, & McIntyre, 2011; Luo & Tung, 2007; Sun et al., 
2012). Luo & Tung (2007), in their widely cited springboard argument, argue EM MNEs  ‘seek 
sophisticated technology or advanced manufacturing know-how by acquiring foreign companies 
or their subunits that possess such proprietary technology’ (p. 485) (emphasis added).  At a 
conceptual level, this view has also been strongly associated with calls for new theoretical 
understandings of EM MNE expansion, as the belief is that the OLI paradigm does not explain 
acquisition related strategic asset seeking behaviour particularly well (Kedia et al., 2012). Hence 
the question of whether acquisitions have a greater propensity to target strategic assets, whether 
greenfield investments do not, and whether they also rely upon existing ethnic networks, or a 
stages model to investment, are all important empirical questions in this growing area of 
research. 
These results, as far as I am aware, are the first to show that the motivations for Chinese MNE 
acquisitions do indeed appear to systematically differ from those of greenfield investment 
projects and in doing so they accord with some of the main theoretical predictions of the growing 
EM MNE literature. The sample of Chinese MNEs investing in the US shows they did have a 
greater propensity to use acquisitions, rather than greenfield FDI, when targeting strategic 
assets. Greenfield investments had a lower propensity to target strategic assets and showed 
more indications of being motivated by other factors.  Greenfield investment strategies, it is 
generally believed, indicates organizations have decided to take aspects of their tacit and explicit 
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knowledge, corporate culture, and physical property to a host economy (Hennart & Park, 1993; 
Huallacháin & Reidb, 1997). Results here also support this idea, as they show that greenfield 
location decisions between states were primarily driven by market seeking and efficiency (cost) 
considerations (i.e. TAX and UNION are significant at 10% level). Market size, for example, 
appears to be one of the most important determinants of greenfield location choice (LGSP is 
significant at 1% for GF in entire period).  The findings, in this regard, are also consistent with 
some previous studies investigating the location choice of FDI within the US for MNEs from other 
countries, as well as those looking at EM MNE outward FDI, which have found market seeking 
also to be important (T. Alon, 2010; Brown, Florax, & Mcnamara, 2009; Buckley et al., 2007; 
Cheng & Ma, 2007; C. Coughlin & Segev, 2000; Duanmu, 2012; Friedman et al., 1992; Kolstad & 
Wiig, 2012; Ramasamy et al., 2012).  I therefore interpret the results to show that a more 
important factor motivating greenfield FDI was market seeking, involving strategies that looked 
to exploit previously acquired competitive advantages (Dikova & Brouthers, 2009).  This 
interpretation is also consistent with a more recent strand of research which argues that some 
EM MNEs do indeed possess some firm specific ownership advantages, albeit ones which are far 
less obvious than those found in developed market MNEs. These include, for example, their 
capabilities in process innovation and low cost production (Ramamurti, 2012b). 
Some may argue that these findings showing a greater propensity for strategic asset seeking in 
acquisitions than greenfield FDI are hardly surprising, as they are generally in line with predictions 
of transaction cost/internalization approaches to understanding MNE entry mode, as well as the 
EM MNE literature, including contributions such as Mathews's (2002, 2006) ‘Link, Leverage, 
Learn’ framework and Luo & Tung's (2007) ‘Springboard’ perspective. Nonetheless, while there 
is some truth in this, it is worth again stressing the central relevance of entry mode in the EM 
MNE literature, as well as the current lack of rigorous and systematic empirical investigation of 
the reasons for the use of different entry modes. This lacuna exists, at least in part, because most 
studies to date have used international panel data, which are not suitable for drawing conclusions 
with regards to motivations for different entry mode because of hard to control for host country 
acquisition barriers (Slangen & Hennart, 2007). Others have relied upon anecdotal evidence, such 
as the observed upturn in EM MNE acquisition activity, without formally exploring the 
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motivations between different entry modes and whether they are actually different (Sun et al., 
2012).  This study is a first attempt to probe these entry mode questions in more detail.9  
 
2.5.2 Entry mode, strategic-asset-seeking and the global financial crisis 
The global financial crisis presents an important structural break, one that also lends itself to 
exploring the question of the use of different entry modes by EM MNEs, including asset seeking 
behaviours via acquisitions. To my knowledge there has also been relatively little empirical 
research on the impact of the global financial crisis on EM MNEs, despite the fact it has been a 
‘game changing’ event for many EM MNEs looking to rapidly catch-up with the developed market 
counterparts (Nolan, 2012; X. Yang & Stoltenberg, 2014).  Indeed, much of the recent research 
on EM MNEs has largely avoided discussion of how the global financial crisis may have impacted 
EM MNEs and their FDI behaviour (Cui & Jiang, 2012; Ramasamy et al., 2012; C. Wang et al., 
2012). 
It seems, the crisis has greatly weakened the hand of developed market MNEs, but strengthened 
that of EM MNEs. Yang & Stoltenberg (2012), for example, in one of the few studies to consider 
the impact of the crisis, argue that there are important links to Chinese post-crisis policy changes 
and the propensity to engage in SAS behaviour.  They note that Chinese multinationals are now 
‘leveraging the financial resources accumulated over the last 30 years, by taking advantage of the 
cheap assets made available globally by the recent financial crisis (p. 1). My results, in line with 
observations made in a minority of the EM MNE literature that considers the crisis (i.e. Luo et al. 
(2010); Yang & Stoltenberg (2012)), show that aggressive strategic acquisitions did increase in 
the aftermath of the crisis. Although my empirical models do not allow us to identify specifically 
why this is so, a number of factors may play a part. The crisis has undoubtedly led to a significant 
reshaping of the global economy. The asymmetric shock of the financial crisis has weakened US 
                                                            
9 By doing so, I also contribute to the dedicated literature on foreign establishment mode. As noted, of the 23 
empirical studies comparing the motivations for greenfield and acquisition entry mode that Slangen & Hennart 
(2007) have recently identified, none looked at what could be considered EM MNEs.  
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and European domestic demand, making these economies less attractive for market seeking, 
while simultaneously significantly eroding the valuations of Western MNEs, leading to a discount 
on the price of the strategic assets they own. The credit systems in countries such as China are 
now also considerably stronger, in comparison to their Western counterparts, than they were 
only several years ago (Yao et al., 2010).  Results from this paper show the game changing nature 
of the global financial crisis have also led to increased ‘springboard’ type behaviours, as the 
propensity for strategic asset seeking acquisitions increased in the wake of the crisis. These 
results, I believe, are consistent with the theoretical literature on EM MNEs arguing that 
acquisitions are the dominant entry mode for strategic asset seeking in EM MNEs (Child & 
Rodrigues, 2005; Kedia et al., 2012; Luo & Tung, 2007; Mathews, 2002, 2006). 
 
2.5.3 Entry mode, strategic-asset-seeking and domestic institutional idiosyncrasies 
A further strong strand of theorizing previously noted argues EM MNE FDI strategies are 
‘idiosyncratic’ owing to their domestic institutional environment (Kedia et al., 2012), including 
such things as domestic capital market imperfections (Buckley et al., 2007). An extension of this 
line of reasoning, which is particularly prominent in the literature on Chinese MNEs, is that they 
are aided by the state to acquire strategic assets (Luo & Tung, 2007; Luo et al., 2010). Yang and 
Stoltenberg (2012), for example, argue, 'the state has asserted its role specifically to grow 
Chinese multinationals in size and in number, by leveraging the financial resources accumulated 
over the last 30 years, by taking advantage of the cheap assets made available globally by the 
recent financial crisis and by institutionalizing its 'Go Global' strategy' (p. 1). Other studies echo 
this view. Pradhan (2009), for example, found aggressive acquisition of strategic assets, such as 
technology and brands, is driven primarily by state owned EM MNEs. I find the opposite, 
however, in that state-owned Chinese MNEs have a diminished propensity to strategic asset seek. 
Why are state owned MNEs not so successful in acquiring strategic assets in the US via 
acquisitions? One plausible and likely explanation is that SOEs meet greater hurdles in their 
investment decisions in the US. As Cui & Jiang (2012) point out, ‘The political image associated 
with state ownership in Chinese investing firms can stimulate politically sensitive and public 
concerns in host countries, and provoke negative reactions from politicians and the public in the 
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host countries.’ (p. 270).  This can lead to acquisitions being blocked (Meyer, Ding, Li, & Zhang, 
2014). Wang et al. (2012) have also commented more specifically upon the significance of state 
ownership and  Chinese investments in the US: ‘the acquisition of many US firms by Chinese SOEs 
failed as a result of concerns of national-level US politicians that this might be motivated by non-
commercial objectives, and might lead to unfair competition’ (p. 663). Greater cultural distance 
and ethnocentricity of Chinese MNEs also ‘contribute to high host-country normative pressures 
on foreign firms’ (Cui & Jiang, 2012, p. 267).  This may lead them, according to Cui and Jiang 
(2012), to avoid high profile acquisitions which are likely to be politically disruptive.  
There are, of course, numerous examples of failed acquisitions in the US by Chinese MNEs. In 
1990 US President George Bush blocked China National Aero-Technology Import and Export 
Corporation (CATIC) from purchasing Mamco Manufacturing, an aircraft manufacturer based in 
Seattle, Washington (Office of the Press Secretary, 1990).  Although Chinese investment in the 
US was tiny at this time, official action was taken to stymie Chinese state owned investment 
activity.  More recent high-profile examples include the often cited failed bid by China National 
Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), a Chinese SOE, for Union Oil Company of California (Unocal) 
in 2005 and the 2009 forced withdraw of the proposed purchase of a 51% stake of Firstgold, a 
company based in Nevada, by Northwest Nonferrous International Investment Company, a 
Chinese SOE. In reality, China's state owned MNEs are quite heterogeneous in terms of 
managerial competency and autonomy and recent investment blockages may have been well 
warranted. Nevertheless, recent high profile US federal government activity has done little to 
change the perceptions of a hostile investment environment in the US for Chinese SOEs. 
An alternative explanation for the lack of asset-seeking acquisitions by state-owned MNEs is that 
the extent of state support measures and industrial policy to encourage such activities has been 
considerably overstated. Indeed, some argue considerable myth, hype and fear has surrounded 
claims that China is ‘buying the world’, so leading to inaccurate, over exaggerated claims of 
Chinese state involvement (Nolan, 2012). There is also, some further argue, actually very limited 
empirical evidence to support the idea that China has a sophisticated industrial policy to support 
state-owned MNEs in acquiring strategic assets. Thus, the only empirical study of its type, to the 
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best of my knowledge, has recently shown that most outward M&A activity from China does not 
in fact follow government guidelines, either in terms of industries or countries targeted: ‘Overall, 
there is no general trend apparent in the compliance of Chinese outward M&A with the 
government recommendations’ (Meuer, Wang, Wang, & Reinmoeller, 2012, p. 18). Meuer et al. 
(2012) go on to argue that: ‘The claim that China’s internationalization is primarily orchestrated 
by its government is not supported’ (p. 24). Their findings also strongly reject the idea that state-
owned enterprises are ‘instruments of the government’ (p. 26).  In other words, while many think 
that the Chinese domestic institutions are idiosyncratic and supportive of strategic asset seeking 
acquisitions, they actually may not be.  
As Cui & Jiang (2012) note, however, there is currently ‘a lack of understanding of the role of 
state ownership in the internationalisation of Chinese firms, despite the fact that it can be an 
important parameter in explaining the deviation of Chinese firms’ FDI strategies from existing 
theoretical predictions’ (p. 280). Findings from this study suggest the jury is still out on exactly 
why Chinese SOEs are less successful at acquiring strategic assets in the US case. I argue, however, 
the role of state policy to encourage strategic asset seeking has been overstated, and the role of 
US policy in blocking strategic asset related deals underestimated.   In any case, further detailed 
and systematic study of the impact of ownership considerations on Chinese MNE FDI is certainly 
warranted.  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
Much of the conceptual and empirical literature on EM MNE international expansion concerns 
the question of whether EM MNEs use acquisitions to rapidly acquire strategic assets so they can 
catch-up with their developed market counterparts (Kedia et al., 2012; Sun et al., 2012; Yiu et al., 
2007). Entry mode considerations, therefore, are centrally important. To date, however, there 
have been no empirical studies exploring whether systematic differences in the propensity to use 
greenfield or acquisition entry modes exist. More specifically, no studies have explored whether 
there is a greater propensity to use the latter for acquiring strategic assets, despite this being an 
important prediction of the conceptual literature on EM MNEs. The findings on entry mode in 
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this study are the first to systematically confirm Chinese MNEs do have a greater propensity to 
use acquisitions for acquiring strategic assets in developed markets. This adds a further piece to 
the understanding of the nature Chinese MNEs. It also, in turn, casts further light on the bigger 
question of whether the OLI paradigm is suitable for explaining Chinese MNE FDI strategies. On 
balance, empirical findings from this study are broadly supportive of the idea that Chinese MNEs 
do indeed have a stronger propensity to seek strategic assets via explorative acquisitions to 
acquire the brands, technologies, management know how and intangible assets that they 
themselves lack. They are therefore also supportive of the idea that Chinese MNEs actively seek 
the firm-specific advantages that will allow them to succeed as latecomers in global markets 
(Kedia et al., 2012). 
A logical extension of this study would be the inclusion of a developed economy comparative 
component as well as understanding the outcomes of SAS-related FDI. This study shows strategic 
asset seeking is, most likely, taking place, but it could be true that firms from a wide variety of 
developmental home institutional backgrounds (i.e. both developed and developing countries) 
also engage in SAS activity in the US via the acquisition mode of entry.  Further, it is not at all 
clear whether the SAS acquisitions of Chinese MNEs are successful.  While I speak directly to the 
latter line of extension in Chapter 3, the former comparative component is a potentially fruitful 
area for future research as direct comparisons of the determinants of Chinese and developed 
economy FDI is largely missing from the current literature set. 
This study, as well as exploring the use of different entry modes by Chinese MNEs, has also 
focused on two large markets of crucial geopolitical importance in both pre and post global 
financial crisis periods. Accordingly, it would be remiss not to comment on the policy 
ramifications.  It is of note, in particular, that greater propensity for strategic asset seeking 
acquisitions by Chinese state-owned MNEs in the US was not found. This suggests that the US 
national policy has achieved some of its main objectives, which favours private sector 
engagement. Scaremongering about Chinese state-owned MNEs actively acquiring US strategic 
assets may, therefore, be exaggerated. From a Chinese perspective, the strong involvement of 
private sector MNEs undertaking strategic asset seeking strategies in the US would also appear 
encouraging, suggesting an underlying dynamism in their private sector MNEs, as they strive for 
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firm-level catch-up in the wake of the global financial crisis.  There is no reason why, in the longer 
run, this trend cannot benefit both economies, in a similar way to that of Japanese investments 
in the US. 
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3. An Event Study of Chinese MNE Strategic Asset Acquisitions and 
Resulting Patent Generation 
 
3.1 Introduction 
There is a growing literature on Chinese MNEs (Deng, 2013; Wei, 2010) and a considerably larger 
research base looking at emerging market MNEs (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012; Hennart, 2012; 
Ramamurti, 2012b). Within this literature, there are also a growing number of papers which 
argue that EM MNEs, including Chinese MNEs, look to acquire intangible strategic assets that 
they themselves lack using FDI. They do so in particular via aggressive acquisitions, often to 
psychically distant developed markets (Deng, 2009; Luo & Tung, 2007; Sun et al., 2012). While 
much of the literature assumes the acquisition mode of entry is preferred for the purposes of 
strategic asset-seeking FDI, this was not empirically substantiated until this thesis (i.e. chapter 2).  
This trend, moreover, is considered somewhat unusual and unique, as it contrasts with the more 
incremental and risk-averse strategies observed in MNEs from the developed world in earlier 
periods of history. The OLI model, a  dominant paradigm used to understand MNEs, may 
therefore need refinement (Dunning, 2006) or, as some have argued, even rejection: ‘there are 
significant peculiar traits characterizing present-day EM MNEs that merit the development of a 
new framework specific to these firms’ (Luo & Tung, 2007, p. 485) (see also Mathews (2002)). 
Some others hold that the internationalisation strategies of Chinese firms ‘deviate from the 
predictions of existing theories’ (Cui & Jiang, 2012, p. 266) and that ‘existing theories do need an 
overhaul since the locational determinants of Chinese companies generally do not follow 
mainstream literature’ (Ramasamy et al., 2012, p. 25). 
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate a side of the strategic-asset-seeking debate that has 
so far received less attention to date. This concerns not whether EM MNEs are acquiring 
strategic-assets as was discussed but rather what they do with them once they are acquired and, 
in particular whether they are actually capable of fully absorbing, utilising and exploiting acquired 
foreign strategic assets. In this way, Chapter three of this thesis builds directly upon the findings 
of Chapter two. I use event study methodologies to focus on the specific case of Chinese MNEs 
(including state-owned and private sector) and their investments to the developed markets of 
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Europe, the United States and Japan. To the best of my knowledge this is one of the first studies 
to establish what the end results of such SAS acquisitions by Chinese MNEs actually are. Some 
reservations have already been expressed about Chinese MNEs ability to integrate acquired 
strategic assets (Rugman & Li, 2007). One of the more interesting findings from this study is that 
when a Chinese firm acquires an innovative firm in the United States, Europe or Japan, innovation 
in the acquirer’s home market (i.e. China) significantly improves.   
After developing hypotheses I explain in more detail the data, methodology and models used in 
this study. Results are then discussed.  This is followed by discussion and conclusion. 
 
3.2 Literature review and hypothesis development 
3.2.1 Chinese MNEs and strategic assets 
Strategic assets refer to critical resources or capabilities, including, for example, research and 
development (R&D) capacity, proprietary technology, design facilities, brands and reputation, 
and distribution and production networks that give firms competitive advantages over others 
(Teece et al., 1997). Strategic asset seeking implies acquiring critical assets that one does not 
already possess: ‘to primarily enhance a firm’s critical competencies rather than to exploit 
existing assets’ (Deng, 2009, p. 83). Many conceptual studies have explored the implications of 
SAS and exploration (as opposed to ‘exploitation’) strategies of EM MNEs, particularly 
emphasising the implications for the OLI paradigm.  Numerous empirical studies have now also 
explored the extent of such behaviour.  These have used international panel data, involving 
large samples of host countries, including developed nations that are plentiful in intangible 
strategic assets.  These studies often use macro level Chinese OFDI data, considering various 
proxies for SAS in the host location and use both national (Buckley et al., 2007; Cheng & Ma, 
2007; Kang & Jiang, 2012; X. Liu et al., 2005; C. Wang et al., 2012) and sub-national (i.e. 
provincial levels) (Duanmu, 2012) (see Chapter 1 for a review). In some cases firm level M&A 
data from commercial databases is also used (T. Alon, 2010; Amighini & Franco, 2013) or hand 
 77 
 
gathered data (Ramasamy et al., 2012).10 Many of these studies do find that SAS is important: 
‘Chinese firms are motivated to improve their competitive disadvantage in innovation and 
technology’ (Ramasamy et al., 2012, p. 24). They illustrate the ‘strategic asset seeking 
motivation of Chinese acquisitions of high-tech firms abroad’ (De Beule & Duanmu, 2012, p. 
271). There is now a growing consensus in the IB literature that Chinese MNEs target intangible 
strategic assets (Deng, 2012).  Unfortunately, however, none of these studies has shown 
whether SAS has led to successful outcomes for Chinese MNEs. They simply show it is (most 
likely) taking place. Serious doubts, however, have been cast on the ability of EM MNEs to 
absorb and integrate newly acquired intangible strategic-assets (Rugman & Li, 2007; Rugman, 
2009).  
Successful SAS implies EM MNEs must be able to absorb, integrate and productively use the 
strategic assets they have acquired. Luo and Tung (2007), for example, note that while 
international acquisitions may aid firms in acquiring a target company's knowledge and 
expertise; ‘no company can  survive in the long run by merely relying on external acquisitions 
for knowledge development’ (p. 495). They go on to note that acquisitions will only succeed if 
EM MNEs are able to absorb and integrate the capacity for further intangible strategic asset 
generation latent in the firms they acquire. Only in so doing will they develop the firm-specific 
ownership advantages that they originally lacked.  
Recent studies on Chinese cross-border acquisitions echo this view. Morck et al. (2008), for 
example, argue the firm which developed the valuable intangible assets, such as brand names 
or technology, should be in charge of managing, protecting and growing these intangible assets. 
This is seen to be true as ‘A new technology must be updated continuously, or risks eclipse by 
advances elsewhere’ (Morck et al., 2008, p. 346). Morck et al. (2008) go on to argue ‘Failure to 
keep pace with the expanding technology frontier or to safeguard the value of a brand name 
courts disaster, and the Chinese manufacturing firm typically lacks the ability to contract and 
monitor the foreign firm’s performance in these dimensions’ (p. 346). 
                                                            
10 These studies, which usually account for the problem of ‘onward-journeying’ FDI through tax havens and 
offshore financial centres, are superior.  
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When developed economy MNEs acquire firms from developing economies, the process of 
ensuring technology frontiers and brand reputations are being positively expanded is easier for 
the original creators of these streams of assets than the acquired firm as continued 
management and expansion of an asset is comparatively easier than absorbing and integrating 
the same assets externally and then attempting to build on acquired technologies or brands 
(Grossman & Hart, 1986; Meyer & Estrin, 2001; Morck et al., 2008). Patenting activity, for 
example, is often the result of a continued stream of research over several years. Future 
patenting activity within a stream of research may, therefore, be easier for firms which have 
substantial experience innovating within a given research stream. In some cases, MNEs from 
economically advanced economies acquire a firm and then change it to fit its strategy and 
culture to the point the original firm is no longer readily recognizable. This is done as advanced 
economy MNEs look to exploit their technological advantages in developing economies, but 
lack the complementary local resources necessary to put their products and services within 
reach of local consumers (Hennart, 2009). When an acquisition takes this form, it is sometimes 
referred to as a brownfield acquisition (Estrin & Meyer, 2011).  
Interestingly, what seems to be happening when EM firms acquire firms from advanced 
economies, especially for SAS purposes, is quite the opposite. In the case of Chinese MNEs, 
when the acquisition mode of entry is pursued much of the acquired firm is left as it was 
previous to the acquisition with the exception of its manufacturing facilities (Estrin & Meyer, 
2011; Rui & Yip, 2008). Notable changes in many such acquisitions are the transfer of 
manufacturing back to China and the expansion of financial resources availability for the 
acquired firm (Athreye & Kapur, 2009). Chinese MNE Wanxiang, for example, ‘acquired its US 
competitor Schiller in 1998 for its brands, technology and customer-relationship. It separated 
these assets from the production facilities, which were sold to a third party, and fulfilled US 
orders from its Chinese lower-cost manufacturing sites’ (Estrin & Meyer, 2011, p. 487). 
Are EM MNEs therefore able to successfully internalize their foreign intangible strategic asset 
acquisitions to further strengthen global competitiveness? This vital aspect of post-FDI 
integration of strategic assets remains underexplored (Deng, 2013). If it was to be shown EM 
MNEs are able to efficaciously facilitate the continued generation of intangible strategic assets 
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in their foreign market acquisitions primarily through the availability of expanded financial 
resources, it would lend support to the idea Chinese MNEs are able to ‘springboard’ into 
globally competitive positions (Luo & Tung, 2007). This is because it would support the idea that 
EM MNEs are capable of rapidly undertaking firm-level catch-up via SAS acquisitions (Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2012; Hennart, 2012; Ramamurti, 2012b). 
Hypothesis 1: The innovative performance of foreign firms acquired by Chinese MNEs 
improves over time. 
 
3.2.2 Domestic innovation and SAS acquisitions 
Attention has also been given to the idea that Chinese MNEs pursue SAS via developed market 
acquisitions primarily to repatriate intangibles and use these to serve their home markets, as 
opposed to directly competing in international markets (Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Luo & Tung, 
2007; Ramamurti, 2012b; Rui & Yip, 2008)11.  A recent World Bank report, for example, has found 
that, 'The main reason for encouraging outward investment is to enable Chinese multinationals 
to absorb foreign technology and use it to improve domestic production’ (The World Bank, 2013, 
p. 388). Ramamurti (2012), in considering  solutions to the observation that EM MNEs strategic 
asset seek via aggressive acquisitions, also suggests that EM MNEs may engage in cross border 
transactions in order to obtain strategic assets, such as technology and brands, for exploitation 
in their home market. Others also make the same point: ‘[EM MNEs] use FDI as a spring board to 
enhance their competitive positions relative to advanced country MNCs that have entered their 
home markets (Luo & Tung, 2007)’ (Chari, 2013, p. 350). One problem with this argument, 
however, is that it does not fully explain why the developed market owners of intangible strategic 
                                                            
11 Xu and Meyer (2012) have noted in their recent literature review that many EM MNES ‘entered the 
global stage with a cost leadership strategy, exploiting low-cost human resources and production costs 
in their home countries’ (p.23). They go on to raise what they believe is one of the key follow up 
questions: ‘How will such companies integrate [these] new assets with their low cost production at 
home? In particular, how do they transfer capabilities that are organisationally embedded, and whose 
effective transfer would require fundamental changes in the structure and culture of the acquiring 
emerging economy MNE?’ (ibid). 
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assets (like patents) would willingly choose to sell them to their Chinese competitors. It may be 
true that acquired strategic assets ‘generally complement mass-manufacturing cost advantages, 
resulting in possible synergies for EM MNEs’ (Luo & Tung, 2007) but it is not entirely clear why 
developed market MNEs would not choose to exploit these proprietary intangibles using the 
country specific advantages offered in emerging markets. Hard won ownership advantages, it 
might be argued, following the OLI model, are unlikely to be so easily sacrificed. A persuasive 
response to this argument, however, is found in Hennart's (2012) bundling model. The bundling 
model assumes  
developed country MNEs enter foreign countries to serve local customers. To do this, 
MNEs need to bundle their [firm specific advantages] (cutting-edge technologies, strong 
brands) with complementary local resources such as land, utilities, employees, managers, 
access to suppliers, and access to final customers (Hennart, 2009). 
(Hennart, 2012, pp. 171–172)   
Hennart (2012) goes on to argue local resources (such as land, utilities, natural resources, labour 
and customer access) are available in asymmetric, imperfect markets where local actors (i.e. local 
firms and government) maintain considerable control in the allocation of local resources. His 
main argument is, therefore, that Dunning’s OLI model overlooks the range of market 
imperfections associated with accessing host country ‘locational advantages’ (the ‘L’ in the OLI 
model). He argues this is especially true in the case of EMs due to the developing nature of their 
institutional environments. In short, Hennart (2012) questions the OLI’s assumption of locational 
advantages being equally available to all firms. He argues that better access to ‘complementary 
local resources’, plus the growing and highly competitive markets for technology, potentially 
strengthen the bargaining power of EM MNEs. Such local complementary resources (also 
achieved via participation in domestic business groups and strong state-business relationships) 
also allow for rents appropriable only by domestic firms and thus cross-subsidisation of SAS FDI. 
Hennart (2012), therefore, questions a central tenet in OLI thinking – the assumption that host 
country locational advantages are freely available to all. He argues, instead, that EM MNEs are in 
fact able to generate rents associated with the bundling of intangible strategic assets with 
‘complementary local resources’ (CLRs) (Hennart, 2012).  These resources include ‘the knowledge 
of how to incorporate these intangibles into products that meet the needs and tastes of local 
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consumers, the logistics necessary to put products within their reach, and all the other inputs 
necessary for local production’ (Hennart, 2012, p. 183). The fact such resources are only 
accessible to domestic EM MNEs in their home markets also provides strong incentives for them 
to acquire intangible strategic assets from foreign markets for deployment in their home 
market.12 These same barriers and market imperfections (including weak IPR protection and 
enforcement) also deter foreign MNEs from successfully entering emerging markets. The 
remaining option for a developed market MNE – an outright sale of their intangible assets – starts 
to look like a more logical choice.  An implication of the bundling model is that EM MNEs will look 
to benefit, at least initially, from their domestic market rents. Only later may they be able 
leverage these CLRs (and the size and rapid growth of the domestic market) to also innovate and 
create their own FSAs for further internationalisation/FDI). In other words, it strongly reinforces 
the logic of international ‘technology looting’. Hennart (2012) is certainly quite clear about the 
logic of his model: that EM MNEs target intangibles in foreign markets initially for domestic 
exploitation.  
One explanation for Chinese MNEs undertaking SAS related OFDI, therefore, is not to develop 
FSAs for international competition (and ones sufficient to overcome liabilities of foreignness). 
Rather, OFDI is seen as a means of transferring various capabilities, expertise and technologies 
back to their domestic market (Ramamurti, 2012a, 2012b). They then use these to compete 
against the highly competitive (and pervasive) developed market MNEs that have developed 
strong positions in their domestic markets. Foreign MNEs have also been reluctant to introduce 
their most advanced products and technologies to countries such as China, for fear of 
expropriation of intellectual property (Peng, 2013). As such, Chinese MNEs have also been 
pushed to search in foreign markets for such strategic assets. For China, domestic market 
potential is enormous. Developing domestic competitive advantage is, therefore, seen as a key 
                                                            
12'Luo and Tung (2007) liken the advantages provided by strong home market positions to ‘home court’ 
advantages that are not easily matched by foreign ﬁrms because of their liabilities of foreignness, and 
because of the favourable treatment domestic ﬁrms may enjoy from developing country governments 
that are eager to support domestic champions’ (Chari, 2013, p. 350).  
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means of survival. Exploiting domestic markets is less risky and is potentially supported, in some 
cases, by the preferential access to what have been referred to as ‘complementary local 
resources’. 
Hypothesis 2: The domestic innovative performance of Chinese MNEs that undertake 
foreign strategic asset related acquisitions improves over time. 
3.2.3 Firm-level determinants of innovation capability, absorptive capacity  
Numerous factors may determine an MNE’s capability to not only target and attain foreign 
strategic assets, but also to absorb and harness them (including, for example, firm level 
organisation, such as business group membership; industry level effects; previous experience 
with foreign MNEs, etc.).13 A great deal, however, has been made of how state ownership and 
involvement may influence EM MNE FDI (Buckley et al., 2007; Cui & Jiang, 2012; Luo et al., 2010; 
C. Wang et al., 2012).  Indeed, according to Cuervo-Cazurra (2012), the key distinguishing feature 
of EM MNEs, and the only one that really justifies the creation of new theoretical understandings 
of EM MNEs, relates to the question of whether the domestic institutional environment has an 
undue influence on the FDI decisions of EM MNEs. Xu and Meyer (2012) also recently undertook 
a detailed review of the EM MNE strategy literature and concluded, ‘Institutions-based 
perspectives have evolved as the most popular line of theorizing as they bring context into the 
analysis of firm level phenomena (Meyer and Peng, 2005)’ (p. 11). Looking at the Chinese case, 
for example, some argue that state actors supply Chinese MNEs with numerous resources, such 
as access to capital, domestic market monopolies, information and streamlined administrative 
procedures (Luo et al., 2010).  Similarly, Xu and Meyer (2012) note, 'SOEs are found to benefit 
more than private firms, through vertical linkages as opposed to horizontal linkages (Liu et al., 
2009)' (p. 11). The domestic institutional environment, therefore, in general may play a central 
role in determining OFDI strategies (Buckley et al., 2007). As Cui & Jiang (2012) note: 
                                                            
13 Absorptive capacity is a firm’s ‘ability to recognize, assimilate, and apply external knowledge which 
helps the firm better internalize external resources. In other words organizations need absorptive 
capacity (AC) to make learning possible (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). According to Cohen and Levinthal, 
absorptive capacity is, “… largely a function of the firm’s level of prior related knowledge… and it is 
history or path-dependent” (p. 128)’ (Jiatao Li & Kozhikode, 2008, p. 436). 
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Government support can grant firms resource advantages in overseas investment to 
compensate for their lack of firm-specific advantages…When making strategic 
decisions, managers of SOEs may factor in the possibility that further supports, either 
formally or informally, will be available in unexpected adverse circumstances. Such 
managerial cognition influences decision-makers’ risk perception, and leads managers 
to downplay the role of risks in outward FDI (Buckley et al., 2007)… With perceived 
government backing combined with below-market cost of capital, SOEs are able to 
bear short-term loss.  
(Cui & Jiang, 2012, p. 268) 
Luo et al. (2010) also developed ‘the logic that OFDI promotion policies set by emerging market 
governments are economically imperative and institutionally complementary to offsetting 
competitive disadvantages of emerging market enterprises in global competition’ (p. 68). They 
argue, therefore, that ‘governmental promotion of OFDI is a legitimate political action needed to 
help compensate for EMEs’ competitive disadvantages and organisational deficiencies so that 
they can better compete against their much more experienced counterparts from advanced 
economies (ibid).  This view has been echoed in a great number of recent academic contributions 
to the discussion on EM MNEs. Thus, in the Chinese case, it is again suggested ‘the evidence 
supports the view that government lays the foundations for the international expansion of 
Chinese firms (Peng et al., 2008)’ (C. Wang et al., 2012, p. 668). As such, showing that Chinese 
MNEs international expansion is ‘institutionally embedded’ also points to the ‘importance of 
looking beyond firm boundaries to understand the origins of OFDI from emerging markets (Meyer 
& Peng, 2005)’ (Wang et al., 2012, p. 671). Wang et al. (2012) also note how SOEs have 
technological advantages ‘by accessing the findings of public R&D, patents and other government 
controlled assets unavailable to other firms’ (p. 662). In this light it is also interesting that some 
studies find that SAS is more common among SOEs than private businesses (T. Alon, 2010; 
Ramasamy et al., 2012). This may also influence the ability of Chinese MNEs that are recipients 
of such policies (i.e. maybe state owned firms)  to successfully integrate the intangible strategic 
assets they are tasked with acquiring (Deng, 2009; Luo et al., 2010). 
Despite the plethora of literature arguing state support for FDI may lead to more asset-seeking, 
few if any studies comment on what policies are used to help Chinese MNEs absorb strategic 
assets. It does not follow, for example, that even if SOEs are given greater support, they are 
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necessarily more successful at harnessing or absorbing intangible strategic assets. They may well 
be less successful than private sector MNEs. Morck et al. (2008), for example, point to the wide 
range of ‘profound institutional infirmities’, including poor corporate governance and a state 
directed banking system, as ‘reasons for concern’ about the economic rationale for such state 
supported acquisitions (p. 347). Others also note that ‘the efficiency and incentives to learn are 
low in Chinese SOEs (Fan, 1998) because of the central government’s soft budget constraint, the 
lack of well-defined property rights, and the focus on both economic and non-economic goals’ 
(C. Wang & Kafouros, 2009, p. 610). So even if SAS acquisitions may be more frequent among 
SOEs, it is not clear they will be any more successful at absorbing the acquired strategic assets, 
be it at home or abroad. Indeed, it may well be worse. 
Hypothesis 3a: The innovative performance of strategic asset related foreign 
acquisitions of Chinese state-owned MNEs is inferior to private sector MNEs.  
Hypothesis 3b: The innovative performance of the domestic operations of Chinese 
state-owned MNEs undertaking strategic asset related foreign acquisitions is inferior to 
that of private sector MNEs.  
 
3.3 Data and methodology 
This study focuses on the acquisition and absorption of intangible strategic assets by Chinese 
MNEs undertaking acquisitions to developed markets. Acquisitions and not greenfield 
investments are used as acquisitions are generally considered to be the primary mechanism used 
to acquire strategic assets by Chinese MNEs (as evidenced in chapter two of this thesis). In a 
recent summary of the literature on MNE entry mode, for example, it was concluded that: ‘MNEs 
lacking host-country or industry-specific knowledge are more likely to choose acquisitions to 
efficiently obtain this tacit knowledge, and can thus be considered to be resource or strategic-
asset-seekers’ (Slangen & Hennart, 2007, p. 411).  This view is also representative of the vast 
majority of work looking at EM MNEs (Deng, 2009; Luo & Tung, 2007; Rui & Yip, 2008).  
As I am specifically interested in the innovative performance of strategic asset-seeking 
acquisitions to developed markets I investigate the efficacy of Chinese MNE SAS acquisitions in 
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the three markets where strategic assets are most abundant: Europe14 (EU), United States (US) 
and Japan (JP).  The innovation triad of EU, the US and Japan was selected as these constitute the 
largest developed markets in the world and are widely accepted as the most important sources 
of intangible strategic assets. The vast majority of patents granted worldwide during the defined 
period of study, 1998-2010, for instance, were in the innovation triad (WIPO, 2012). These 
markets not only possess a large share of strategic assets, they also have superior institutions 
which create a functioning market for such assets (i.e. a body of law which requires accurate 
reporting of the value of such intangible assets and redress should there be foul play). Chinese 
FDI data to the innovation triad is also comparatively reliable and detailed. 
I use event study methodology to test whether the number of patent applications showed 
abnormal increases or decreases after the acquisition of an EU, US or Japanese company by a 
Chinese MNE. Patents are generally considered a reasonably good indicator of a firm’s ability to 
innovate. As such, this study focuses on pre and post patent generation in the acquired firms as 
well as their domestic acquirers.  Whilst conceptually there is a drawback to this somewhat 
restricted definition of strategic asset seeking (for example, brands and management know-how 
are also talked about as desirable strategic assets that Chinese MNEs seek in markets such as the 
US – see section 2.3.1), patents provide a window into the efficacy of the internalisation of 
innovative processes. In a recent review of the innovation literature, moreover, it was concluded 
that ‘innovation as an outcome [i.e. patents] is usually the key dependent variable in empirical 
studies related to innovation’ (Crossan & Apaydin, 2010, p. 1169). Research expenditures are 
sometimes used as proxies for SAS (Chung & Alcácer, 2002; Halvorsen, 2012; Kornecki & 
Ekanayake, 2011). These, however, measure inputs into innovation, not actual outputs. For this 
reason, it has been argued that patents ‘are a better indicator of the availability of strategic assets 
in host country’ (Beule & Bulcke, 2012, p. 18) (see also Pradhan (2009). 
Comparatively few studies looking at EM MNE FDI strategies take a dynamic, longitudinal 
approach to understanding the trajectory of their OFDI and international expansion strategies 
(Fortanier & Tulder, 2009). Event Study methodology, however, is well suited to addressing this 
                                                            
14 The definition of European is taken from the European Patent Office.  See epo.org for more details. 
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lacunae. Further, the event study approach, while first developed for use in finance, is also ideal 
for understanding many other types of questions, such as how technological development has 
evolved in response to EM MNEs (Ahern, 2009; Corrado, 2011). Recently, the event study 
approach has been used to see how acquisitions of EM MNEs of developed market firms impact 
their share prices (Aybar & Ficici, 2009).  These studies, however, do not distinguish between 
acquisitions undertaken explicitly for strategic-asset-seeking purposes or specifically look to the 
strategic asset seeking question. Thus, it is not possible to infer a great deal about the success of 
strategic asset seeking acquisitions from these studies.  In order to address this specific question, 
a more direct approach is required. We, therefore, include only acquisitions in which the firm 
being acquired has successfully been granted at least one patent either before or after being 
acquired by a Chinese firm.  Although not perfect, this method allows us to analyse the majority 
of SAS-related transactions regardless of industry. 
The Thomson One Banker database was used to locate Chinese MNE acquisitions in the EU, US 
and Japan, starting from 2010 and going back.  I then went through each transaction manually to 
ensure its validity.  Next, I searched for historical patenting activity for each EU, US and Japanese 
company in its respective domestic patenting authority 15 .  An initial search for Chinese 
acquisitions in the US yielded 268 deals.  Upon further inspection, this was decreased to 241 
acquisitions which actually took place and had post acquisition ownership levels of at least 10%.  
Of these 241 observations, 32 could not be used and in 161 acquisitions the target (i.e. US firm) 
did not register any patents either before or after the acquisition.  An example of an unusable 
observation is typified as a Chinese firm acquiring only a division or branch of a company, but all 
patenting activity was registered through the target firm’s parent company. In this way, it is 
impossible to delineate for which patents a given branch was responsible. This left us with 47 
usable observations in the US to analyse the first hypothesis.  Identical processes were performed 
for acquisitions performed by Chinese MNEs in the EU and Japan, yielding 23 and 13 observations, 
respectively.  The number of patents registered by a given target company ranged from a single 
patent, for example, in Alibaba.com’s acquisition of Vendio Services (a US-based ecommerce 
                                                            
15 The patenting authority of the US is the United States Patenting and Trademark Office (uspto.gov); EU is European 
Patent Office (epo.org); JP is Japan Patent Office (jpo.go.jp). 
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software developer) in 2010 to 313 patents when Shanggong purchased Duerkopp Adler (a 
German-based sewing machine manufacturer) in 2004. 
In order to analyse my second hypothesis, I also gathered domestic patenting activity data for 
the acquiring firms (i.e. Chinese firms).  I limited my search in this case to Chinese MNEs which 
acquired a firm in the EU, US or Japan which previously displayed innovative capability (i.e. the 
sample firms from the first hypothesis). In many cases the Chinese MNE was a member of a larger 
group.  In these cases it is assumed the technological capability acquired by the Chinese MNE 
may be disseminated among other group members.  In some cases the company listed as the 
acquirer seemed to be a firm incorporated in a tax haven with little substantive activity. In light 
of this, domestic patenting activity data were gathered for the entire business group of each 
observation16.  This, however, made gathering data for extremely large business groups (i.e. 
Huawei, TCL, COSCO, Geely, China National Agrochemical, etc.) impractical. As an aside, when 
searching for patents in English, the search results invariably missed observations. Searching in 
Chinese, therefore, was the only way to accurately gather these data.  This was not found to be 
an issue in EU, US or Japanese databases.  Some Chinese firms, such as China Travel International 
Investment, did not engage in patenting activity in either the pre or post crisis periods, and were 
thus excluded from the study.  Excluding firms which did not register any patents as well as 
excluding those with supra-copious patents effectively cut the ‘tails’ off the sample and leaving 
a more normalized sample.  After excluding business groups which were too large to include and 
Chinese companies which bought an innovative firm in EU, the US or Japan but did not 
themselves have any patents, 50 observations were left.  The company included with the most 
patents registered was Shoudu Iron and Steel with 2,437 registered patents. 
 
3.4 The model 
The event study approach was initially developed to measure the effect of an event on stock 
prices (Dodd & Warner, 1983).  This approach is adapted to measure the effect of an event on 
innovative capacity.  I do so looking at yearly quarters rather than days and patents rather than 
                                                            
16 The patenting authority of China is the State Intellectual Property Office of the P.R.C. (sipo.gov.cn) 
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stock prices. Event study methodology has been used outside of finance in many non-stock 
market-related studies such as the impact of professional sport franchises on local US economies 
(Lertwachara & Cochran, 2007), institutional impacts of currency crises (Shimpalee & Breuer, 
2006), and the aftermath of civil war (S. Chen, Loayza, & Reynal-Querol, 2008). Ergo, I am not 
undertaking a new methodological interpretation of established event study methodology.  That 
said, I am not aware of any other studies which specifically employ the event study approach in 
the analysis of patenting activity. The event study approach employed here is based on 
estimating pre-acquisition (estimation window) patenting activity for each firm in the sample and 
then calculating abnormal patenting activity in the post-acquisition period (event window). In 
this commonly used interpretation of event study methodology, these abnormal patents are 
assumed to reflect the firm’s reaction to the acquisition (i.e. event) (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). 
In this study, abnormal patenting activity is defined as: 
(4)  
)* = )* − 9* 
where:	
)*  is patents generated during the event window that are unexplained by normal patenting 
activity 
)* is the number of patents granted to company   at time  
9* is the normal number of patents generated during the estimation window; mathematically 
expressed as: 
(5)  
9* = 1:2* ; )*
<=->
*?<@
17 
                                                            
17 Abnormal returns are most commonly estimated by the residual from a regression of )*on a constant and some 
‘market return’ such as the S&P500 Index return for stock prices.  Ideally, I would generate a ‘market patents granted’ 
variable equal to the average number of patents granted to a company by taking the total number of patents granted 
divided by the number of companies that were granted said patents.  This type of estimation for patents was, however, 
impossible due to data limitations as the USPTO only tracks granted patents by year, not quarter, and does not keep 
any record of how many companies are granted those patents. 
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where time  = 0 is the quarter in which the acquisition occurred, time  = 1 is the first quarter 
after the acquisition, time  = −1 is the quarter directly proceeding the acquisition and so 
forth.  In this way the event window runs from time 1to 2	and spans time  = 2 − 1 + 1 
total time units.  Furthermore, the estimation window spans time 0 to 1 − quarters, or 
:2* = 1 −  − 0 + 1 total quarters when an event will not influence patents.  Under this 
interpretation, if significant, )*  represents the change in real (count) patents caused by an 
acquisition.  This shift can be either positive or negative where a negative )*  value denotes 
diminished patenting activity after an acquisition compared to normal patent generation 
behaviour. 
Every abnormal patent granted for a given firm ()*) during the event window is then tested 
for significance using t-statistics generated by the square root of the variance during the 
estimation window, defined as: 
(6)  
()) = 1:2* − 2 ; )*,
<=->
*?<@
 
As is typical in the literature, the focus then shifts to the average abnormal patents over a defined 
number of time periods after an acquisition has occurred (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997).  In this 
way, rather than investigating companies’ abnormal returns on a firm-by-firm basis, I am able to 
effectively average the results of all the firms in my sample to analyse whether a significant 
number of companies experience a significant patenting pattern in the post-acquisition period.  
The average abnormal patents, AAP, is, therefore, simply the average of all   companies’ 
abnormal patents at time  where significance is calculated using the square root of the variance: 
(7)  
* = 1;)*
B
)?=
 
(8)  
() = 1,;())
B
)?=
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Beyond evaluating if an acquisition significantly impacted patents at a specific point in time, a 
potentially more interesting question is whether that acquisition had permanent effects on 
innovation over several time periods.  While most event studies run abnormal returns tests, these 
tests do not give insight as to whether the event was significant on the whole.  To answer this 
question, cumulative abnormal patents, !)*, are estimated.  The cumulative abnormal patents 
is the sum of all abnormal patents from the beginning of the event window, 1, to time .  Each 
event can be tested for significance in its entirety using the square root of the variance, expressed 
as: 
(9)  
!)* = ; )2
*
2?<=
 
 
(10)  
 (!)*) = ( − 1 + 1)()) 
However, while finding the number of significant events is an important step, calculating the 
cumulative average abnormal patents, !* , is one of the fundamentally most important 
measures in event study methodology.  Simply put, it is used to examine whether the aggregated 
acquisitions of a sample experience significant abnormal patents. This is tested using the square 
root of the variance, expressed as: 
(11)  
!* = 1;!)*
B
)-=
 
(12)  
(!*) = 1,;(!)*)
B
)?=
 
In order to appraise the cogency of the cumulative average abnormal patents measurement, the 
generalized sign test is typically applied (Cowan, 1992).  Rather than assuming a one-half 
probability for a positive or negative abnormal patents under the null hypothesis (as was the case 
 91 
 
for the sign test used for average abnormal patents results), the generalized sign test estimates 
the proportion of negative abnormal returns during the estimation window, denoted as &̂, and 
compares that to the number of negative cumulative abnormal returns during the event window, 
denoted as %18.  The generalized sign test statistic, "*EF, is computed as: 
(13)  
"*EF = % − &̂G&̂(1 − &̂) 
I also use two additional nonparametric tests to give further support to the tests described above. 
The first tests whether the number of positive CAPs is significantly different from the number of 
negative CAPs (Doukas & Travlos, 1988).  The test-statistic is found using: 
 (14)  
'* = H − &G&(1 − &) 
where p is the probability under the null hypothesis that a CAP is either positive or negative 
(0.50), n is the number of positive plus negative CAPs, and m is the number of positive (or 
negative) CAPs. 
The second test determines whether the number of statistically significant positive or negative 
CAPs is statistically different than the number given by the probability of a type I error (Doukas 
& Travlos, 1988).  This test statistic is expressed as: 
 (15)  
'* =  − (G((1 − () 
where q is the probability of a type I error (0.05), s is the number of statistically significant 
positive/negative CAPs at the 95% level, and r is the total number of CAPs. 
Finally, if significant cumulative average abnormal patents are detected, the natural extension is 
to attempt to explain the factors that would cause the event to be significant.  This is typically 
                                                            
18 Again, the generalized sign test can just as easily be used to test for positive cumulative abnormal returns by 
denoting &̂ and % as the proportion of positive abnormal returns during the estimation window and the number of 
positive cumulative abnormal returns during the event window, respectively. 
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done using ordinary least squares to regress a number of firm-level explanatory variables against 
individual firms’ cumulative abnormal patents. Unfortunately, the number of firms with firm-
level data available (i.e. annual reports) brought the sample size down to 37.  Thus, unlike event 
study methodology, running regressions on such a small sample would have limited explanatory 
power. Even in event study methodology, however, cumulative abnormal patenting results could 
potentially be biases by a small sample size (i.e. 10 or fewer observations). The sample size used 
here is adequate for producing valid event study results. 
In lieu of regressing cumulative abnormal patents against firm-level determinants, I 
disaggregated my sample into groups such as ownership (state owned and private) and estimated 
one-way analysis of variance (Anova) models to aid in understanding differences between 
groups.  Essentially, Anova models calculate and compare variability in order to determine 
whether the means between two or more groups are different.  This is generally expressed as: 
(16)  
;I> −	̅K,
8
>?=
 
where xj is the value of observation x in group j and ̅ is the mean of all observations in the list 
(i.e. all groups).  This is termed the variability of the data, or otherwise known as the sum of 
squares (SS). 
I partition the total variability19 into two parts: 1) between group variability20 (experimental 
variance) and 2) within group variability21 (error variance). The ratio of the two parts is then taken 
(i.e. experimental variance divided by error variance) to determine the total SS.  The degrees of 
freedom are noted and, subsequently, the mean square is calculated as the SS divided by degrees 
of freedom.  The F ratio (mean square between groups divided by mean square within groups) is 
                                                            
19 Total variability is defined as:L ; IMN 	− 	 ̅MNK,8,>?=
.
)?=
 
20 Between group variability is defined as: ; nMI̅M 	− 	 ̅MNK,.)?=  
21 Within group variability is defined as: L ; IMN −	 ̅MNK,8,>?=
.
)?=
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then determined and significance is subsequently reported.  If the F ratio = 1 there is no 
difference between groups.  If variation between groups is greater than variation within groups 
the F ratio will be greater than 1 and there may be differences between groups.  Significance of 
the F ratio indicates there are differences between the mean cumulative abnormal returns of 
two or more groups (i.e. ownership structures).  This analysis simply indicates the presence of 
differences between groups, however, but does not specify where the differences occur. 
If results are significant, a post-hoc test can be run to determine where the differences lie.  The 
most commonly used post hoc tests are Scheffe and Games-Howell.  If variances are 
homogeneous Scheffe tests are most appropriate. Conversely, if variances are heterogeneous 
Games-Howell tests are superior. 
 
3.5 Results 
Cumulative average abnormal patents are analysed using two sets of estimation and event 
windows for granted patents.  Granted patents are used rather than applied patents as 1) I 
attempt to measure innovation as an outcome and 2) issues dates are not readily available for 
Japanese data.  For the target firms (EU, US, Japan) an estimation window of twelve quarters 
prior to and including the quarter in which the acquisition took place is used.  The target firms’ 
event window spans from eleven quarters after an event to fifteen quarters after an event.  For 
the acquirer firms (Chinese) an estimation window of twelve quarters prior to and including the 
acquisition period and an event window of four to eight quarters after the acquisition took place 
is used.  As I am not aware of any previous studies using event study methodology to analyse 
patenting activity, I used descriptive statistics as the basis for determining the length of my 
estimation and event windows (see Table 6). I determined the best approach for determining 
estimation windows was to calculate the minimum number of days it took a given patent to go 
from applied to granted.  In my sample, the minimum number of days was 60.  This indicates it 
took less than one quarter for some patents in the sample to be granted.  As the purpose of the 
estimation window is to estimate the ‘normal’ patenting activity of a given firm, in the case of 
Chinese patenting activity, time zero (the time period in which the acquisition took place) should 
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be included in the estimation window.  Starting my estimation window at twelve quarters prior 
to an acquisition is an arbitrary decision based on testing several different estimation windows 
without finding any significant changes in results.  The starting quarter for the event window was 
determined using the mean and median amounts of time between patent application and award.  
In the case of Chinese patenting activity in the sample, the mean number of days is 463 and the 
median is 344.  This indicates the event window should start at 463/90 = 5.14 quarters or 344/90 
= 3.82 quarters.  In this case, I chose to use four quarters after an acquisition as the beginning of 
my event window as this allows me to lengthen the total time period of the event window 
without dropping the most recent observations in the sample.  In other words, I can use 
acquisitions up to the fourth quarter of 2010, lag the start date of the event window four quarters 
and still have patent and market data to the end of 2012 as well as an adequately long event 
window period (four periods).  The end of the event window was determined by the availability 
of data for the most recent observations.  If the event window spans to eight quarters past the 
acquisition only 49 observations were usable.  If the event window was expanded to 12 periods, 
only 36 observations were available. Extending to 16 quarters allowed only 28 usable 
observations.  For this sample, in no cases did model results which ended the event window 
either 8 or 16 periods after an event change signs or significance (see Appendix A).  I, therefore, 
use the longest event window possible which does not drop a significant number of observations. 
Finally, two companies (Shanghai Electric and Suntech) made acquisitions in two or more 
different regions in overlapping event windows.  Including overlapping data such as these can 
potentially skew results. I estimated event study models both including and excluding the 
overlapping observations.  Results remained robust across all models for both domestic and 
foreign models including and excluding these observations.  See Appendix B for a comparison of 
results.  The results presented below include all observations. Identical methodology was used in 
the case of determining estimation and event windows of foreign patents; the median time 
between application and acceptance for US patents in my data was 959 days=10.65 quarters.  I 
would then use quarters 11 to 15 in my event window.  Doing this, however, resulted in a 
decrease in measurable events (due to the fact that many mergers happened less than 15 
quarters before 2012:Q4; the end of the data sample) from 70 to 37.  Even though using quarters 
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11-15 is theoretically consistent with the Chinese event window, I opt for more observations and 
choose an event window from quarters 4 to 8 which includes 70 events.  This change in the event 
window does not change the event study results, as can be seen in Appendix C.  
Using this adaptation to typical event study methodology, my results indicate foreign firms’ 
innovative activity does not change after being acquired by a Chinese firm. See Table 7.  See 
Appendix D for the base programming code used for these models.  These results are confirmed 
by the generalized sign test (a non-parametric measure).  The ratio of positive to negative CAPs 
indicates far more firms experience a decline in patenting activity, but results are significant for 
only a small minority of firms.  Overall, patents are on average estimated to decrease by less than 
one patent over the event window.  Thus, hypothesis one is rejected: The innovative 
performance of foreign strategic asset acquisitions of Chinese MNEs does not significantly 
deteriorate over time. 
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics of Patents Granted by Quarter 
Foreign Target Patents 
Type Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
All 1470 0.408 1.264 0 14 
SOE 609 0.432 1.273 0 14 
Non-SOE 861 0.391 1.258 0 14 
Chinese Acquiror Patents 
Type Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
All 1029 7.601 15.46 0 113 
SOE 378 9.349 17.51 0 113 
Non-SOE 651 6.585 14.04 0 88 
All data described above is from the beginning of the estimation 
window, 12 quarters before the merger, to the end of the 
event window I use throughout the rest of the paper, 8 
quarters after merger. 
 
It should also be noted that the model results which use mean estimated rather than market 
estimated data are analogous. Likewise, results for percentage change in patents rather than the 
number of patents also yields very similar results.  See Appendix D for these results.  This indicates 
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robustness across event study techniques.  Moving forward I report only the number of mean 
estimated patents.  All market and percentage change results are available upon request. 
Cumulative average abnormal patents results for the acquiror home country (China) indicate 
innovative activity was comparatively and highly significantly enhanced in the post-acquisition 
period. See Table 8.  Supporting non-parametric tests confirm CAAP results. Mean estimated 
CAAP models show an average increase of nearly 40 patents per firm over and above the 
number of normal patents generated eight periods after the acquisition.  This number drops 
slightly to around 27 patents when taking into account the upward market trend of Chinese 
patenting activity generally and remains highly significant. This provides strong evidence that 
the domestic innovative performance of Chinese MNEs that undertake foreign strategic asset 
related acquisitions improves over time.  Thus, hypothesis two is confirmed. 
Table 7: Event Study Results for Foreign Patents 
Foreign Target Results 
Quarters@ CAAP (t-stat) GS+ GS-# Pos:Neg 95% Sig^ 
Abnormal Patents Estimated using Mean Estimated Return--70 Events 
4 -0.23 (-0.43) -2.18** 1.70* 5:39*** 2:1 
4-5 -0.26 (-0.35) -1.23 1.22 8:37*** 5*:3 
4-6 -0.47 (-0.50) -0.91 0.98 9:36*** 3:3 
4-7 -0.71 (-0.66) -1.23 1.46 8:38*** 3:3 
4-8 -0.79 (-0.65) -0.59 0.98 10:36*** 3:6** 
Abnormal Patents Estimated Using Market Estimated Return (WIPO Data)--47 Events 
4 -0.30 (-0.65) -0.82 0.67 7:20** 2:2 
4-5 -0.51 (-0.79) -0.08 0.37 9:19* 2:5*** 
4-6 -0.81 (-1.03) -0.08 0.37 9:19* 2:6*** 
4-7 -1.13 (-1.24) -0.45 0.97 8:21** 3:6*** 
4-8 -1.30 (-1.28) 0.28 0.37 10:19 3:8*** 
***=p<.01 ; **=p<.05; *=p<.10 
Estimation window ranges 0 to 12 quarters before merger 
@ The event window begins 4 quarters after an event.  4-7 indicates the cumulative abnormal patents 
from 4quarters to 7 quarters after a merger is announced. 
# A negative t-statistic on the generalized sign test indicates the opposite of the sign in question.  A 
negative t-statistic for the negative generalized sign test indicates that significantly less negative CAPs were 
observe than predicted—this indicates there were significantly more positive CAPs than predicted. 
^ Denotes the number of events that are significant at the 95% level; both positive and negative 
(Positive:Negative) 
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Table 8: Event Study Results for Chinese Patents 
Chinese Aquiror Results 
Quarters@ CAAP (t-stat) GS+ GS-# Pos:Neg 95% Sig^ 
Abnormal Patents Estimated using Mean Estimated Return--49 Events 
4 8.69* (1.81) 5.98*** -4.26*** 30:10*** 15***:0 
4-5 15.84** (2.34) 7.31*** -5.41*** 34:6*** 20***:1 
4-6 25.27*** (3.04) 7.97*** -5.41*** 36:6*** 26***:1 
4-7 32.61*** (3.4) 7.97*** -5.41*** 36:6*** 27***:0 
4-8 39.95*** (3.73) 8.97*** -5.69*** 39:5*** 28***:0 
Abnormal Patents Estimated Using Market Estimated Return (WIPO Data)--35 Events 
4 5.81* (1.7) 3.56*** -2.92*** 20:8** 9***:0 
4-5 11.22** (2.33) 4.3*** -3.59*** 22:6*** 14***:2 
4-6 18.59*** (3.15) 5.04*** -3.59*** 24:6*** 16***:1 
4-7 22.45*** (3.29) 4.67*** -3.25*** 23:7*** 17***:2 
4-8 27.21*** (3.57) 5.78*** -3.93*** 26:5*** 17***:2 
***=p<.01 ; **=p<.05; *=p<.10 
Estimation window ranges 0 to 12 quarters before merger 
@ The event window begins 4 quarters after an event; the median time between application and approval for 
patents in China in my data.  4-7 indicates the cumulative abnormal patents from 4 quarters to 7 quarters 
after a merger is announced. 
# A negative t-statistic on the generalized sign test indicates the opposite of the sign in question.  A negative t-
statistic for the negative generalized sign test indicates that significantly less negative CAPs were observe 
than predicted—this indicates there were significantly more positive CAPs than predicted. 
^ Denotes the number of events that are significant at the 95% level; both positive and negative 
(Positive:Negative) 
 
To test the impact of ownership on innovative capability (hypotheses 3a and 3b), the sample is 
first disaggregated by ownership (state and private) and run as separate event study models.  
CAAP results for both private and state-owned models closely mirrored results for the overall 
sample, and thus each other. See Tables 9 and 10.  This gave preliminary evidence differences 
between groups may not exist.  After validating Anova methodology was appropriate for these 
data, models were run for individual firms’ CAPs in both groups.  No statistically significant 
differences were found between state-owned and private-owned Chinese firms in either 
acquiror (China) or target (EU, US, Japan) markets. See Table 11.  Thus, hypotheses that the 
innovative performance of strategic asset related foreign acquisitions of Chinese SOEs is inferior 
to private sector MNEs (H3a) and the innovative performance of domestic operations of 
Chinese SOEs undertaking strategic asset related foreign acquisitions is inferior to private sector 
MNEs (H3b) are both rejected. 
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Table 9: Event Study Results for State Owned Enterprises Aquirors 
Foreign Target Results 
Quarters CAAP (t-stat) GS+ GS-# Pos:Neg 95% Sig^ 
Abnormal Patents Estimated using Mean Estimated Return--29 Events 
4 -0.35 (-0.56) -1.64 1.29 2:18*** 1:0 
4-5 -0.42 (-0.48) -0.22 0.54 5:16** 4***:1 
4-6 -0.71 (-0.66) 0.26 0.17 6:15* 2:2 
4-7 -1.19 (-0.96) -0.22 0.54 5:16** 2:2 
4-8 -1.58 (-1.14) -0.22 0.54 5:16** 2:2 
Chinese Acquiror Results 
Quarters CAAP (t-stat) GS+ GS- Pos:Neg 95% Sig 
Abnormal Patents Estimated using Mean Estimated Return--18 Events 
4 8.78** -2.86 2.60** -2.43** 9:2** 4***:0 
4-5 11.88** -2.73 2.03** -1.90** 8:3* 5***:2** 
4-6 18.60*** -3.49 3.18*** -1.90** 10:3** 7***:1 
4-7 21.15*** -3.44 2.60** -1.36* 9:4* 6***:2* 
4-8 25.36*** -3.69 2.60** -1.36* 9:4* 6***:2* 
***=p<.01 ; **=p<.05; *=p<.10 
Estimation window ranges 0 to 12 quarters before merger 
# A negative t-statistic on the generalized sign test indicates the opposite of the sign in question.  A 
negative t-statistic for the negative generalized sign test indicates that significantly less negative CAPs were 
observe than predicted—this indicates there were significantly more positive CAPs than predicted. 
^ Denotes the number of events that are significant at the 95% level; both positive and negative 
(Positive:Negative) 
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Table 10: Event Study Results for Non-State Owned Enterprises Acquirors 
Foreign Target Results 
Quarters CAAP (t-stat) GS+ GS-# Pos:Neg 95% Sig^ 
Abnormal Patents Estimated using Mean Estimated Return--41 Events 
4 -0.15 (-0.31) -1.46 1.14 3:21*** 1:1 
4-5 -0.15 (-0.22) -1.46 1.14 3:21*** 1:1 
4-6 -0.3 (-0.36) -1.46 1.14 3:21*** 1:1 
4-7 -0.37 (-0.39) -1.46 1.46 3:22*** 1:1 
4-8 -0.23 (-0.21) -0.6 0.83 5:20*** 1:3 
Chinese Acquiror Results 
Quarters CAAP (t-stat) GS+ GS- Pos:Neg 95% Sig 
Abnormal Patents Estimated using Mean Estimated Return--31 Events 
4 8.19* -1.86 5.22*** -3.12*** 18:7** 8***:0 
4-5 16.42** -2.64 6.55*** -4.20*** 21:4*** 12***:0 
4-6 27.10*** -3.56 6.55*** -4.20*** 21:4*** 16***:0 
4-7 33.65*** -3.83 7.00*** -4.56*** 22:3*** 17***:0 
4-8 40.45*** -4.12 8.34*** -4.92*** 25:2*** 18***:0 
***=p<.01 ; **=p<.05; *=p<.10 
Estimation window ranges 0 to 12 quarters before merger 
# A negative t-statistic on the generalized sign test indicates the opposite of the sign in question.  A 
negative t-statistic for the negative generalized sign test indicates that significantly less negative CAPs were 
observe than predicted—this indicates there were significantly more positive CAPs than predicted. 
^ Denotes the number of events that are significant at the 95% level; both positive and negative 
(Positive:Negative) 
 
 
  
 100 
 
Table 11: One-Way ANOVA Results for State Owned and Non-State Owned Chinese (Acquiror) 
Firms 
Foreign Target Results 
Quarters SOE Non-SOE F-Statistic p-value 
Abnormal Patents Estimated using Mean Estimated Return 
4 -0.35 -0.15 0.54 0.467 
4-5 -0.42 -0.15 0.20 0.654 
4-6 -0.71 -0.3 0.25 0.616 
4-7 -1.19 -0.37 0.55 0.462 
4-8 -1.58 -0.23 0.87 0.354 
Chinese Acquiror Results 
Quarters SOE Non-SOE F-Statistic p-value 
Abnormal Patents Estimated using Mean Estimated Return 
4 8.78 8.19 0.07 0.791 
4-5 11.88 16.42 0.04 0.843 
4-6 18.60 27.10 0.19 0.661 
4-7 21.15 33.65 0.04 0.835 
4-8 25.36 40.45 0.01 0.936 
***=p<.01 ; **=p<.05; *=p<.10 
Estimation window ranges 0 to 12 quarters before merger 
 
 
3.6 Discussion and conclusions 
The question of whether EM MNEs are acquiring strategic assets and using these assets to 
develop the firm-specific ownership advantages that they themselves lack is central to the 
current conceptual discussion and empirical investigations of EM MNE FDI strategies.  At last 
count, for example, there were over 138 articles on Chinese MNEs (Deng, 2013) alone and a 
considerably larger research base looking at EM MNEs (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012; Hennart, 2012; 
Ramamurti, 2012b), with many exploring this very question. Within this literature, moreover, a 
growing consensus seems to be emerging arguing that EM MNEs, including Chinese MNEs, look 
to acquire the intangible strategic assets that they themselves lack via FDI. They do so in 
particular via aggressive acquisitions, often to psychically distant developed markets (Deng, 
2009; Luo & Tung, 2007; Sun et al., 2012). Unlike their developed market counterparts, therefore, 
Chinese MNEs today may try to ‘springboard’ to the technological frontier, using non-incremental 
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learning processes by directly acquiring cutting edge capabilities from their developed market 
counterparts. The empirical finding that Chinese MNEs do target strategic assets via FDI, 
however, is puzzling. It is puzzling as it is still not at all clear how Chinese MNEs are actually able 
to harness, absorb and exploit these acquired strategic assets.  Indeed, intuitively one would 
assume this to be a major challenge for these Chinese MNEs, most having comparatively little 
useful experience of such processes from which to draw. To date, however, there has still been 
very little research in this area, investigating how such acquisitions perform, specifically in terms 
of their generation of further intangible strategic assets – a key criteria for measuring the success 
of these investments. If Chinese MNEs are to foster their own dynamic capabilities, the elixir of 
sustained growth and performance, it will be necessary for their foreign acquisitions to also 
succeed.  Some, though arguably still a minority, have openly questioned whether Chinese MNEs 
have sufficient capabilities to properly exploit their acquisitions (De Beule & Duanmu, 2012; 
Narula & Dunning, 2010; Rugman & Li, 2007). These studies also make the important point that 
it is not reasonable to make the jump from the finding that Chinese MNEs are strategic asset 
seekers to outright rejection of the OLI model, because of the question of absorptive capacity:  
‘Although my results indicate that these Chinese multinationals seem to target high-tech 
manufacturing firms in technologically advanced countries, this does not automatically imply the 
active augmentation of existing ownership advantages given their supposed lack of absorptive 
capacity’ (De Beule & Duanmu, 2012, p. 271).  
Results from this study, some of the first to look at the actual outcomes of strategic asset 
related FDI in greater detail, show no statistically significant evidence regarding the increased 
patenting activity in the acquired firms. It is not, therefore, possible to yet draw strong 
conclusions regarding the way in which EM MNEs manage technological and innovative 
performance in their foreign acquisitions. Suffice to say, there is no evidence that Chinese 
MNEs are enhancing or destroying innovative competency in their acquired firms. Chinese firms 
may be acquiring advanced economy firms capable of generating cutting edge innovation not in 
hopes of embedding these SAS acquisitions directly and immediately into their existing 
organisational frameworks, but to support the non-manufacturing portion of the subsidiary at 
arms-length (i.e. through cash injections and other forms of financing) (Estrin & Meyer, 2011; 
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Rui & Yip, 2008). In this way, Chinese firms allow the original creators of an innovation to 
continue pushing the world-leading technological threshold for a given innovation in the 
advanced economy (Grossman & Hart, 1986; Meyer & Estrin, 2001; Morck et al., 2008). When 
Chinese MNE Mindray Medical International purchased the patient monitoring business of US-
based Datascope Corporation for $202 million in 2008, for example, it stated that, 
“[Datascope’s] existing management team is expected to continue post-closing without 
significant changes along with the rest of the patient monitoring division staff” (Mindray, 2011). 
Once an innovation has been codified through patenting, that innovation can easily be 
transferred back to China for domestic market exploitation (Dhanaraj, Lyles, Steensma, & 
Tihanyi, 2004). While innovative activity in the foreign firm does not significantly improve after 
acquisition by a Chinese firm, it does not significantly deteriorate either. This indicates a steady 
stream of products and services patented in the most stringent patenting environments (i.e. US, 
EU and Japan) are available to Chinese firms for immediate deployment in advanced economies 
and further development to suit local domestic markets. In other words, our findings on the 
outcomes of Chinese SAS acquisitions suggest a form of ‘springboarding’ to the technological 
frontier may be taking place (Luo & Tung, 2007). 
Findings regarding domestic technology patenting performance in the wake of a foreign strategic 
asset related acquisition also provide potentially important insights for further conceptualizing 
Chinese MNE FDI strategy. These results suggest that a form of international technology transfer 
may well be taking place. Chinese MNEs undertaking strategic asset seeking appear to engage in 
forms of ‘technological looting’ – making foreign strategic asset acquisitions primarily to exploit 
them within their domestic markets.  This finding is potentially important, as it lends further 
weight to the emerging view that the OLI model may not adequately explain Chinese MNE FDI 
behaviour. This argument is made, however, not because the OLI model does not properly 
explain why Chinese MNEs target strategic-assets with the aim of developing their own firm-
specific ownership advantages (by absorption of intangibles, for example). For it does not seem 
there is yet much evidence to suggest they are fully capable of absorbing their strategic asset 
acquisitions (and in doing so building firm-specific ownership advantages that would make them 
capable of competing internationally). Rather, this assertion is based on findings in this study and 
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the more recent criticism relating to OLI model’s assumption of ‘location’ advantages being freely 
available to all (the ‘L’ in ‘OLI’) (Hennart, 2012). This is because if Chinese MNEs do indeed have 
privileged access to complementary local resources, from which they can earn monopoly rents, 
there are very strong incentives to engage in the type of ‘technological looting’ found in this 
study’s sample firms. If such complementary local resources were not available, it is not clear 
why innovative developed market MNEs would not choose to directly enter China. In other 
words, the economic logic of the type of ‘technological looting’ found in this study, owing to 
prevailing firm specific advantages of incumbent developed market MNEs, would be greatly 
diminished. As such, results from this study lead to the interesting possibility that the OLI model 
may not be effective in explaining Chinese MNE FDI, but not primarily because of the more talked 
about conundrum of the pervasive rise of SAS related FDI in Chinese MNEs. Rather, results 
suggest the weakness in the OLI model may be related to its restrictive assumptions about 
location advantages and their availability to all (Hennart, 2012). This explanation, if true, would 
also explain why Chinese MNE FDI strategies appear to be different to their developed market 
counterparts. 
A striking example of SAS and subsequent technological looting can be found in the Chinese 
organization ZJF Group's purchase of the Ireland-based semiconductor firm Firecomms Ltd.  In 
the fourth quarter of 2010 Firecomms Ltd. become a wholly owned subsidiary of ZJF Group.  Prior 
to this acquisition Firecomms had a steady stream of patents in the plastic optical fiber industry 
(see Table 12). 
 
Table 12: Firecomms patenting activity (granted patents) from 2003-2013 (acquisition year in 
bold) 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
1 4 1 1 3 2 3 3 1 2 0 
Source: European Patent Office 
As aforementioned, ZJF acquired Firecomms in the fourth quarter of 2010 (November).  Patents 
'in the pipeline' were subsequently granted in Europe the following year and a half - no patents 
were granted to Firecomms in Europe after the second quarter of 2012. Interestingly, Firecomms 
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was granted its first Chinese patent in the third quarter of 2009, before it was acquired by ZJF.  
This same patent was granted in Europe in the first quarter of 2008 (the application date for this 
patent was second quarter 2006 in Europe and almost exactly one year later in China).  By 2010 
Firecomms largest market was China and it was beginning to ramp up production in hopes of 
competing for larger contracts as many 'provincial governments [began] to classify Plastic Optical 
Fiber as a major construction focus across China' (Firecomms, 2010).  However, many of these 
contracts were being granted to indigenous Chinese firms with mass manufacturing capabilities, 
but not any substantial technological capabilities, such as ZJF.  While Firecomms had the 
capability to pursue efficient mass manufacturing processes in China, it did not have access to 
large infrastructure project purchasers/decision makers.  In other words, it did not have access 
to the complementary local resources (i.e. strong local firm-government relationships) necessary 
to exploit its firm-specific technological advantages.  In this case, the outright sale of the entire 
company seemed to be the best option.  Furthermore, after ZFJ purchased Firecomms, more 
patents which were previously granted in Europe were applied for, and subsequently granted, in 
China.  A typical example from Firecomms is the patent for an 'Optical connector'.  This patent 
was attributed to inventors Thomas Moriarty and Patrick Doyle in both Europe and China and the 
patent descriptions in both Europe and China are identical.  However, this patent was granted in 
Europe prior to ZFJ's purchase of Fireomms, but well after the acquisition in China.   
ZFJ does not seem to be interested in competing in the plastic optical fiber (POF) industry on a 
global scale.  Prior to acquiring Firecomms, I was not able to find a single patent registered to ZFJ 
in POF or related areas.  After the purchase of Firecomms, the only patents registered to ZFJ 
affiliates were patents Firecomms was previously granted in Europe. Furthermore, Firecomms 
has not undertaken any patenting activity, aside from patents which were 'in the pipeline' before 
being acquired, in the post-acquisition period.   As far as I am aware, ZFJ was simply a 
manufacturing firm with strong government connections before the acquisition of Firecomms.  It 
then leveraged its newfound burst of world-leading technology against those relationships to win 
provincial infrastructure contracts.  The acquisition of Firecomms by ZFJ, therefore, represents a 
striking example of a Chinese company acquiring a European firm strictly to gain access to its 
technology for exploitation in its home market, or in other words technological looting. 
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In the above case the Chinese company which acquired the innovative European company was 
not itself active in innovation.  Far more common in the sample of this study is the case of a 
Chinese company engaging in innovation at home, but wishing to enhance its innovative 
capabilities (at home) through the acquisition of an innovative foreign firm.  One typical example 
of this type of behaviour is Shanghai, China-based Spreadtrum Communications’ acquisition of 
San Diego, US-based Quorum Systems in 2007. Spreadtrum Communications is a privately owned 
wireless baseband chipset provider and Quorum Systems is a fabless semiconductor company.  
In the five years leading up to and including the year of the acquisition (2003-2007) Spreadtrum 
Communications was granted a total of 80 patents in China (i.e. an average of 16 patents per 
year).  In the first year alone after acquiring Quorum Systems (2008), Spreadtrum 
Communications registered 133 patents.  Within two years of the acquisition (2008-2009), they 
were granted 224 patents.  However, in the third year after the acquisition (2010) they were 
granted just 11 patents, in the fourth year after (2011) nine patents and the fifth year after (2012) 
six patents.  See Figure 5.  Furthermore, Spreadtrum Communications was found to have its 
patents granted very quickly after application.  In many cases the time between applying for a 
patent and the patent being granted was around three months.  US patenting activity by Quorum 
Systems has had a negative trend since being acquired. 
 
Figure 5: Spreadtrum patenting activity before and after acquiring Quorum Systems in 2007 
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Source: State Intellectual Property Office of the P.R.C. 
Another example of the technological looting taking place through the acquisition of innovative 
firms in Europe, Japan and the US by Chinese companies would be the UTStarcom Holdings’ 
purchase of Pedestal Networks in 2005.  UTStarcom Holdings is a state owned enterprise based 
in Beijing, China which sells telecommunication infrastructure products and Pedestal Networks 
is a Fremont, California, US-based DSL solutions provider.  The pre and post-acquisition patenting 
trends for UTStarcom highly resemble those of the previously discussed Spreadtrum 
Communications.  See figure 6. In the case of UTStarcom, it seems there was a slightly longer lag 
between acquiring Pedestal Networks and the subsequent burst of patenting activity.  Once the 
transfer of US patents to China was complete, however, the level of patent generation remained 
higher than pre-acquisition patenting levels. 
 
Figure 6: UTStarcom patenting activity before and after acquiring Pedestal Networks in 2005 
 
Source: State Intellectual Property Office of the P.R.C. 
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the local government, as seems to have been the case for ZFJ. Nepotism such as this is generally 
found to be more prevalent in economies with developing institutions, such as China (Contractor, 
2013). 
Finally, it is argued that Chinese investments with a strategic intention of acquiring strategic 
assets ‘finds more support among state-owned firms’ (Ramasamy et al., 2012, p. 24). Others 
make the assertion that ‘among the various institutional dimensions…the role of governments 
may be of paramount importance in mid-range emerging economies’ (Hoskisson, Wright, 
Filatotchev, & Peng, 2013). This study shows, however, that even if SOEs are given more support 
to target strategic-assets (which, I believe, is as yet an unproven stereotype), they are not 
necessarily more (or less) capable of absorbing such assets. Another implication or interpretation 
of this finding could also be that, in terms of access to complementary local resources, both state 
and non-state sector appear to have equal access.  Future research should, however, still look to 
further explore not only the role of ownership (and domestic market institutions) in driving 
strategic asset seeking, but more importantly also its role in aiding absorption. For it is still not at 
all clear how governments may promote or retard absorptive capacity in MNEs. 
 
3.7 Managerial and policy relevance 
This research is highly relevant to both managerial and policy decision makers.  The findings in 
this study may give credence to the ‘go out when weak to become stronger at home’ strategy for 
managers of Chinese firms experiencing substantial domestic competitive pressure (Child & 
Rodrigues, 2005).  A parallel strategy has been successfully implemented by Haier in regards to 
customer expectations and quality levels (H. Liu & Li, 2002).  This study offers preliminary 
evidence that this strategy is also being implemented in the case of innovation generation 
through the acquisition of an innovative firm in advanced economies. In this case, the number of 
patents granted is found to be significantly larger than firms’ internal patenting activity prior to 
acquiring an innovative foreign firm and overall patenting trends in the Chinese market.  On 
average, two years after the acquisition there will be an increase of around 40 patents per year 
compared to the pre-acquisition period.  For many companies this is a substantial increase. The 
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real value of these patents to the organization, however, is not analysed in this study. Future 
research should be conducted to analyse innovative absorptive capacity as well as the real value 
of these innovations. 
For managers of firms in Europe, United States and Japan which primarily target Chinese 
consumers or would like to enter the Chinese market but do not have access to complementary 
local resources (i.e. ‘the knowledge of how to incorporate these intangibles into products that 
meet the needs and tastes of local consumers, the logistics necessary to put products within their 
reach, and all the other inputs necessary for local production’ (Hennart, 2012, p. 183)) outright 
sale of part or all of the firm to a Chinese company may be an attractive option.  When a firm 
from Europe, the United States or Japan is acquired, innovation at the firms in those countries is 
not significantly impacted, but access to CLRs in China is typically gained. 
This study is also highly applicable to current macro-level policy debates. One such area of direct 
and contemporary relevance is the middle income trap debate. The middle income trap (MIT) is 
typified by rapid economic growth at low income levels and a levelling off of growth once middle 
income status has been achieved (The World Bank, 2013).  For countries caught in the MIT 
transcendence to high-income country status is highly illusive. China's unprecedented economic 
growth over the last 30+ years has placed its population comfortably in middle income country 
status.  Some, however, question whether China's growth trends will continue.  To this end, there 
is a current debate as to whether China is destined to become 'trapped' in middle income status 
in the short to medium terms. Eichengreen, Park, and Shin (2012) state, 'At some point, high 
growth in middle income countries will come to an end' (p. 13).  They go on to conclude that 
China appears to be doing a marginally better than most middle income countries to avoid the 
middle income trap as it has made progress in scaling the technology ladder.  More specifically, 
China has taken incremental steps toward becoming an exporter of advanced technology, and 
thus alleviating the risk of becoming stuck in the MIT. 
It is well documented that the importation of advanced technology has increased the technical 
base for high tech production in indigenous Chinese firms (X. Liu & Buck, 2007).  More recently, 
product content regulations and official 'indigenous innovation' governmental campaigns have 
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also spurred the rapid build-up of advanced technological competencies through inward foreign 
direct investment, primarily in the form of joint ventures and knowledge spillovers (Woo, 2012).  
The next logical step in the progression toward becoming an innovative society, and thus taking 
one important step to averting the MIT, is the ability to internalise advanced technology from 
non-domestic sources.  A recent World Bank report has found, 'The main reason for encouraging 
outward investment is to enable Chinese multinationals to absorb foreign technology and use it 
to improve domestic production' (The World Bank, 2013, p. 421).  In the short-term absorbing 
technology and using it to improve domestic production is a worthy strategic goal.  However, in 
the medium to long-term, it will be much more important for Chinese MNEs to internalise 
capabilities to innovate rather than simply transfer explicit technological knowledge. 
This study, regarding domestic technology patenting performance in the wake of a foreign 
strategic asset related acquisition, therefore, provides potentially important insights for the MIT 
debate. These results suggest that a form of international technology transfer may well be taking 
place. Chinese MNEs undertaking strategic asset seeking appear to engage in forms of 
‘technological looting’ – making foreign strategic asset acquisitions primarily to exploit them 
within their domestic markets. This infers these firms are not interested or otherwise capable of 
competing internationally.  In other words, acquiring strategic assets from developed markets 
may help build domestic markets, but does not necessarily aid in gaining international 
competiveness – a key factor in alleviating the risk of falling into the MIT. If the primary objective 
of Chinese policy makers is to support and create internationally competitive organizations, they 
may need to reanalyse the efficacy of their macro-level policies. Future research would do well 
to link policy and economic frameworks and debates to current international business theorising 
in a more coherent manner. 
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4. Developed Economy Investment Promotion Agencies and Chinese 
Foreign Direct Investment 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Attracting foreign direct investment has become an increasingly important objective for 
developed economies.  From a policy perspective, inward FDI is perceived to generate copious 
benefits for host economies such as access to capital, productivity spillovers, innovation 
spillovers and new employment (Bobonis & Shatz, 2007). The benefits of FDI for developed 
economies, therefore, constitute a significant source of economic growth. Alfaro, Chanda, 
Kalemli-Ozean and Sayek (2006), for instance, find, ‘increases in the share of FDI or the relative 
productivity of the foreign firm leads to higher additional growth in financially developed 
economies’ (p 1). Indeed, the findings from chapter four indicate the innovative performance of 
firms which are acquired by Chinese MNEs in developed markets does not significantly change in 
the post-acquisition period. Further, when a Chinese MNE acquires an innovative developed 
market firm, local complementary resources (Hennart, 2009, 2012) are combined with firm-
specific strategic assets (such as patented technology) to be exploited in the home (Chinese) 
market. This indicates FDI from China should not only be welcomed by developed markets, but 
actively pursued due to ‘traditional’ benefits of inward FDI such as improved access to capital, 
improved employment and increased competition as well as tertiary benefits such as access to 
new market. 
In light of the perceived benefits derived from generating FDI, many developed economies have 
systematically implemented policies which target foreign MNEs.  Some policies which directly 
target FDI are, for example, tax credits (Bobonis & Shatz, 2007; C. C. Coughlin et al., 1990; K. Head 
et al., 1995), state (US) industrial programs (Woodward, 1992), foreign investment attraction 
funds (Friedman et al., 1992), pollution reduction incentives (Fox, 1996), and foreign trade zones 
(Bobonis & Shatz, 2007; K. Head et al., 1995).  Chief among foreign investment generation 
policies, however, is the establishment of investment promotion agencies (K. Head & Ries, 2010). 
IPAs encapsulate, or otherwise disseminate information about, many of the above FDI generation 
strategies. The establishment of IPAs to generate FDI is not, however, a new phenomenon.  This 
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policy initiative has been actively pursued by both developed and emerging economies for well 
over 30 years (Morisset, 2003). While the sources of IPAs have traditionally been heterogeneous 
across global economies, target economies have overwhelmingly been developed economies 
such as North America and Europe.  Historically, focusing on generating FDI from developed 
economies provided a promising scope as the vast majority of FDI flows were derived from 
developed country MNEs with significant ownership advantages.  These ownership advantages 
could be exploited abroad generating significant rents for the MNE itself and various positive 
spillovers and increased employment for the host economy (Bobonis & Shatz, 2007). 
The rise of EM MNEs has fundamentally changed the once one-way stream of FDI from developed 
economies to the rest of the world (Sauvant et al., 2010).  FDI from emerging markets makes up 
an increasingly large share of global FDI flows.  As of 2012 EM firms contribute around 25% of all 
outward FDI flows globally (Contractor, 2013; UNCTAD, 2013a).  China, an emerging market 
economy, for example, is now the world’s largest importer of oil (Hornby, 2013) and invests 
heavily outside its borders to ensure natural resource security (Zweig & Bi, 2005).  This brings 
into question why Chinese firms pursue FDI rather than, for example, engaging in importing and 
exporting. A reasonable explanation comes from Buckley and Casson’s (1981) internalisation 
theory. The internalisation theory is based on the relative fixed and variable costs experienced 
by firms when serving a foreign market. It is argued, for example, when an export market is small, 
minimising fixed costs through exporting yields good results, but as the market size increases, 
and in turn variable costs, FDI may be a better option (Blonigen, 2005; Buckley & Casson, 1981). 
As previously noted, the option of pursing FDI rather than engaging in import and export has 
dramatically intensified in recent years. Further, the increasing importance of China as a source 
of FDI has been noted by policy makers in both developed and developing economies.  The 
majority of IPAs representing the province of British Columbia, Canada, for example, are located 
in emerging markets.  In fact, British Columbia has four offices in China alone – more than in any 
other target economy. The emergence of EM firms as important sources of FDI has created an 
aggregated focal shift in IPA policy strategy in some cases, and a simple expansion of the scope 
of IPAs to include non-developed economies, especially from large emerging markets with 
increasing outward FDI flows, in other cases. 
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IPAs are generally seen to lower the transaction cost of investing in a particular location through 
the dissemination of information which may not be readily accessible to foreign firms.  In other 
words, IPAs attempt to lowers a foreign firm’s liability of foreignness (LOF) in the host economy.  
LOF deals primarily with the fact that, ‘multinational enterprises (MNEs) doing business abroad 
face costs (Hymer, 1976; Kindleberger, 1969) arising from the unfamiliarity of the environment, 
from cultural, political, and economic differences, and from the need for coordination across 
geographic distances, among other factors’ (Zaheer, 1995, p. 341).  It is argued LOF, therefore, 
presents barriers to entry for foreign firms.  It has been further argued that the psychic distance 
(i.e. environmental, cultural, political, institutional, and economic differences) between two 
developed economies (such as Canada and Germany) is far less than the psychic distance 
between a developed and developing economy (such as Canada and China) (Meyer & Estrin, 
2014; Ronen & Shenkar, 2013).  Thus, historically, the task of IPAs from a developed economy to 
help mitigate the LOF of MNEs from target (developed) economies, may not have been as 
important due to low levels of psychic distance.  In these cases LOF may not have posed serious 
impediments to the investment location decision.  More recently, IPAs have expanded their 
scope to also targeting psychically distant emerging market firms with very high levels of LOF.  
This expansion in scope represents a new challenge for developed economy IPAs as well as a 
timely opportunity. 
Several past studies have analytically analysed the impact of IPAs on the generation of FDI 
(Bobonis & Shatz, 2007; C. K. Head et al., 1999; Lim, 2008; Morisset, 2003; Wilkinson & Brouthers, 
2000; Woodward, 1992).  However, in no case has the impact of IPAs been investigated with a 
focus on attracting EM FDI into a developed economy. Further, as far as I am aware, there have 
not been any studies with look directly at host economy policies for generating FDI from 
emerging markets. Home country policies which encourage or otherwise facilitate FDI from EMs 
has been studied extensively (Luo et al., 2010). It is puzzling, therefore, host country policies to 
generate EM FDI, such as the establishment of an IPA, have received less attention to date. 
This study takes a first step in addressing this conceptual gap in the literature by analysing the 
following research question: Are developed economy IPAs a major determinant in the location 
choice of Chinese MNE FDI projects? I explore this question from a transaction cost economics 
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perspective. In the present case, this assumes that as psychic distance increases, the cost of 
investing in a given location, and thus propensity to invest in that location, decreases (Lim, 2008).  
I use random effects generalized least squares (GLS) and negative binomial models on an 
unbalanced panel data set from 2003-2011 of Chinese FDI into Canadian provinces to estimate 
the impact of IPAs on the location decision.  I find that the presence of IPAs significantly increases 
the propensity for a Chinese firm to locate in a given province. 
This chapter moves forward with a literature review and hypothesis development.  Data and 
methodology are then detailed.  This is followed by the results sections.  Finally, discussion, policy 
implications and conclusion sections bring the chapter to a close. 
 
4.2 Literature review and hypothesis development 
4.2.1 Investment promotion agencies and FDI generation 
The impact of investment promotion agencies in generating FDI has been studied for over 20 
years.  The seminal work of Wells and Wint (1990) questioned the effectiveness of IPAs in 
generating FDI.  They determined IPAs offer benefits to countries in much the same way 
marketing campaigns benefit for-profit organizations. In an updated version of this work, Wells 
and Wint (2001) define IPAs as ‘Activities that disseminate information about, or attempt to 
create an image of the investment site and provide investment services for the prospective 
investors’ (p. 4). They go on to identify four main functions of the IPA: image building, investor 
facilitation, investment generation and policy advocacy.   
The task of image building is to create the perception of a given market (at the national or sub-
national level) as an attractive location for FDI (Lim, 2008). An example of this would be Ontario, 
Canada’s IPA branding itself as the financial centre of Canada.  Ontario’s IPAs might, for instance, 
prominently showcase the majority of banks in Canada being headquartered in Ontario, having 
the largest stock market in Canada and its large number of finance professionals.  Through 
branding itself as the premier Canadian location for financial investment, it hopes to gain the 
majority of foreign investment in this niche area.  
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Advising on, and sometimes expediting, approval processes, facilitating the purchase or lease of 
physical sites, setting up utilities accounts and the like encompass the facilitator roles IPAs play. 
According to Morisset (2003), ‘Investor facilitation and investor services refer to the range of 
services provided in a host country that can assist an investor in analysing investment decisions, 
establishing a business, and maintaining it in good standing’ (p. 7). Canadian IPAs, for example, 
generally attempt to make applying for and obtaining business licenses a transparent process at 
both the provincial and national level. Canadian IPAs also provide highly specific services to help 
navigate complex rules, regulations and expectations of, for example, natural resource extraction 
FDI. More specifically, IPAs may give examples from past investments on how ‘net socio-
economic benefit’ to the host country was derived.  This will generally help investing 
organizations assess the potential value of the intended investment, as well as increase the 
chances of the investment being approved. 
IPAs also engage in direct marketing campaigns.  Such pointed investment generation initiatives 
generally include targeting specific companies or industries and subsequently mailing investment 
information, sending emails, attending trade shows, hosting forums and seminars, and otherwise 
increasing the visibility of investment opportunities to a targeted group of organizations (Wells 
& Wint, 1990).  Provincial Canadian IPA employees attending the China Mining Conference and 
Exhibition coordinated by the Tianjin Municipal Government and China Mining Association is an 
example of direct marketing initiatives. 
The final major function of IPAs is policy advocacy. According to Morisset (2003), policy advocacy 
‘consists of the activities through which the agency supports initiatives to improve the quality of 
the investment climate and identifies the views of the private sector on that matter. Activities 
include surveys of the private sector, participation in task forces, policy and legal procedures, and 
lobbying’ (p. 7). In this way, IPAs are tasked with listening to what potential investors would like 
to change in the investment environment the IPA represents. IPAs then actively engage with 
policy makers to facilitate those changes.  An example of this bottom up approach might be a 
request to raise the minimum investment values which are subject for review under the 
Investment Canada Act of 1985. As of 2013, WTO members wishing to invest more than US$344 
million in Canada must undergo review to assess whether the investment is of ‘net benefit’ to 
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Canada.  If there is significant pushback to raise this investment threshold by potential investors, 
the IPA may attempt to lobby the national-level government for change. 
While there are four main functions of IPAs discussed in the literature, the primary overarching 
objective of foreign investment promotion agencies is to generate foreign direct investment 
(Wells & Wint, 1990).  This goal is facilitated through the dissemination of information which may 
otherwise be an impediment to investment due to a lack of nuanced understanding of potential 
host economies cultural, political and economic environmental differences (Lim, 2008).  
Morisset, (2003) echo this view, ‘[investment] promotion agencies are viewed as vehicles for 
addressing coordination and information issues’ (p. 7). In other words, one of the main objectives 
of IPAs is to mitigate liabilities of foreignness caused by information asymmetries.  Zaheer (1995) 
define LOF as, ‘all additional costs a firm operating in a market overseas incurs that a local firm 
would not incur’ (p. 343).  He goes on to categorize these costs based on other similarities, such 
as unfamiliarity with the local environment and the lack of legitimacy in the host economy (ibid).  
A key thread throughout the extensive LOF literature set is that LOF raises the cost of conducting 
investment in a qualitatively dissimilar economy.  Further, there is a positive relationship 
between cost and psychic distance of the home and host economies (Ellis, 2008; Meyer, 2014). 
Morisset (2003), for example, conclude, ‘The finding that promotion is positively associated with 
FDI inflows across countries has to be qualified because it is closely linked to the environment in 
which the agency operates’ (p. 18).  Determining the psychic distance between two economies, 
however, is not a straight forward calculation.  Rather, it is multifaceted interpretation of macro-
level socio-economic factors such as language, religion and level of economic development 
(Blomkvist & Drogendijk, 2013). 
There have been several past attempts to analytically analyse the impact of IPAs.  While a few of 
these studies find IPAs have a positive and significant impact on the generation of FDI  (Bobonis 
& Shatz, 2007; Lim, 2008; Morisset, 2003; Wells & Wint, 1990; Woodward, 1992), the majority of 
studies find IPAs do not have a significant impact on the location choice of FDI (C. Coughlin & 
Segev, 2000; C. K. Head et al., 1999; K. Head et al., 1995; K. Head & Ries, 2010; Kotabe, 1993; 
Martin, 2003; Wilkinson & Brouthers, 2000; Wint & Williams, 2002).  Until very recently, IPAs 
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focused on generating FDI were located in developed economies which possessed large pools of 
firms with globally competitive firm-specific advantages. This was generally true regardless of the 
IPAs home country’s economic development (i.e. both ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ countries targeted 
developed economies as sources of FDI).  Wilkinson and Brouthers (2000) observe, ‘the pattern 
of trade offices in many respects follows the world pattern of trade, with the overwhelming 
majority of trade offices located in either developed nations or newly industrialized nations of 
the Pacific Rim’ (p. 231).  
Developed economies pursued inward FDI to further build competencies and competition as well 
as generate employment opportunities for its constituents.  Developing economies sought to 
attract FDI to spur knowledge spillovers in production techniques, product innovation and 
managerial knowhow as well as provide adequate employment opportunities for its citizens.  
Ergo, while the individual importance of each initiative may have varied according to 
development level, the overall goals were largely the same and the source for these attributes 
was, historically, found almost exclusively in developed economies (Wilkinson & Brouthers, 
2000). 
For developed economy IPAs, this constituted a decided advantage in regards to alleviating 
additional costs of international investment due to lower levels of LOF. This is seen to be true as 
the level of economic development is a major factor in determining psychic and institutional 
distance and, in turn, the extra transaction costs involved in international expansion (Puthusserry 
et al., 2013). Blomkvist and Drogendijk (2012) note, ‘the importance of differences in the degree 
of industrialization…will affect the intensity of the activities of the firms in a foreign market’ (p. 
667). Firms from economies such as the United Kingdom, for example, will have comparatively 
lower levels of LOF, and in turn transaction costs, when entering psychically near Canada 
compared to firms from psychically distant China.  In a recent review of the EM literature, 
Contractor (2013) comes to much the same conclusion: 
[EM MNEs] suffer not only from the LOF (Eden and Miller, 2004; Zaheer, 1995) that all 
internationally expanding firms face, but do so to a greater degree.  This is because EMMs 
have only recently internationalized, and because EMMs operating in advanced nation 
markets face larger institutional and cultural distance, than in the traditional patterns of 
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FDI flows when a multinational from one developed nation invested in another developed 
country 
(Contractor, 2013, p. 321) 
One important reason for high levels of psychic distance are differences in home institutional 
environments from which EM and developed economy firms expand (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 
2008). Institutional theory has not, however, been used in past studies on the impact of IPAs. 
This is, most likely, due to past studies focusing on IPAs ability to generate FDI exclusively from 
developed economies. Recent FDI flow data indicating EM MNEs constitute a significant portion 
of the global total, however, has necessitated a shift in the evaluation of how institutions impact 
these flows. Contractor (2013), for example, comment, ‘institutions are less-developed in 
emerging nations, so that their firms face an environment of “institutional voids” (Khanna and 
Palepu, 2006). Hence successful ventures by EMMs abroad – and particularly EMM expansion 
into advanced nations – would seem fraught with obstacles’ (p. 316). Indeed, intuitional theory 
has become one of the primary lines of theorisation EM MNE FDI behaviour (Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2012). This due to the sometimes significant differences between EM and developed markets’ 
formal institutions (i.e. law, regulations and rules) and informal institutions (i.e. isomorphic 
normative pressure, culture and ethics) (Peng et al., 2009). While institutional incongruences are 
generally seen as a strategic disadvantage for EM MNEs, Contractor (2013) argue, the 
‘institutional voids’ between EM and developed economies can be seen as a decided advantage 
for EM MNEs expanding into other emerging markets. Others (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; 
Guillen & Carcia-Canal, 2009; Khanna & Palepu, 2010; Ramamurti, 2012b) echo this view citing 
EM MNEs enhanced ability to cope with the inefficient capital markets, poor enforcement of local 
and international laws, capricious bureaucrats and erratic regulations which typify EM 
institutional environments.  The ability of EM MNEs to operate effectively in emerging market 
economies other than their own does not, however, translate into the ability to operate in 
markets with highly developed institutions.  The findings in this strand of research complement 
LOF theories.  Institutional voids increase the transaction costs of expanding from an EM to a 
developed economy due, for example, to increased levels of information asymmetries. 
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Due to the large gap in psychic distance between, for example, Chinese firms and developed 
economies, the value derived from the services provided by developed economy IPAs located in 
EMs, rather than other developed economies, is greatly enhanced.  If, therefore, a developed 
economy IPA is able to efficaciously disseminate information which lowers transaction costs 
associated with LOF, the propensity to invest in that economy should be enhanced. 
Hypothesis: The presence of a developed economy IPA increases the propensity of a Chinese firm 
to invest in that location. 
 
4.3 Data and methodology 
4.3.1 Data 
To explore my research question I elect to analyse Chinese FDI into Canadian provinces.  This is 
done for four main reasons. First, EM firms from countries such as China, tend to engage in 
natural resource seeking behaviour to a significant degree (Zweig & Bi, 2005), especially in large 
natural resource rich countries such as Canada.  In fact, the majority of Chinese FDI into Canada 
is in the natural resource extraction sector.  In terms of value of Chinese FDI in Canada mining 
represents 97% of all investment from 2003-2011.  In terms of the number of investments 
(count) mining represents 68% of all investment. Tables 13 and 14 breakdown Chinese 
investments in Canada by industrial sector.  Appendix A reports sectorial breakdowns for both 
greenfield and acquisition investments.  On the surface, this could be troubling as Chinese firms 
may simply be investing in provinces with large natural resource reserves.  Upon closer 
investigation, however, it was found that Canada is a large natural resource-rich country with 
substantial natural resource endowment found in almost every province and territory.  
Newfoundland and Labrador, for example, is geographically the 10th largest province (including 
territories) in Canada, but in my period of study (2003-2011) it registered the highest natural 
resource exports per square kilometre.  Larger provinces such as Québec (approximately the 
size of France, Spain and Germany combined) registered high aggregate natural resource 
exports, but once the size of the province was taken into account natural resource export levels 
were found to be slightly below the average for Canadian provinces.  In other words, as long as 
natural resources and size (as well as other key control variables) are controlled for it should be 
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possible to effectively tease out the efficacy of IPAs in a sub-national ‘competition’ for Chinese 
FDI in a country such as Canada.  In other developed countries which are rich in natural 
resources, such as Australia, natural resource endowment is not nearly as homogeneously 
dispersed across provinces as Canada, thus making controlling for natural resources much more 
difficult. 
 
Table 13: Sectorial distribution of Chinese FDI in Canada by number of transactions from 2003-
2011 
Sector Count Percentage 
Mining: Materials 76 54.68% 
Mining: Energy and Power 17 12.23% 
Financials 10 7.19% 
Industrials 8 5.76% 
Telecommunications 7 5.04% 
High Technology 6 4.32% 
Healthcare 5 3.60% 
Consumer Products and Services 4 2.88% 
Consumer Staples 4 2.88% 
Retail 2 1.44% 
Source: Thomson ONE and FT fDi Markets 
 
Table 14: Sectorial distribution of Chinese FDI in Canada by value (millions) of transactions from 
2003-2011 
Sector 
Value 
(millions) Percentage 
Mining: Energy and Power $32,034.13 76.66% 
Mining: Materials 8,664.70 20.74% 
Industrials 269.77 0.65% 
Financials 264.94 0.63% 
Telecommunications 246.45 0.59% 
High Technology 144.53 0.35% 
Consumer Staples 90.68 0.22% 
Retail 39.61 0.09% 
Consumer Products and Services 15.65 0.04% 
Healthcare 14.19 0.03% 
Source: Thomson ONE and FT fDi Markets 
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Second, host provincial and national-level governments are typically involved in large natural-
resource related FDI transactions.  This is primarily concerned with trust.  On the one hand, the 
investing company has a strong interest in ensuring their investment is protected from 
privatization and other unfavourable future political circumstances.  On the other hand, the host 
economy has a vested stake in ensuing the investing firm is socially responsible and provides a 
substantial net social, economic and environmental benefit to the host economy.  Within an 
economy such as Canada, determining whether a natural resource extraction investment 
provides a net gain is highly equivocal depending on the concerned interest group (i.e. financial 
investment firms may evaluate ‘net gain’ differently than staunch environmental protection 
groups).  Adding the complexity of high levels of psychic and institutional distance can only serve 
to exacerbate an already contentious issue.  This is especially true of firms from China which are 
sometimes seen by outsiders to operate in a ‘growth at all costs’ institutional environment which 
may be incongruent with developed economies’ long-term goals.  Further spurring trepidation 
toward Chinese FDI is the fact that (natural resource) investment projects are dominated by 
state-owned firms.  Appeasing the host national and subnational governments, which 
theoretically represents all interest groups in a democratic society, therefore, is highly important 
for both the investing firms and the host economy.  One important medium for disseminating 
information or acting as a catalyst for FDI discussion is the IPA.  Canada, therefore, provides an 
excellent arena for testing the efficacy of developed economy IPAs in generating Chinese FDI. 
Third, the IPA development policy at the sub-national level in Canada is typical of many 
developed economies.  Historically, most provincial Canadian IPAs targeted, almost exclusively, 
other developed economies for generating inward FDI.  The emergence of EMs as key players on 
the outward FDI scene, however, precipitated an expansion in the scope of most provincial IPA 
offices to include large developing economies in addition to developed economies.  Ontario for 
instance, currently has IPAs in China, France, Germany, India, Japan, Mexico, United Kingdom and 
United States.  Ontario has more than one office in only two countries – China and United States.  
The number of employees in the China office is, however, 2.5 times higher than the US office.  
This, it can be inferred, makes China the most important IPA destination in the world for Ontario.  
The IPA policy in British Columbia has a slightly different focus with IPAs in Japan (1), South Korea 
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(1), China (4), India (3), United States (3 – all in California), and United Kingdom (1).  Within British 
Columbian IPAs the country with by far the most employees is China. Similarly to Ontario, this 
indicates China is the most important outpost for IPAs.  Although developed economies still 
constitute the primary focus of IPAs from Ontario, the increasing importance of IPAs located in 
EMs is unmistakable in both Ontario and British Columbia.  This trend is representative of 
developed countries (either on a national or subnational level) in many major economies. 
Finally, Chinese FDI data in Canada is comparatively reliable and detailed. Dependent variable 
data, as a result, is able to account for the use of tax havens and offshore financial centres as 
intermediaries for subsequent FDI into the Canada.  In this way, ultimate beneficiary ownership, 
as defined by the OECD’s most current benchmark definition of FDI, is used (OECD, 2008). As 
noted in section 1.1.3, to date many studies on Chinese MNE outward FDI have not properly 
accounted for their frequent use of offshore tax havens and financial centres to channel FDI. 
Instead, they use official data sources, which are, unfortunately, prone to the methodological 
problems inherent in the earlier OECD guidelines (Beugelsdijk et al., 2010; Kolstad & Wiig, 2012). 
Given tax haven jurisdictions are the major destinations as well as source countries for Chinese 
MNE FDI, it is in fact very important to account for their use (Kolstad & Wiig, 2012; J. Liu & Scott-
Kennel, 2011; Rodríguez & Bustillo, 2011; Rosen & Hanemann, 2011). 
4.3.2 Dependent and independent variables 
In this subnational-level study I evaluate Chinese MNE firm-level investments into Canadian 
provinces. For my dependent variable I use Chinese acquisition and greenfield investments across 
all thirteen Canadian provinces and territories for the time period 2003-2011.  In this case, there 
are two main methods for regressing panel data: by value and count.  Using yearly aggregated 
investment dollar amounts in a given year and province for the dependent variable is typically 
seen to represent the quality of investment.  Using yearly aggregated counts of investments, on 
the other hand, would generally represent the quantity of investments.  In the case of Chinese 
FDI into a large, resource-rich economy, however, the dollar amounts of investment may be 
dominated by large natural resource-related investments, thus rendering smaller, incremental 
greenfield investment less important.  The Chinese company Sinopec’s $2.148 billion (USD) 
purchase of Calgary-based Daylight Energy, for example, risks diminishing the importance of 
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more incremental greenfield investments such as Daqo New Energy’s investment in Ontario of 
$5.17 million in the solar power industry or Linyi Shandong Biological Product’s manufacturing 
facility investment in Manitoba of $50 million.  Due to the very large monetary value natural 
resource investments demand, it could be argued using count models are more appropriate.  
When using count models all investments are weighted equally, regardless of size.  This, in 
theory, gives a more balanced view of the investing firms.  In light of the above conundrum, I run 
models using dependent variables for both value and count.  Value-based models utilize random 
effects GLS models and count models use random effect Poisson models.  Independent variables 
are consistent across models. 
The dependent variable dataset is based on commercial databases.  Acquisition investments 
were taken from the Thomson ONE database.  Greenfield investments were taken from the 
Financial Times fDi Markets database.  Both of these databases have been used extensively in 
past research and are considered to be valid sources of secondary data. I follow the normal 10% 
ownership threshold for acquisition investments and minimum values of around $500,000 for 
greenfield investments. This dataset initially included 120 acquisition investments and 34 
greenfield investments. Upon further scrutiny of individual investment, however, only 82 
acquisition and 31 greenfield investments were included. The 38 acquisition and 3 greenfield 
investments were excluded due to the inability to verify the validity of the transaction or simply 
because the value of the transaction was not available.  In total, my sample consists of 113 
transactions across Canada in the time period 2003-2011.  Breakdowns of both greenfield and 
acquisition investments across the 13 Canadian provinces and territories can be found in Tables 
15 and 16. 
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Table 15: Distribution of Chinese FDI in Canada by value (millions of dollars) from 2003-2011 
Province GF Value Acq Value Total Value 
Alberta 35,200,000 29,195,847,000 29,231,047,000 
British Columbia 149,350,000 8,978,620,000 9,127,970,000 
Manitoba 65,500,000 - 65,500,000 
New Brunswick - - - 
Newfoundland - 39,582,000 39,582,000 
Northwest 
Territories 
- - - 
Nova Scotia - 8,242,000 8,242,000 
Nunavut - - - 
Ontario 352,070,000 1,447,629,000 1,799,699,000 
Prince Edward 
Island 
- - - 
Québec 832,610,000 211,607,000 1,044,217,000 
Saskatchewan - 262,293,000 262,293,000 
Yukon - 57,067,000 57,067,000 
Total 1,434,730,000 40,200,887,000 41,635,617,000 
Source: Thomson ONE and FT fDi Markets 
 
 
Table 16: Distribution of Chinese FDI in Canada by number (count) of transactions from 2003-
2011 
 
Province 
GF 
Count 
Acq 
Count 
Total 
Count 
Alberta 2 13 15 
British Columbia 7 34 41 
Manitoba 2 - 2 
New Brunswick - - - 
Newfoundland - 1 1 
Northwest 
Territories 
- - - 
Nova Scotia - 1 1 
Nunavut - - - 
Ontario 16 25 41 
Prince Edward 
Island 
- - - 
Québec 4 4 8 
Saskatchewan - 3 3 
Yukon - 1 1 
Total 31 82 113 
Source: Thomson ONE and FT fDi Markets 
 124 
 
As detailed in the above tables, Alberta dominated FDI flows in terms of value with British 
Columbia a distant second.  In regards to frequency (count) of FDI projects, however, British 
Columbia and Ontario registered by far the most investments with Alberta coming in a distant 
third.  Four provinces did not register any FDI from China during the period of study: New 
Brunswick, Northwest Territories, Nunavut and Prince Edward Island. 
The main explanatory variable in this study is the presence of an IPA in a given province.  
Provinces which had at least one IPA located in China at some point in the period of study include: 
Alberta, Ontario, British Columbia, Québec and Saskatchewan. This equates to just under 40% of 
all provinces.  Many provinces had more than one IPA in China in a given year and the number of 
employees working in each IPA varied by location. Ontario, for instance, has an IPA in Beijing with 
three employees and one in Shanghai with two employees. British Columbia maintains IPA offices 
in Beijing (eight employees), Shanghai (five employees) and Guangzhou (six employees). Alberta 
has offices in Beijing and Shanghai, but did not disclose how many people it employs in each 
office. Québec has only one office in China which is located in Beijing and did not disclose how 
many people it employs.  This office was opened in 2007 – the middle of my period of study.  
Saskatchewan opened its first IPA in China in 2010.  This IPA is located in Shanghai and is a joint 
collaboration with Alberta and British Columbia which is entitled ‘Western Canada Trade and 
Investment Office’. 
Ideally, I would measure not only whether or not a province maintains an IPA in China, but also 
the intensity of its efforts.  Such intensity has been defined as number of employees, operational 
budget and years established in past studies.  Each IPA and the respective home governing body 
for each foreign IPA was contacted in search of the above information.  Alas, these data were not 
available on a consistent basis across IPAs.  In light of the dearth of nuanced IPA data, I elect to 
use a dummy variable to represent the presence of an IPA in a given province, where one equals 
a provincial IPA was functioning in China in a given year and zero otherwise. 
FDI flowing from China into Canada could, of course, be motivated by factors other than the 
presence of an IPA. Main or control variables included in many recent location choice studies 
include a proxy for each market seeking, efficiency seeking, strategic asset-seeking, and natural 
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resource seeking.  I follow this tradition by including control variables for gross provincial product 
per capita, provincial corporate tax rate, Canadian patents per capita and natural resource 
exports.  As previously mentioned, in the specific context of Canada, the size of provinces vary 
widely.  Thus, geographic area (square kilometres) is also included.  Furthermore, many Chinese 
outward FDI location choice studies also control for the distance from Beijing to the host 
economy as well as levels of Chinese diaspora in the host economy.  Finally, while not typically 
controlled for in Chinese outward FDI studies, past work on the impact of state or provincial 
policy on generating exports and/or FDI typically include a variable on the use of trade missions.  
While the overarching objective of trade missions is generally to facilitate export opportunities, 
the generation of FDI is typically seen as a tertiary benefit.  I, therefore, also control for high-level 
trade missions involving provincial premiers.  Dependent and independent variables are scaled 
where appropriate. Table 17 includes details of main and control variables. 
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Table 17: Variable explanations, data sources, and expected signs 
Variable 
Variable 
Abbreviation Proxy 
Main or 
Control 
Variable Data Source 
Chinese FDI 
in Canada 
FDI_VALUE Value of 
Chinese FDI 
projects in host 
province 
(scaled) 
Dependant Thomson ONE; FT 
fDi Markets  
Chinese FDI 
in Canada 
FDI_COUNT Frequency 
count of 
Chinese FDI 
projects in host 
province 
Dependant Thomson ONE; FT 
fDi Markets  
Provincial 
IPA in 
China 
IPA Dummy 
variable where 
1 = a given 
province has an 
IPA in China, 
otherwise 0 
Main Contact with 
provincial 
governments and 
IPAs 
Market Size GPPPC Gross provincial 
product per 
capita (scaled) 
Control Statistics Canada 
Taxation TAX Province 
corporate tax 
rate (highest 
marginal tax 
rate) 
Control Canada Revenue 
Agency 
Strategic 
Assets 
PAT Canadian 
(federal) 
patents per 
capita (scaled) 
Control Canada Intellectual 
Property Office 
Natural 
Resources 
NR Total natural 
resource 
exports as a 
proportion of 
total exports 
(scaled) 
Control Statistics Canada 
 127 
 
Trade 
Mission 
TRADE Dummy 
variable where 
1 = the 
provincial 
Premier led a 
trade mission to 
China 
Control Media reports; 
contact with 
provincial 
governments and 
IPAs 
Cultural 
Proximity 
CUL Dummy 
variable where 
1 = provincial 
ethnic Chinese 
population is 
more than 1% 
of total 
provincial 
population, 0 
otherwise 
Control Statistics Canada 
Geographic 
Size 
SIZE Geographic size 
(scaled square 
kilometres) of 
provincial land 
excluding fresh 
water (scaled) 
Control Statistics Canada 
Distance DIS Geographic 
distance from 
Beijing to the 
capital of the 
host province 
(scaled) 
Control www.geobytes.com 
 
 
4.3.3 Model definition 
In the case of developed economy IPAs, the measurement for efficacy is typically either the 
quality or quantity of generated investments.  Quality is generally defined in terms of the 
monetary value of investments while quantity focuses on the number of investments.  In order 
to gain a holistic view of the efficacy of IPAs from developed economies, I estimate the impact of 
IPAs against both the values and counts of Chinese FDI into Canadian provinces.  I estimate the 
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value of investments in my unbalanced panel data set through the use of random effects 
generalized least squares. 
This model is estimated as:  
(17)  FDI_VALUEit = f (β1IPAit, β2GPPPCit, β3TAXit, β4PATit,β5NRit, β6TRADEit, β7CULit, β8SIZEit,  
   β9DISt,) 
Where FDI_VALUEit is the value of FDI in year t (t=1,…T) in province i (i =1,…I).  The correlation 
matrix for the aforementioned model can be found in Table 18.  While multicollinearity is not a 
major concern in my dataset, heteroscedasticity could be an issue.  After calculating the modified 
Wald statistic (which tests for groupwise heteroscedasticity in the residuals) (Sanfilippo, 2010), 
the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is rejected.  According to Baltagi, Bresson and Pirotte 
(2005) GLS is a suitable methodology for linear data where the variances of the dependent 
variable are unequal (i.e. heteroscedasticity).  After running the Hausman test, it was determined 
random effects models would be best suited to my data. This makes sense as time invariant 
independent variables, such as distance, size and diaspora are included in the models.  If a fixed 
effects model were to be used, these variables would be absorbed by the intercept (Wooldridge, 
2002b). In other words, time invariant variables would be automatically omitted in a fixed effects 
model. 
Table 18: Correlation matrix 
 
FDI 
VALUE IPA GPPPC TAX PAT NR TRADE CUL SIZE DIS 
FDI VALUE 1.0000          
IPA 0.4303 1.0000         
GPPPC 0.0585 0.0239 1.0000        
TAX 0.0241 0.1528 0.0593 1.0000       
PAT 0.4265 0.6303 0.0864 0.2189 1.0000      
NR -0.0220 -0.0911 0.0372 -0.0642 0.0187 1.0000     
TRADE 0.0076 0.2931 -0.0725 0.0552 0.2215 -0.0485 1.0000    
CUL 0.2192 0.5060 -0.1667 0.1360 0.5044 0.0869 0.2635 1.0000   
SIZE 0.0172 0.1284 0.2127 -0.0756 -0.0443 -0.0825 -0.0052 -0.1283 1.0000  
DIS -0.1337 0.0161 -0.6156 -0.0283 0.0124 -0.2798 0.1382 -0.0942 -0.3436 1 
 
My second estimation seeks to model the counts of Chinese investment in Canadian provinces.  
To do this I utilize Poisson and negative binomial models.  Negative binomial models are typically 
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used in place of Poisson models in cases where unobserved heterogeneity in the data are 
observed (Cameron & Trivedi, 2013). See Hilbe (2011) for an excellent review of negative 
binomial methodology.  Please, also see section 2.3.2 in this dissertation. 
My second model is defined as: 
(18) FDI_COUNTit = f (β1IPAit, β2GPPPCit, β3TAXit, β4PATit,β5NRit, β6TRADEit, β7CULit, β8SIZEit,  
   β9DISt,) 
Where FDI_COUNTit is the value of FDI in year t (t=1,…T) in province i (i =1,…I).  After estimating 
models for both Poisson and negative binomial models, likelihood-ratio tests favoured the use of 
negative binomial models.  Relatedly, overdispersion was also found to be present in the data 
set.  For the same reasons as model (1), random effects is more suitable for model (2) 
estimations. 
In the case of exploring the impact of IPAs on generating FDI, causality could be a major cause 
for concern.  The argument could be made that increases in Chinese FDI in a given province are 
causing provincial governments to open IPAs in China rather than provincial IPAs efficaciously 
generating Chinese FDI investment into a province.  This causality conundrum is not unique to 
this study.  In a recent study, Head and Ries (2010) goes to great lengths to tease out potential 
biases related to causality when analysing the impact of Canadian trade missions on exports.  As 
well as determining Canadian trade missions do not significantly increase trade, they also lay out 
several methods for effectively exploring causality issues.  Unlike Head and Ries (2010) there does 
not seem to be a high or significant level of correlation between residuals and the IPA variable in 
this study. Tests to confirm endogeneity is not an issue, however, were still performed. One such 
method discussed in Head and Ries (2010) which can appropriately be applied to my study is the 
incorporation of lagged dependent variables.  This method helps ‘capture unobserved factors 
promoting trade between Canada and mission countries that existed prior to the missions’ (K. 
Head & Ries, 2010, p. 765). 
In keeping style with Head and Ries (2010), I report estimates from the lagged dependent variable 
specification do not give any indication previous levels of Chinese FDI into Canada influence 
current FDI flows.  Following Head and Ries (2010) I lag my dependent variables one-year, two-
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years and three-years and do not find any improvement in model fit.  Furthermore, the 
coefficients on the IPA effects did fall when using lagged dependent variables, but not 
significantly. 
Results from the more familiar Granger-causality test provide similar results: when testing the 
causality of FDI flows on the presence of IPAs the null hypothesis of non-causality is confirmed. 
When the order of variables is reversed, however, the null hypothesis of non-causality is rejected.  
This suggests a unidirectional relationship (Granger, 1969).  Test results are reported in Table 19. 
Table 19: Granger causality test results 
FDI flows do not cause IPAs (lag1) Chi2 9.52 
 p>chi2 0.3910 
IPAs do not cause FDI flows (lag1) Chi2 32.81 
 p>chi2 0.0001 
 
In regards to the Granger causality test, Sanfilippo (2010) comment, ‘causality tests should be 
cautiously considered as a source of information on the direction of causality in the absence of 
other variables (Greene, 2003). Rather than causality, this kind of test determines which of the 
two variables follows the other and, thus, “precedence” is considered a more appropriate term 
to describe what a Granger test effectively captures (Mukherjee et al., 1998)’ (p. 603).  Thus, it is 
appropriate to infer the presence of provincial IPAs proceed the location choice of Chinese FDI. 
 
4.4 Results and discussion 
4.4.1 Results 
Results are presented for both GLS and negative binomial model estimations.  Table 20 reports 
the results from the GLS model specified in equation (17) which uses the value of investments as 
the dependent variable as well as results from the negative binomial model specified in equation 
(18) which uses the number of investments (count) as the dependent variable.  Both models are 
estimated against an identical set of main and control independent variables. 
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Despite geographic and industrial composition differences between models, major results are 
similar.  Irrespective of the dependent variable used, results indicate the presence of a Canadian 
provincial IPA is highly significant and positively related to the location choice of Chinese FDI.  
This confirms the hypothesis: the presence of a developed economy IPA increases the propensity 
of an Chinese firm to invest in that location.  In both models Chinese FDI is also significantly drawn 
to provinces with high levels of strategic assets.  When using the value of FDI as the dependent 
variable, in addition to the presence of a foreign IPA and home province strategic assets, 
geographic distance is a significant factor where geographically near provinces are more likely to 
be chosen as FDI locations by Chinese firms than geographically distant provinces.  When using 
the number of transactions as the dependent variable long geographic distance is no longer a 
deterrent to investment.  Rather, high corporate tax rates seems to draw FDI.  While this is 
superficially counter intuitive, it simply reiterates the importance of IPAs and strategic assets.  
The benefits of the presence of an IPA in China and high levels of strategic assets in the host 
province outweigh the increased corporate tax rates of locating in a given province. 
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Table 20: Generalized least squares and negative binomial model estimations 
2003-2011 
FDI VALUE 
MODEL 
FDI COUNT 
MODEL 
IPA 46.70087 *** 2.692777 *** 
 (15.0915) (.92635) 
GPPPC -7.65669 .3434744 
 (4.980737) (.6414504) 
TAX -115.0429 5.456393 ** 
 (106.3407) (2.163238) 
PAT 6.868645 *** .2959231 *** 
 (2.305032) (.0880247) 
NR -59.69881 -.6575627 
 (61.31769) (4.673482) 
TRADE -16.74836 .2984068 
 (15.0101) (.2934623) 
CUL -20.06006 .3037105 
 (13.88643) (1.428652) 
SIZE -.9716892 -.0775179 
 (.7434377) (.153707) 
DIS -16.86504 ** .2125117 
 (6.652598) (.4411484) 
CONSTANT 195.3441 -5.918033 
 (81.21324) (5.72231) 
NUMBER OF 
OBSERVATIONS 
117 117 
Adjusted R2  .2934  
LLH  -96.578963 
AIC  1.8047 
Coefficients reported with robust standard errors in parentheses.   LLH = Log Likelihood.  AIC = Akaike Information 
Criterion.  Asterisks ***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
 
4.4.2 Discussion 
In a recent focused study on the impact of psychic distance on Chinese FDI behaviour, Blomkvist 
and Drogendijk (2013) conclude ‘Chinese firms invest less in countries at a larger psychic and 
cultural distance to China’ (p. 678). Similarly, my findings suggest the increased transaction costs 
for Chinese MNEs associated with overcoming LOF (such as psychic distance) in a developed 
economy may have been mitigated through the efficacious dissemination of information by IPAs. 
Given the high psychic distance between China and Canada, finding IPAs significantly impact the 
location decision is, therefore, perhaps unsurprising. Indeed, Blomkvist and Drogendijk (2013) go 
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on to argue, ‘to capture the effect of psychic distance the underlying stimuli needs to be adapted 
to the particular cultural and institutional setting of a country or region’ (p. 679).  Thus, when 
Chinese firms invest in other, psychically near, emerging markets, or developed economy firms 
invest in other, psychically near, developed economies, mitigating LOF through the establishment 
of IPAs may not be an effective strategy.  Conversely, maintaining an IPA in a psychically distant 
market may aid in the generation of FDI from that target economy. This is so, it is commonly 
argued, as, 
the overseas offices [IPAs] are effective at promoting an environment of increasing cross-
cultural awareness. Arguably, a foreign office creates greater awareness and serves as a 
bridge between two countries.  States with overseas offices have a competitive advantage 
over those states without them because these foreign outposts help to formalize the 
exchange of information. 
(Martin, 2003, p. 65) 
In short, it is necessary to consider the psychic distance between target and host economies 
when evaluating the potential efficacy of maintain or establishing an IPA.  In cases where 
substantial psychic distance is present, such as, for example, Canadian provinces targeting 
Chinese FDI, IPAs have a significant impact on the investment location decision. This finding has 
substantial implications for policy frameworks.   
As found in this and several past studies, it is very important to consider FDI generation initiatives 
on an economy-by-economy basis (Blomkvist & Drogendijk, 2013). This view is echoed by Head 
and Ries (2010b) who find, ‘Our analysis underscores the importance of relying primarily on 
within country-pair information when estimating policy effects on international transactions’ (p. 
772). This is due primarily to the impact of psychic distance. It is, therefore, important for policy 
makers to consider psychic distance when evaluating the potential efficacy of FDI generation 
polices, such as the establishment of IPAs. 
One aspect of psychic distance which may be particularly applicable in the case of developed 
economies generating Chinese FDI through IPAs is the consideration of institutional voids. 
Chinese firms investing in developed economies need to withstand strong isomorphic pressure 
from both home and host institutions. This pressure, furthermore, may be pulling the investing 
firm in distinctly different strategic directions. This is especially true in situations where natural 
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resource extraction is one of the primary drivers for investment. This is due to high, often 
incongruent, expectations of conformance to both home and host governmental standards. 
There is, for example, strong pressure to ensure natural resource security in the most cost 
efficient manner from the home country and consideration of net-socioeconomic benefit in the 
host economy. This is further exasperated by the model of state ownership of many natural 
resource-seeking EM MNEs, such as those from China, as their investment may come under 
pressure to harbour a mix of political and economic motives (Morck et al., 2008). 
In this light, it surprising Chinese FDI policies have been evaluated primarily from the home 
country perspective through, for example, institutional pressure to expand globally.  In some 
cases EM firms ‘go global to avoid poor institutional environments at home’ (Luo & Rui, 2009: 
50).  This is likened to ‘pushing’ firms to internationalize (Deng, 2013), while home country 
promotional efforts ‘pull’ firms across borders (Buckley et al., 2007). It is clear home country 
policies which ‘push’ and ‘pull’ EM firms to expand across boarders are important in 
understanding the internationalisation of EM MNEs, but host country policies may also play an 
important role.  To date, however, host country EM FDI generation policies have not been 
discussed to any significant degree in the extant literature. This study investigates one important 
host country policy consideration for developed economies in generating EM FDI, the impact of 
maintaining IPAs. The results of this study conclude that when psychic distance is significantly 
large the presence of an IPA has a positive impact on the generation of FDI.  
Three Canadian provinces (Alberta, British Columbia and Ontario) maintained at least one IPA in 
China throughout the entire period of study (2003-2011).  Both Québec and Saskatchewan 
commenced provincial representation through an IPA for the first time during the study period.  
The investment patterns of Chinese MNEs in Québec and Saskatchewan pre and post IPA, 
therefore, provide potentially interesting subcases to explore. 
According to Investissement Québec (2013), which is the governing body for Québec’s IPAs 
globally, Québec opened its first IPA in China in 2007. During the period of study, Québec did not 
receive any Chinese FDI until one year after it opened its Chinese IPA office. The investment 
amount of its first Chinese FDI transaction was $46,000,000.  From 2009-2011, Québec 
 135 
 
succeeded in generating a further $998,000,000 in Chinese FDI.  In other words, in the first four 
years covered in this study Québec did not have an IPA in China and did not register any Chinese 
FDI.  After opening an IPA in China, Chinese FDI totalled over $1 billion in just five years.  The 
story for Saskatchewan is very similar.  During the period of study, Saskatchewan received a total 
of $1,000,000 in Chinese FDI prior to opening an IPA in China.  Saskatchewan opened an IPA in 
China in 2010 for the first time and by 2011 had generated $261,000,000 in Chinese FDI.  While 
opening IPA offices in China may not be the sole reason for increased Chinese FDI, it seems to be 
a significantly positive determinant. 
The decision of Agricultural Bank of China to open a branch office in Vancouver, British Columbia 
was largely facilitated by British Columbia’s IPA in Beijing. As of early 2013, Agricultural Bank of 
China (ABC) was the 11th largest bank in the world in terms of market capitalization and was 
present in only four other cities outside of China: Sydney, Frankfort, Tokyo and New York (Invest 
in British Columbia, 2010).  ABC’s other offices are located in what are generally considered the 
financial capitals of their respective countries.  Canada’s financial capital, however, is generally 
considered to be Toronto, Ontario. Furthermore, other large Chinese banks, such as Bank of 
China’s 2011 greenfield investment of $17.6 million, chose to locate in Toronto.  This makes ABC’s 
decision to locate in Vancouver a very interesting case.  The three official reasons stated for ABC 
choosing Vancouver are the geographic proximity of British Columbia to China, one of the main 
decision makers having attended University of British Columbia in the late 1990’s and the efforts 
of British Columbia’s IPA office in Beijing (Invest in British Columbia, 2010).  According to the 
Trade and Invest in British Columbia website, ‘Agricultural Bank of China’s Canadian expansion 
was facilitated by British Columbia’s International Trade and Investment Representatives’ (Invest 
in British Columbia, 2010).  This case provides strong support for this study’s model estimation 
results: IPAs, distance and strategic assets are important determinants in the location choice of 
Chinese FDI in developed countries. 
Generating Chinese FDI in the financial sector is, of course, easier for Ontario, where Toronto is 
located, than other Canadian provinces.  UnionPay, a Chinese bank card organization, for 
example, chose to locate in Toronto.  The primary reason for Toronto being chosen as the 
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Canadian headquarters of UnionPay was proximity to other major financial institutions.  
According to Invest in Ontario,  
Ontario is among the top three financial hubs in North America.  Fourteen of the country’s 
24 banks are headquartered in Ontario, including the five largest, which are all based in 
Toronto. Forty-five of the 54 foreign bank subsidiaries and branches in Canada, including 
Bank of China (Canada) and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (Canada), also have 
their Canadian head office in Ontario. 
 (Invest in Ontario, 2012) 
Invest in Ontario (2012) go on to outline the partnerships it helped UnionPay obtain and the 
overall success UnionPay has had since locating in Toronto. 
Another example of the importance of developed market IPAs in generating Chinese FDI can be 
found in the 15% stake China’s ANTHILL Resources Ltd. invested in British Colombia’s Yellowhead 
Mining Inc. According to Invest in British Columbia (2010), ‘In September 2010, ANTHILL 
Resources Ltd. announced it was acquiring a 15 per cent interest in Yellowhead Mining Inc. 
following nearly a year of matchmaking support from B.C.’s North China trade and investment 
team based in Beijing’ (Invest in British Columbia, 2010).  Clearly, British Columbia’s IPA had a 
large impact in generating this investment. 
Based on the results of the model estimations and the above discussion I can surmise with a 
significant level of confidence that developed economy IPAs are a major determinant in the 
location choice of FDI projects from Chinese MNEs. From a policy prospective, the use of IPAs to 
generate FDI from psychically distant economies makes strong intuitive sense.  Using an IPA as a 
medium to lower transaction costs for the investing firm increases the effectiveness of 
disseminating information within the target market. This, in turn, increases the propensity of 
generating FDI and subsequently improves economic growth in the host economy. 
In their study on the location choice of Chinese MNEs, Ramasamy et al. (2012) conclude that 
when host economies which have abundant natural resources, such as Canada, target Chinese 
FDI, a government to government strategy may be an attractive solution. The IPA may be one 
such useful medium for conducting, or acting as a catalyst for, such discussions. A further policy 
implication of this study for the home country may be assessing the opportunity to couple and 
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capitalise on incentives, promotions and official initiatives offered by host economies through 
IPAs. In this way, IPAs and home governments can disaggregate incentive structures based not 
only on the strategic importance of an economy for a particular industry, but also have 
investment promotion strategies which complement, or at least do not impede, firm-level 
investment strategies in a given host economy.  More specifically, host country Chinese FDI 
generation policy initiatives carried out by IPAs could be coupled with information found in, for 
instance, MOFCOM and National Development and Reform Commission’s (NDRC) ‘Overseas 
Investment Industrial Guidance Policy’ and ‘Guidance Catalogue for Overseas Investment 
Industries’ publications (Meuer et al., 2012). 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
The objective of this chapter was to empirically explore the efficacy of developed economy IPAs 
in generating FDI from China.  Findings indicate developed economy IPAs in China are efficacious 
in generating Chinese FDI.  I propose this is due to the desire to mitigate the significant 
transaction costs associated with Chinese MNEs’ LOF when entering a psychically distant 
developed economy. 
The first major contribution to the literature, therefore, is to shed light on the debate of the 
efficacy of IPA offices.  In the relatively limited IPA literature set the findings are inconclusive.  A 
few previous studies find IPAs are a significant driver of FDI generation (Bobonis & Shatz, 2007; 
Lim, 2008; Morisset, 2003; Wells & Wint, 1990; Woodward, 1992), but the majority of past 
studies do not find IPAs have an impact on the location choice of FDI (C. Coughlin & Segev, 2000; 
C. K. Head et al., 1999; K. Head et al., 1995; K. Head & Ries, 2010; Kotabe, 1993; Martin, 2003; 
Wilkinson & Brouthers, 2000; Wint & Williams, 2002).  These past studies have primarily been 
undertaken from the perspective of developed economies pursuing FDI from other developed 
economies and in no case has the impact of IPAs been investigated with the focus of attracting 
EM FDI into a developed economy.  The rising importance of emerging markets such as China as 
important sources of FDI, therefore, has been completely overlooked in this literature set. 
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Further, host country policies to attract EM FDI have not been analysed to any significant degree 
in the extant literature. 
The second major contribution explores why this study found IPAs to significantly impact the 
location decision while the majority of past studies did not.  I argue when investing in a developed 
economy, Chinese MNEs may be qualitatively different from developed economy MNEs 
(Contractor, 2013).  This is due to the large psychic distances between emerging markets and 
developed economies.  Psychic distance in this case is described as the macro-level socio-
economic factors such as language, religion and level of economic development (Blomkvist & 
Drogendijk, 2013) as well as institutional voids found in many emerging markets like China such 
as inefficient capital markets, poor enforcement of local and international laws, capricious 
bureaucrats and erratic regulations (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Guillen & Carcia-Canal, 2009; 
Khanna & Palepu, 2010; Ramamurti, 2012b). These large levels of psychic distance create 
substantial LOF, which, in turn, increases the transaction cost of Chinese firms investing in 
developed economies.  The goal of IPAs, however, is to alleviate LOF through the effective 
dissemination of information. Investissement Québec, Québec’s official governing body for IPAs 
worldwide, for example, state, ‘Investissement Québec is the ideal organization to assist you in 
carrying out your investment project [in Québec]. Professionals are available to guide you 
throughout the process’ (Investissement Québec, 2013).  When developed economy IPAs target 
EM FDI rather than other developed economy FDI alleviating LOF becomes a much more difficult 
task due to high degrees of psychic distance.  
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5. Conclusion 
5.1 Discussion of aggregated results 
Understanding the internationalisation strategies of EM MNEs has become a major focus area in 
international business research (Deng, 2012; Ramasamy et al., 2012) as it has been argued 
traditional conceptual models of the MNE may not be applicable to EM MNEs (Buckley et al., 
2009; Stephen Chen & Tan, 2012; Luo & Tung, 2007; Mathews, 2006; Rui & Yip, 2008; Yiu et al., 
2007). A strand of contention regards whether asset augmenting strategies, as opposed to 
exploitation strategies, are common in EM MNEs (Buckley et al., 2007; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012; 
Deng, 2012; Hennart, 2012; C. Wang et al., 2012). The idea EM MNEs engage in asset 
augmentation has gained considerable traction within EM MNE specific theories (Deng, 2012; 
Luo & Rui, 2009; Luo & Tung, 2007; Wei, 2010).  EM MNEs, in particular, have been identified as 
being strongly driven by aggressive acquisitions, predominantly in developed markets, in their 
pursuit of strategic assets (Kedia et al., 2012; Luo & Tung, 2007; Sun et al., 2012).  My findings in 
Chapter two complement past work in this area to a significant degree.  It was found that Chinese 
MNEs have a higher propensity to use the acquisition mode of entry when engaging in strategic 
asset seeking behaviour.  This work is among the first to explore the impact of entry mode 
(greenfield versus acquisition) on the location choice or empirically address the SAS behaviour of 
Chinese MNEs. 
While there are qualitative papers on SAS, there are few papers which analyse the results of such 
behaviour. Chapter three questions how innovation is impacted when a Chinese MNE acquires 
an innovative firm from the US, EU or Japan.  I find that innovation does not rise or fall 
significantly in the acquired (developed economy) firm, but innovation in the acquiror (EM) firm 
increases significantly in the wake of SAS acquisitions. Finally, the efficacy of developed host 
countries to generate FDI from China has not been analysed to any significant degree in past 
studies.  Chapter four explored the role of mitigating psychic distance through IPAs on the 
generation of FDI from Chinese MNEs.  It was found that IPAs have a significant and positive 
impact the location choice of Chinese MNEs. The work in this thesis, therefore, addresses several 
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important conceptual gaps in the understanding of Chinese MNE cross-border investment 
behaviour, especially the understanding of Chinese FDI behaviour in developed economies. 
The primary impetus driving this research was to contribute to the theoretical debate on the 
applicability of historically dominant MNE frameworks and conceptual models to EM MNE 
investment behaviours. Precluding this pursuit was the dearth of reliable empirical evidence of 
the determinants of Chinese FDI.  Over the last decade a rapidly growing conceptual and 
empirical literature set has emerged on the outward foreign direct investment of Chinese MNEs 
(Deng, 2013), as well as a more general literature on EM MNEs (Ramamurti, 2012b). A large body 
of influential empirical studies within this literature set have employed econometric methods to 
explore these new conceptual issues relating to the FDI strategies of Chinese MNEs. A major 
motivation for this thesis was to show how the overwhelming majority of empirical studies on 
Chinese FDI to date have not adequately addressed the difficulties involved in measuring the FDI 
activity of Chinese MNEs. As reported in Chapter one, official Chinese FDI statistics are currently 
reported in congruence with OECD norms, which dictate only the country of immediate 
investment be recorded, rather than the ultimate beneficial owner (Buckley et al., 2013).  In this 
way, the use of offshore tax havens and financial centres by Chinese MNEs is not taken into 
account (Ning & Sutherland, 2012). Thus, although Chinese FDI statistics are gathered in line with 
international balance of payment norms, using these data for FDI location choice studies may 
bias econometric results (Sutherland & Ning, 2011). In hopes of elucidating these potential 
methodological limitations, I first explored how geographical and volume biases are inherent in 
Chinese FDI data due to the common use of SPEs in tax havens and THOFCs  Data biases due to 
the use of SPEs and THOFCs have either not been recognised or satisfactorily dealt with in most 
existing academic research on Chinese FDI (Sutherland & Ning, 2011). 
According to official MOFCOM data Chinese FDI to Hong Kong, BVI and CI is significant. Between 
2003 and 2010 on average around 80% of FDI flows were destined for one of these three tax 
havens. This gives an indication as to seriousness of the impact of initial Chinese FDI to an 
offshore SPE host being incorporated in official MOFCOM statistics. Accurate estimations on the 
destination and volume of Chinese FDI flowing from tax havens to third countries is not currently 
available. 
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Given the geographical and volume biases inherent in official MOFCOM statistics, care must be 
taken when using both aggregate and firm-level FDI data as an indicator of the genuine FDI 
activities of MNEs (Beugelsdijk et al., 2010; OECD, 2008).  Although these problems are relatively 
well known, statisticians and empirical researchers do not seem to have developed consistent 
methods for handling SPEs. China’s MOFCOM data, currently the most popular source for 
econometric studies on Chinese FDI, does not, therefore, seem to be a promising way of 
investigating the determinants of Chinese FDI. To date, however, most quantitative studies have 
looked at the country location determinants of Chinese FDI using this aggregated official FDI data. 
Surprisingly, most of these studies incorrectly include FDI to THOFCs, through the inclusion of FDI 
to Hong Kong, BVI and CI in their regression analyses. Reporting only immediate destination flows 
will almost certainly lead to positive volume biases to THOFCs and negative biases to non-
THOFCs.  
The majority of studies investigating the determinants of the cross-border location choices of 
Chinese MNEs are, therefore, based on FDI data which are methodologically questionable for 
understanding the determinants of the location decision.  As a result of using data which may be 
methodologically inappropriate for exploring the location choice of Chinese FDI, little is actually 
known about the drivers and determinants of the location choice of these firms.  By using 
methodologically more appropriate ultimate ownership FDI data for empirical analysis, it could 
be argued the results in Chapters two and four provide methodologically superior insight into the 
determinants and drivers of the location choice of Chinese FDI compared to most previous 
studies on the topic. This chapter moves forward by recapping and tying together the major 
findings in the three main chapters of this thesis.  It then goes on to discuss the theoretical 
contributions of each chapter individually and the papers as a whole.  Finally, it discusses the 
shortcomings of this thesis and identifies areas of productive future research. 
 
5.1.1 Main findings: Chinese MNEs, foreign establishment mode and SAS 
Much of the conceptual and empirical literature on EM MNE international expansion investigates 
the question of whether EM MNEs use acquisitions to rapidly acquire strategic assets in order to 
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catch-up with their developed economy counterparts (Kedia et al., 2012; Sun et al., 2012; Yiu et 
al., 2007). Foreign establishment mode considerations, therefore, are of central importance. To 
date, however, there have been no empirical studies exploring whether systematic differences 
exist in the propensity to use greenfield or acquisition entry modes. More specifically, no studies 
have explored whether there is a greater propensity to use acquisitions to obtain strategic assets, 
despite this being an important prediction in the conceptual literature on EM MNEs. The findings 
on mode of entry in this study are the first to systematically confirm Chinese MNEs do have a 
greater propensity to use acquisitions for acquiring strategic assets in developed markets.  
Further, this study is among the first to investigate the impact of the financial crisis on SAS 
behaviour of Chinese MNEs in developed countries as well as ownership idiosyncrasies between 
private and state-owned FDI in the United States. 
 
5.1.1.1 Entry mode and Chinese MNE SAS 
Despite lacking systematic empirical evidence comparing motives for greenfield and acquisition 
entry modes in Chinese MNEs, the view that they have a greater propensity to use aggressive 
acquisitions, as opposed to greenfield FDI, to obtain strategic assets from psychically distant 
developed markets, has become quite widely accepted (I. Alon et al., 2011; Luo & Tung, 2007; 
Sun et al., 2012).  Results from this study are the first to show that the motivations for Chinese 
MNE acquisitions do indeed appear to systematically differ from those of greenfield investment 
projects. The sample of Chinese MNEs investing in the US shows they did have a greater 
propensity to use acquisitions, rather than greenfield FDI, when targeting strategic assets. 
Greenfield investments were found to be motivated by market seeking and cost efficiency 
considerations (i.e. corporate income tax and unionization). I interpret these results as greenfield 
investments looking to exploit previously acquired competitive advantages in the US (Dikova & 
Brouthers, 2009).  This interpretation is consistent with a more recent strand of research which 
argues some EM MNEs do indeed possess firm specific ownership advantages, albeit ones which 
are far less obvious than those found in developed market MNEs (Contractor, 2013). These 
include, for example, their capabilities in process innovation, low cost production and long-term 
orientation (Contractor, 2013; Ramamurti, 2012b). 
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It could be argued that finding a greater propensity for strategic asset seeking in acquisitions than 
greenfield FDI is not particularly surprising, as they are generally in line with predictions of 
transaction cost/internalisation approaches to understanding MNE entry mode, as well as the 
EM MNE literature generally. While there is some truth in this, it is worth again stressing the 
central relevance of entry mode in the EM MNE literature, as well as the current lack of rigorous 
and systematic empirical investigation of the reasons for the use of different entry modes. Others 
have relied upon anecdotal evidence, such as the observed upturn in EM MNE acquisition 
activity, without formally exploring the motivations between different entry modes and whether 
they are actually different (Sun et al., 2012).  This study is a first attempt to probe these entry 
mode questions in more detail. By doing so, I also contribute to the dedicated literature on 
foreign establishment mode. As noted, of the 23 empirical studies comparing the motivations for 
greenfield and acquisition entry mode that Slangen and Hennart (2007) have recently identified, 
none looked at what could be considered EM MNEs. 
 
5.1.1.2 Entry mode, SAS and the global financial crisis 
It has been argued in the EM MNE literature that the global financial crisis has facilitated the 
rapid growth of EM MNEs, especially in augmenting perceived strategic asset deficiencies 
compared to developed economy MNEs (Luo et al., 2010; X. Yang & Stoltenberg, 2014). The 
financial crisis created a prolonged downturn in developed markets and a collapse in the 
valuations of many western-based MNEs. This, it is suggested, is ‘triggering a new wave of 
organizational restructuring for western companies which urgently need capital to fund their 
operations' (Luo et al., 2010, p. 77). This, in turn, 'generates more opportunities than before for 
EMEs to venture abroad through mergers and acquisitions’ (ibid).   
The global financial crisis, therefore, presents an important structural break in understanding the 
SAS behaviour of EM MNE in developed economies, especially regarding the acquisition mode of 
entry. Further accentuating the increased propensity of EM MNEs to rapidly acquire strategic 
assets in the post-crisis period, it is argued, was the preferred mode of entry in the pre-crisis 
period, which was greenfield FDI.  Historically, FDI by EM MNEs has ‘taken the form of greenfield 
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investment for the most part, while developed country MNEs have relied more on M&As' 
(McAllister & Sauvant, 2013, p. 30).  The financial crisis, however, has caused a collapse in 
valuations of many Western firms and capital availability subsequently restricted. This, in turn, 
caused the rapid decline in acquisition activity by Western MNEs.  The opposite seems to have 
been true for Chinese MNEs, partly because of their pre-crisis behaviours. Prior to the financial 
crisis Chinese MNEs were, for example, more likely than developed economy MNEs to invest via 
greenfield mode of entry, pay cash for international investments, and be controlled by family or 
state actors (McAllister & Sauvant, 2013).  Some argue, therefore, the nature of the prudent pre-
crisis investment behaviour shown by Chinese MNEs has put them in a strong position to 
undertake aggressive investment in the post crisis period, especially via the acquisition mode of 
entry (Beule & Bulcke, 2012; X. Yang & Stoltenberg, 2014).   
It is generally agreed that the crisis significantly weakened the position of developed market 
MNEs but strengthened that of EM MNEs. Yang and Stoltenberg (2012), for example, in one of 
the few studies to consider the impact of the crisis, argue that there are important links to 
Chinese post-crisis policy changes and the propensity to engage in SAS behaviour.  They note that 
Chinese multinationals are now ‘leveraging the financial resources accumulated over the last 30 
years, by taking advantage of the cheap assets made available globally by the recent financial 
crisis’ (p. 1). Results from this study, in line with observations made in the EM MNE literature 
which consider the crisis (i.e. Luo et al., 2010; Yang & Stoltenberg, 2012), show the game changing 
nature of the global financial crisis have also led to increased ‘springboard’ type behaviours, as 
the propensity for strategic asset seeking acquisitions increased in the wake of the crisis. Results 
in Chapter 2, I believe, are in congruence with the theoretical literature on EM MNEs arguing that 
acquisitions are the dominant entry mode for strategic asset seeking in EM MNEs (Child & 
Rodrigues, 2005; Kedia et al., 2012; Luo & Tung, 2007; Mathews, 2002, 2006) and the EM FDI 
investment decisions during the financial crisis accentuated this behaviour. While there have 
been a few recent contributions which discuss the impact of the financial crisis on EM MNEs (i.e. 
Beule & Bulcke (2012); Luo et al. (2010); McAllister & Sauvant (2013); X. Yang & Stoltenberg 
(2012)), this is still seen to be an under-researched area ripe for further analysis. 
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5.1.1.3 Entry mode, SAS and ownership 
Another important line of theorizing argues EM MNE FDI strategies are idiosyncratic owing to 
their domestic institutional environment (Kedia et al., 2012). An extension of this line of 
reasoning, which is particularly prominent in the literature on Chinese MNEs, is that they are 
aided by the state to acquire strategic assets (Luo & Tung, 2007; Luo et al., 2010).  Many argue 
state support, especially among SOEs, represents a significant advantage for EM MNEs, such as 
those from China (Sauvant et al., 2010). Supportive measures include such things as discounted 
loans, low expatriate insurance premiums, tax credits, investment information and streamlined 
application procedures, all of which reduce the real and perceived risks of expanding abroad 
(Buckley et al., 2007; Luo et al., 2010) in search of, in the case of Chinese FDI in developed 
economies such as the US, strategic assets (Deng, 2009). 
I find, however, that state-owned Chinese MNEs have a diminished propensity to strategic asset 
seek. This begs the question as to why state owned MNEs are not successful in acquiring strategic 
assets in the US via acquisition entry mode. One plausible explanation is that SOEs meet greater 
hurdles in their investment decisions in the US.  Indeed, as they are ‘a part of the home-country 
institutions, SOEs may carry non-commercial objectives driven by the political interests of the 
state’ (Cui & Jiang, 2012, p. 268).  This causes many developed economies, such as the US, to 
scrutinize Chinese FDI all the more carefully. Deng (2013), for example, conclude ‘the dramatic 
rise in Chinese FDI has sparked intense political, economic, and developmental debates in the 
global community regarding active state involvement envisioned by the thesis of state 
corporatism (Sauvant, McAllisteer, & Maschek, 2010; Yeung & Lui, 2008)’ (p. 519). 
An alternative explanation for the lack of asset-seeking acquisitions by state-owned MNEs is that 
the extent of state support measures and industrial policies to encourage SAS has been 
considerably overstated. This is, however, contrary to the majority of the current literature. It is 
often argued, for example, SOEs are embedded and part of the domestic Chinese institutional 
fabric and owing to their resource dependency upon the state that they are likely to follow state 
policy.  The domestic institutional environment, it is further argued, plays a central role in 
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determining outward FDI strategies (Buckley et al., 2007). This view has been echoed in a large 
number of recent academic contributions to the discussion on EM MNEs. Thus, in the Chinese 
case, it is suggested ‘the evidence supports the view that government lays the foundations for 
the international expansion of Chinese firms (Peng et al., 2008)’ (C. Wang et al., 2012, p. 668). 
Others, while still a minority, argue there is actually very limited empirical evidence to support 
the idea that China has a sophisticated industrial policy to support state-owned MNEs in acquiring 
strategic assets (Meuer et al., 2012).  In other words, while many believe Chinese domestic 
institutions are idiosyncratic and supportive of strategic asset seeking acquisitions, they actually 
may not be in the case of strategic asset seeking. The work in this thesis provides new empirical 
evidence which seems to support the latter view, that the efficacy of state policy in encouraging 
SAS may have been overstated in many past studies. 
 
5.1.2 Main Findings: Chinese MNE strategic asset acquisitions and resulting patent generation 
A core question in current conceptual discussion and empirical investigations of Chinese MNE FDI 
strategy is whether Chinese MNEs are acquiring strategic assets and using these assets to develop 
the firm-specific ownership advantages that they themselves lack. Within this literature set, a 
growing consensus seems to be emerging arguing that Chinese MNEs look to acquire the 
intangible strategic assets that they themselves lack via FDI. They do so in particular via 
acquisition mode of entry, often to psychically distant developed markets (Deng, 2009; Luo & 
Tung, 2007; Sun et al., 2012). Unlike their developed economy counterparts, therefore, Chinese 
MNEs today may try to ‘springboard’ to the technological frontier, using non-incremental 
learning processes by directly acquiring cutting edge capabilities from their developed market 
counterparts.  It is not, however, at all clear how Chinese MNEs are actually able to harness, 
absorb and exploit these acquired strategic assets.  Indeed, intuitively one would assume this to 
be a major challenge for these Chinese MNEs as most have comparatively little useful experience 
of such processes from which to draw. To date, however, there has been very little research 
investigating how such acquisitions perform, specifically in terms of their generation of further 
intangible strategic assets – a key criteria for measuring the success of these investments.  
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5.1.2.1 Foreign subsidiary innovation and SAS acquisition 
If Chinese MNEs are to foster their own dynamic capabilities, it will be necessary for their foreign 
acquisitions to succeed.  Some, though arguably still a minority, have openly questioned whether 
EM MNEs have sufficient capabilities to properly exploit their acquisitions (De Beule & Duanmu, 
2012; Narula & Dunning, 2010; Rugman & Li, 2007).  Results from the event study model utilized 
in this thesis show no statistically significant positive or negative outcomes regarding the 
performance of continued patenting activity in foreign acquisitions themselves.  Rather, patent 
generation tends to stay flat or trend very slightly negative.  Thus, it is not yet appropriate to 
make any strong conclusions regarding the way in which Chinese MNEs manage technological 
and innovative performance in their foreign acquisitions.  Suffice to say, however, there is no 
positive evidence that Chinese MNEs are capable of harnessing their foreign strategic 
acquisitions.  Future research using case study methodology has the potential to greatly enhance 
our understanding of this important issue. 
 
5.1.2.2 Domestic innovation and SAS acquisitions 
Substantial attention has been given to the idea that Chinese MNEs pursue SAS via developed 
market acquisitions primarily to repatriate intangibles and use these to serve their home 
markets, as opposed to directly competing in international markets (Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Luo 
& Tung, 2007; Ramamurti, 2012b; Rui & Yip, 2008). While patenting activity in the acquired 
foreign subsidiary does not significantly increase or deteriorate in the post-acquisition period, 
domestic (Chinese) patents rise significantly.  This was found to be true estimating both the 
overall trends of patent generation in the market and simply estimating firm-level patent 
generation.  Findings regarding domestic technology patenting performance in the wake of a 
foreign strategic asset related acquisition, therefore, provide potentially important insights for 
further conceptualizing Chinese MNE FDI strategy. These results suggest that a form of 
international technology transfer may well be taking place. Chinese MNEs undertaking strategic 
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asset seeking appear to make foreign strategic asset acquisitions primarily to exploit them within 
their domestic markets. 
One explanation for Chinese MNEs undertaking SAS related OFDI, therefore, is not to develop 
firm-specific advantages for international competition. Rather, outward FDI is seen as a means 
of transferring various capabilities, expertise and technologies back to their domestic market 
(Ramamurti, 2012b). They then use these newly obtained competencies to compete against the 
highly competitive developed economy MNEs that have established strong positions in the 
domestic Chinese market. Further, foreign MNEs have been reluctant to introduce their most 
advanced products and technologies to China, for fear of expropriation of intellectual property. 
As such, Chinese MNEs have also been pushed to search in foreign markets for such strategic 
assets. 
 
5.1.2.3 Absorptive capacity and ownership 
Many factors may determine a firm’s capability to not only target and attain foreign strategic 
assets, but also to absorb and harness them. A great deal has been made of how state ownership 
and involvement may influence EM MNE FDI (Buckley et al., 2007; Cui & Jiang, 2012; Luo et al., 
2010; Meuer et al., 2012; C. Wang et al., 2012).  Indeed, according to Cuervo-Cazurra (2012), the 
key distinguishing feature of EM MNEs relates to the question of whether the domestic 
institutional environment has an undue influence on the FDI decisions of EM MNEs.  Looking at 
the Chinese case, for example, some argue that state actors supply Chinese MNEs with numerous 
resources, such as access to capital, domestic market monopolies, information and streamlined 
administrative procedures (Luo et al., 2010). The domestic institutional environment, therefore, 
in general may play a central role in determining OFDI strategies (Buckley et al., 2007). In some 
studies it has been found that SAS is more common among SOEs than private businesses (T. Alon, 
2010; Ramasamy et al., 2012).  
Despite the plethora of literature arguing state support for FDI may lead to more asset-seeking, 
few if any studies comment on what policies are used to help Chinese MNEs absorb strategic 
assets. It does not follow, for example, that even if SOEs are given greater support, they are 
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necessarily more successful at harnessing or absorbing intangible strategic assets. The findings in 
this thesis provide evidence that even if SOEs are given more support to target strategic-assets, 
they are not necessarily more capable of absorbing such assets.  In other words, there are no 
significant differences in the ability to internalise strategic assets in the case of SAS acquisitions 
executed by state and private-owned MNEs. 
 
5.1.3 Main Findings: Developed economy investment promotion agencies and Chinese foreign 
direct investment 
The primary objective of foreign investment promotion agencies is to generate FDI (Wells & Wint, 
1990).  This goal is facilitated through the dissemination of information which may otherwise be 
an impediment to investment due to a lack of nuanced understanding of potential host 
economies cultural, political and economic environmental differences (Lim, 2008). One of the 
main objectives of IPAs is to mitigate liabilities of foreignness (LOF) caused by information 
asymmetries (Morisset, 2003).  LOF is defined as, ‘all additional costs a firm operating in a market 
overseas incurs that a local firm would not incur’ (Zaheer, 1995: 343).  In other words, LOF raises 
the cost of conducting investment in a qualitatively dissimilar economy.  Further, there is a 
positive relationship between cost and psychic distance of the home and host economies (Ellis, 
2008). 
The majority of past studies find IPAs do not have a significant impact on the location choice of 
FDI (C. Coughlin & Segev, 2000; C. K. Head et al., 1999; K. Head & Ries, 2010; Kotabe, 1993; 
Martin, 2003; Wilkinson & Brouthers, 2000; Wint & Williams, 2002).  These studies, however, 
were primarily taken from the perspective of developed economies generating FDI from other 
developed economies.  The task of developed economy IPAs to mitigate LOF of other developed 
economies, however, is not nearly as formidable a challenge as mitigating LOF from qualitatively 
dissimilar economies, such as China.  One important reason for this is the difference in home 
institutional environments from which EM and developed economy firms expand (Cuervo-
Cazurra & Genc, 2008).  Institutional voids increase the transaction costs of expanding from an 
EM to a developed economy due to increased levels of information asymmetries. In other words, 
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due to a large gap in psychic distance between EM firms and investment initiatives in developed 
economies, the value derived from the services provided by developed economy IPAs could be 
significant. If, therefore, a developed economy IPA is able to efficaciously disseminate 
information which lowers transaction costs associated with LOF, the propensity to invest in that 
economy will be enhanced. 
 
5.1.3.1 IPAs and Chinese FDI generation 
Given the high levels of psychic distance between China and Canada, finding IPAs significantly 
impact the location decision is, perhaps, unsurprising.  The increased transaction costs for 
Chinese MNEs associated with overcoming LOF in a developed economy may have been 
mitigated through the efficacious dissemination of information by IPAs. This study contributes to 
the literature by elucidating the positive role of developed economy IPAs in generating Chinese 
FDI. It further contributes to the literature by highlighting the importance of considering host 
country FDI generation policies. 
 
5.2 Contribution to theory 
This thesis has several implications for international business theory.  First, findings that Chinese 
MNEs internationalize via the acquisition mode of entry primarily to secure strategic assets is 
important to the theoretical debate on the appropriateness of traditional FDI models such as the 
OLI paradigm.  This, it is argued, is due to the explorative, rather than exploitive, nature of these 
SAS acquisitions as well as the rapid pace at which these firms internationalise.  Second, I find 
that once Chinese MNEs complete these SAS acquisitions in developed economies, the newly 
obtained strategic assets tend to be expatriated for exploitation in the domestic market rather 
than contributing toward the build-up of globally competitive firm-specific advantages.  This, I 
argue, may indicate locational advantages are not freely available to all firms, especially in China.  
This, in turn, questions whether extension of the OLI paradigm is necessary. Third, it was found 
developed economy IPAs significantly increase the propensity to generate Chinese FDI.  This was 
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found by accounting for psychic distance in the analysis of IPAs, which has largely been neglected 
in the IPA literature. 
 
5.2.1 Contribution to theory: Chinese MNEs, foreign establishment mode and strategic asset 
seeking 
Much of the extant literature on EM MNEs argues traditional theories and perspectives do not 
adequately explain the behaviour of EM MNEs.  It is generally argued the rapid pace of 
globalization, largely to augment perceived firm-level competitive deficiencies, warrants the 
extension of traditional theories, and in some extreme cases outright rejection (Kedia et al., 
2012). Indeed, despite lacking systematic empirical evidence comparing motives for greenfield 
and acquisition entry modes in EM MNEs, the view that EM MNEs tend to use acquisitions, as 
opposed to greenfield FDI, to acquire strategic assets from psychically distant developed markets, 
has become quite widely accepted (Luo & Tung, 2007; H. Yang, Sun, Lin, & Peng, 2010).  At a 
conceptual level, this view has also been strongly associated with calls for new theoretical 
understandings of EM MNE expansion, as it has been argued that the OLI paradigm does not 
explain acquisition related SAS behaviour particularly well (Kedia et al., 2012). 
My results show that the motivations for Chinese MNE acquisitions appear to systematically 
differ from those of greenfield investment projects and in doing so they are in accordance with 
some of the main theoretical predictions of the growing EM MNE literature. The sample of 
Chinese MNEs investing in the US shows they do have a greater propensity to use acquisitions, 
rather than greenfield FDI, when targeting strategic assets. These findings are generally in line 
with predictions of transaction cost/internalisation approaches to understanding MNE entry 
mode, as well as the EM MNE literature, including contributions such as Mathews's (2002, 2006) 
‘Link, Leverage, Learn’ framework and Luo and Tung’s (2007) ‘Springboard Perspective’.   
According to traditional theories of the MNE, firms internationalise based on specific 
characteristics, such as firm-specific ownership advantages, home and host country locational 
advantages and the ability to orchestrate internal and external resources in a given location in 
order to deliver value to customers. The most dominant theoretical framework used in 
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international business studies today is Dunning's (1988) eclectic OLI paradigm (Cantwell, 2014) 
which argues firms internationalise based on ownership, locational and internalisation 
advantages.  Originally, the ownership advantage argued a firm must have advantages which are 
unique and inimitable in order to successfully compete abroad (Dunning, 1988), but has more 
recently been expanded in scope to cover not only firm-specific resource-based advantages, but 
also the home network in which the MNE operates (Cantwell et al., 2009; Dunning & Lundan, 
2008). In this way, the ‘O’ advantage is two-pronged as it now appropriates consideration for the 
home institutional context from which an MNE expands globally as well as the traditional 
assumption of firm-based resource advantages (Cantwell, 2014). 
The precipitous rise of EM MNEs has, however, challenged some of the key tenets of traditional 
frameworks such the OLI paradigm’s assumption that ownership advantages are prerequisite to 
international expansion (Cui & Jiang, 2012). Mathews's (2002, 2006) ‘Link, Leverage, Learn’ 
framework and Luo and Tung’s (2007) ‘Springboard Perspective’ are prime examples of calls for 
extension to traditional frameworks, such as the OLI paradigm, due to consideration of EM MNE 
international investment behaviour. These frameworks argue EM firms may expand abroad for 
asset exploration purposes rather than exploitation of firm-specific advantages (Child & 
Rodrigues, 2005; Deng, 2009).   
It could be argued the work in this thesis provides further evidence for the bigger question of 
whether the OLI paradigm is suitable for explaining EM MNE FDI strategies. On balance, empirical 
findings from this study are broadly supportive of the idea that Chinese MNEs do indeed have a 
stronger propensity to seek strategic assets via explorative acquisitions to acquire the brands, 
technologies, managerial know how and intangible assets that they themselves lack. They are, 
therefore, also supportive of the idea that Chinese MNEs actively seek the firm-specific 
advantages that will allow them to succeed as latecomers in global markets (Kedia et al., 2012) 
rather than exploiting previously obtained firm-specific advantages (Luo & Tung, 2007).  
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5.2.2 Contribution to theory: Chinese MNE strategic asset acquisitions and resulting patent 
generation 
As has been found in the extant literature (and confirmed in Chapter 2 of this thesis), Chinese 
MNEs are engaging in SAS acquisitions.  What was not initially clear, however, is whether they 
are using these assets to develop globally competitive firm-specific ownership advantages or for 
domestic exploitation.  As discussed in section 5.2.1, unlike their developed market counterparts 
Chinese MNEs today may try to ‘springboard’ to the technological frontier (Luo & Tung, 2007). I 
argue, however, the empirical finding that Chinese MNEs do target strategic assets via FDI is 
rather puzzling. It is puzzling as it is not clear Chinese MNEs are actually able to harness, absorb 
and exploit these acquired strategic assets.  Indeed, intuitively one would assume this to be a 
major challenge for these Chinese MNEs, most having comparatively little useful experience of 
such processes from which to draw. A few recent studies have questioned whether EM MNEs 
have sufficient capabilities to properly exploit their acquisitions (De Beule & Duanmu, 2012; 
Narula & Dunning, 2010; Rugman & Li, 2007). 
Finding no significant outcomes in innovation generation in foreign acquisitions gives preliminary 
indication Chinese MNEs may not be capable of harnessing their foreign strategic acquisitions. 
This finding does not, however, indicate they are incapable either. Conversely, findings regarding 
domestic technology patenting performance in the post-foreign SAS related acquisition period 
do provide potentially important insights for further conceptualizing Chinese MNE FDI strategy. 
These results suggest Chinese MNEs undertaking strategic asset seeking appear to pursue foreign 
strategic asset acquisitions primarily to exploit those assets within their domestic markets. 
This finding is potentially important, as it provides further evidence that the OLI model may not 
explain Chinese MNE FDI behaviour particularly well. This argument is made, however, not 
because the OLI model does not properly explain why Chinese MNEs target strategic-assets with 
the aim of developing their own firm-specific ownership advantages as argued above. Rather, 
this assertion is based on findings in this study and the more recent criticism relating to OLI 
model’s assumption of ‘locational’ advantages being freely available to all (the ‘L’ in OLI) 
(Hennart, 2012). Indeed, Hennart (2009, 2012) argues the primary drawback of the OLI paradigm 
is not due to ‘ownership’ issues as argued by some (Mathews, 2002, 2006), or ‘internalisation’ 
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issues as recently outlined by Teece (2014).  Rather, Hennart's (2012) assertion is based on the 
assumption of ‘locational’ advantages being freely available to all. He argues that better access 
to ‘complementary local resources’, plus the growing and highly competitive markets for 
technology, potentially strengthen the bargaining power of EM MNEs. Such local complementary 
resources also allow for rents appropriable only by domestic firms and thus cross-subsidisation 
of SAS FDI. 
Hennart (2012), therefore, questions a central tenet in OLI thinking – the assumption that host 
country locational advantages are freely available to all. He argues, instead, that EM MNEs are in 
fact able to generate rents associated with the bundling of intangible strategic assets with 
‘complementary local resources’ (Hennart, 2012).  The fact such resources are only accessible to 
domestic EM MNEs in their home markets also provides strong incentives for them to engage in 
SAS acquisitions detailed in Chapter two and subsequently in the ‘technological looting’ found in 
Chapter three. If such complementary local resources were not available, it is not clear why 
developed market MNEs would not choose to directly enter emerging markets. An implication of 
the bundling model is, therefore, that EM MNEs will look to benefit, at least initially, from their 
domestic market rents. Only later may they be able leverage these CLRs (and the size and rapid 
growth of the domestic market) to also innovate and create their own FSAs for further 
internationalisation/FDI. Results from Chapter 3, therefore, leads to the interesting possibility 
that the OLI model may not be effective in explaining Chinese MNE FDI, but not primarily because 
of the previously discussed conundrum of the rapid rise of SAS related FDI in EM MNEs. Rather, 
results suggest the weakness in the OLI model may also be related to its restrictive assumptions 
about location advantages and their availability to all (Hennart, 2012).  
 
5.2.3 Contribution to theory: developed economy IPAs and Chinese FDI 
The main theoretical contribution of Chapter 4 (developed economy IPAs and Chinese FDI) is the 
importance of considering psychic distance when examining the impact of foreign investment 
promotion agencies. The IPA literature is contentious as to whether IPAs are efficacious in 
generating FDI, with the majority of studies on the topic finding insignificant results.  Most prior 
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studies, however, analysed developed economy IPAs attempting to generate FDI from other 
developed economies.  The qualitative differences between developed and emerging economies 
as sources of FDI, due to psychic distance were, therefore, completely overlooked.  This study 
found developed economy IPAs increase the propensity for investment from psychically distant 
economies, such as China.  This finding, embedded in psychic distance and transaction cost 
economics conceptual frameworks, constitutes a significant contribution to the IPA literature and 
lends further evidence that Chinese MNEs may require different policies and considerations than 
developed economy MNEs. 
 
5.2.4 Conceptual contributions and their application to mainstream theories 
The aggregated findings of this work do, of course, also have implications for theoretical 
frameworks aside from the OLI paradigm. In his recent review of IB theoretical frameworks, 
Cuervo-Cazurra (2012) identified several other prominent frameworks used in IB and their 
applicability, or lack thereof, to EM MNEs such as, product life cycle, incremental 
internationalisation, internalisation theory, integration/differentiation and legitimation models, 
as well as resource-based and knowledge-based views. The conceptual contributions in this 
thesis have direct and indirect implications for many of these theories. 
  
5.2.4.1 Product Life Cycle Theory 
The product life cycle theory argues products and services are initially created in markets with 
highly sophisticated consumers, such as developed countries, and only later as the product or 
service becomes standardized, and of lower cost, will that product or service be offered to other, 
less sophisticated consumer markets, such as developing markets. As the product or service 
moves into the maturity and decline stages of the product life cycle, production is shifted to low-
cost production economies (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012). As the product life cycle model speaks 
directly to innovative activity, one aspect of the strategic asset-seeking debate, the aggregated 
findings in this thesis are of direct relevance.  I find that Chinese MNEs are motivated to upgrade 
their technological capability rapidly, and thus tend to prefer the acquisition mode of entry to 
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gain access to strategic assets.  These EM firms are not willing to wait until products and services 
are fully standardised, competing primarily on cost. Rather, EM MNEs look to rapidly 
‘springboard’ (Luo & Tung, 2007) from a position of competitive disadvantage to the 
technological frontier.  Lending further evidence to this line of thinking asks what EM MNEs do 
with their strategic assets in the post-acquisition period. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, when an Chinese MNE acquires an innovative firm from the US, Europe 
or Japan, they do so primarily to repatriate those strategic assets to the home country. This 
finding does not bode well with the assumption that consumers from economically less advanced 
markets, such as China, are not interested or otherwise capable of purchasing cutting-edge 
products and services.  If Chinese consumers are not willing or able to purchase cutting-edge 
products and services, there would be little incentive to exploit those technologies in the home 
country.  In fact, the opposite seems to be true. In many cases, Chinese MNEs engage in FDI 
primarily to compete against globally dominate MNEs at home (Child & Rodrigues, 2005).  My 
findings in Chapter 3 support this view and subsequently question the applicability of product life 
cycle theory to current conceptualisation of Chinese MNE behaviour. 
 
5.2.4.2 Incremental Internationalisations Theory 
The incremental internationalisation theory argues firms engage in cross-border transactions 
first in psychically near markets and over time to increasingly psychically distant markets.  As the 
firm gains experience in international transactions, it subsequently engages in higher risk and 
exposure internationalisation activities, for example, from exporting to sales subsidiary to 
manufacturing facility (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009). The conclusions of this thesis on the behaviour 
of Chinese MNEs do not seem to conform to this theoretical framework.  In Chapter 2, for 
example, it was found Chinese MNEs do engage in the high-risk acquisition entry mode when 
seeking resources, such as strategic assets.  These firms do so in many cases with little or no 
previous experience in regional (psychically near) markets or by first setting up sales offices to 
gain understanding of the host economy.  In fact, as shown in Chapter 3, many Chinese MNEs 
internationalise based solely to repatriate intangible assets and do not seem interested or 
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otherwise capable of competing globally.  In a recent article on the subject, Wang, Luo, Lu, Sun 
and Maksimov (2014) argue, ‘foreign subsidiary autonomy is a strategic mechanism to overcome 
the EMNE’s weakness in managing globally dispersed businesses and their home-country 
disadvantages after foreign entry’ (p. 111).  Further, Chapter 4 found that when Chinese MNEs 
do pursue FDI to psychically distance economies, such as developed economies, they tend to 
locate in economies which offer services, such as IPAs, to help mitigate LOF disadvantages. This 
indicates Chinese firms may use not only firm-specific experience to minimize risk (i.e. LOF), but 
also formal governmental channels such as the IPA.  In light of the findings in all three major 
sections of this thesis as well as the most current work on the theorization of EM MNE (i.e. Wang 
et al. (2014)) it seems the incremental internationalisation theory is not particularly useful for 
explaining EM cross-border investment behaviour. 
 
5.2.4.3 Internalisation Theory 
The internalisation theory is an integral argument of the broader transaction cost approach 
which,  
assumes pre-existing markets, which “fail” under certain conditions (e.g., where asset 
specificity or complex know-how transfers are involved), necessitating the emergence of 
the MNE and FDI to address these failures by internalizing (under a management 
structure) transactions that would otherwise likely evolve in an unfavourable way for one 
of the parties  
(Teece, 2014, p. 12) 
Although not specifically addressed in Chapters 2 and 3, Chinese MNEs tend to internalise 
transaction costs differently from developed economy MNEs due to the poor institutional 
environment in which Chinese MNEs are accustom to operating (i.e. poor legal protection of 
intellectual property and contractual rights) (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012). Chapter 4 assumes that as 
psychic distance between the home and host economy increases, so too does the cost of locating 
in that host economy due, for example, to information asymmetries.  In this case internalising 
the additional costs of doing business in a psychically distant economy may have been 
internalised through the use of an IPA.  In other words, the IPA may have lowered information 
asymmetries, and in turn LOF, for Chinese MNEs entering psychically distant Canada (i.e. 
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developed economy). This allowed expansion via wholly-owned greenfield and majority stake 
acquisition mode of entry in the majority of observations in this study rather than attempting to 
leverage licenses or alliances.  While this was certainly not the focus of Chapter 4, the presence 
and usefulness of developed economy IPAs for Chinese MNE FDI may provide (weak) evidence 
the behaviour of Chinese MNEs warrants extension of internalisation theory. 
 
5.2.4.4 Integration/Differentiation Model of the MNE 
The integration/differentiation model of the MNE explains the decision to centralise operations 
across national borders or, conversely, to localise operations. The former strategy looks to 
capitalise on economies of scale and scope while the latter focuses on customer responsiveness 
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012). A recent extension of this theory addresses the tension between 
headquarters and foreign subsidiary (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999) and subsequently questions 
whether extension is necessary due to the isomorphic pressures (EM) home institutions 
sometimes instil upon their MNEs, especially state owned ones (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012; Hoskisson 
et al., 2013). While this study does discuss the isomorphic pressure (EM) home institutions 
sometimes place on their MNEs, I argue the effect of this pressure is not clear.  In Chapter three, 
for example, it was argued state-owned Chinese firms may have certain advantages over 
privately held Chinese firms due to soft loans, lower expatriate insurance premiums, streamlined 
investment procedures, etc. It was found, however, that the difference in investment behaviour 
between SOEs and privately owned firms was minimal.  This, it could be argued, lends further, 
albeit weak, support to the robustness of the integration/differentiation model of the MNE. 
 
5.2.4.5 Resource-Based View 
‘The resource-based view…argues that firms have firm-specific resources/capabilities that 
managers use to create products that solve the needs of customers in competition with the offers 
of competitors’ (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012, p. 161).  This theory has been extended multiple times 
within an IB framework, most recently by Teece (2014) when he argued the importance of 
understanding and engaging with the idea of ‘dynamic capabilities’ of the firm. Dynamic 
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capabilities theoretical framework stresses ‘the importance of (signature) business processes, 
both inside and outside the firm and also in linking the firm to external partners’ (Teece, 2014, p. 
14). The findings in Chapter 3 have transitive implications for the resource/capacity debate.  In 
Chapter 3 it was found Chinese MNEs engage in strategic asset-seeking acquisitions not 
necessarily to compete with traditional global champions internationally. Rather, they expatriate 
intangible resources for domestic use. This indicates either most Chinese MNEs are not willing or 
are otherwise incapable of competing globally, even in the case of possessing world leading 
technologies.  This provides preliminary evidence that Chinese MNEs may not have the dynamic 
capabilities necessary to effectively harness the intangible resources they acquire from 
developed economy MNEs. 
 
5.2.4.6 Contribution to IB Theory 
This thesis makes a significant contribution to the IB literature. It does so primarily through the 
analysis of the applicability of extant conceptual and policy frameworks to the specific cross-
border investment behaviour of Chinese MNEs.  I argue many of the dominant conceptual 
frameworks currently used in IB may require theoretical extension. 
 
5.3 Limitations and suggestions for future research 
This thesis sufferers from several limitations, but also raises potential questions for future 
research.  Some limitations are quite inconsequential to my main arguments and findings.  Others, 
however, present more serious questions as to generalizability of my results, thus calling into 
question their ability to positively contribute to theoretical debates.  In the introduction section, 
for example, I describe the upward trajectory of Chinese FDI on a global scale using UNCTAD data.  
I then go on to discuss the downside of using data such as these for the basis of, for example, 
Chinese FDI location choice studies.  There is little doubt Chinese FDI flows are growing rapidly, 
but due to current FDI reporting standards (i.e. not accounting for the use of tax havens) reliable 
globally aggregated statistics for genuine value-adding Chinese FDI are difficult to obtain.  
Coupling data sources which account for the use of tax havens, such as Thomson ONE for mergers 
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and acquisitions, FT fDi Markets for greenfield transactions, and DataStream (public companies) 
and ORBIS (private companies) for firm-level data, provides a better alternative.  Access to these 
databases is, however, prohibitively expensive in the case of conducting a PhD.  Thus, for the 
purposes of evaluating macro-level trends, UNCTAD data were used in this descriptive case.  
Further limitations in the introduction section relate to my evaluation of past Chinese FDI location 
choice studies.  Ideally, I would have more thoroughly elaborated on the aggregated nature of 
channelling investment through tax havens.  The structure of the use of tax havens, industrial 
biases caused by tax havens and in-depth case studies all could have been included to strengthen 
this section.  I did not, however, want this thesis to be about Chinese MNEs use of tax havens.  
Rather, the inclusion of this information was used primarily to motivate and substantiate the 
relevance of Chapter 2 directly and Chapter 4 indirectly.  Future research would do well to 
investigate how tax havens are used by Chinese MNEs (i.e. structures, etc.), whether the use of 
tax havens has reduced in light of recent Chinese governmental refocuses regarding the 
increasing intolerance of transfer pricing and diminished inward FDI incentives, and the real or 
perceived impact on local, provincial and country-level Chinese economies. 
A main limitation in Chapter 2 is the use of count data rather than value data.  Ideally, both count 
and value models would have been estimated in this study (either jointly in a hierarchical model, 
or separately).  However, due to the lack of reliable transaction valuations in the case of Chinese 
FDI in the US, count data was the best way forward.  Other studies (i.e. Amighini & Franco, 2013; 
Amighini, Rabellotti, & Sanfilippo, 2013) confronted similar problems regarding the use of 
Chinese FDI and subsequently reacted in a similar manner. 
Perhaps, a more troubling limitation in Chapter 2 is the use of single home and host countries, 
China and the US, respectively.  While there are persuasive arguments for using the single home, 
host country methodology, as detailed in section 2.3, this type of study makes generalizations for 
all EM FDI source countries and all developed host countries difficult.  In this way, contribution 
to theory could also be called into question due to the lack of proof of determinants and causal 
relationships outside this narrowly defined research scope. One way to alleviate this limitation is 
to conduct several more single home and host country studies culminating in a meta-analysis of 
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aggregated results.  Chapter 2, therefore, provides solid evidence of the investment behaviour 
of Chinese MNEs in a developed economy which may or may not be representative of developed 
economies as a whole.  Within the entry mode literature tradeoffs such as these are common 
(Slangen & Hennart, 2007). 
Chapter 3 also suffers from limitations.  First, as this is the first study to use event study 
methodology to analyse patents there were no pre-established time frames for event and 
estimation windows.  To overcome this, I modelled many different event and estimation windows.  
Fortuitously, results did not significantly change when shortening or lengthening time frames. As 
such, I was able to use descriptive statistics to determine which time estimates were most 
appropriate. 
A second limitation from Chapter 3 is my inability to explore firm-level factors which cause 
innovation to rise or fall.  This limitation was due primarily to database restrictions.  I was able to 
generate firm-level data for most of the publically listed companies in my sample, but 
information on private firms was not available.  Including only publically listed companies made 
my sample size prohibitively small.  If I would have had access to the ORBIS database, this issue 
may (or may not) have been alleviated. Future research would do well to determine the factors 
which predicate increased innovative activity in the post-acquisition period for Chinese MNEs. 
The geographic scope of Chapter 3 could also be considered a limitation.  Firstly, using China as 
a sole source of acquisition FDI for analysis may hinder extrapolation of my findings to other FDI 
source countries.  Further, including only acquisitions from Europe, Japan and the US may not be 
representative of behaviour in all developed countries, such as Canada, Australia, South Korea, 
Singapore, etc.  Again, future research can extend this geographic scope to include other 
emerging and developed markets. A further potentially interesting study in this area might 
compare the innovation outcomes from developed market firms investing in other developed 
markets with Chinese firms investing in developed markets. Presumably, developed market firms 
also pursue SAS ambitions in developed markets. Elucidating differences in behaviour, if any, 
between Chinese and developed market firms may yield interesting results.  Finally, the use of 
patents to gauge strategic assets/innovation could be considered rather obtuse.  This is due to 1) 
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strategic assets being defined solely as patenting activity being overly narrow (as discussed in 
section 2.3.1) and 2) the values of patented innovation not being homogenous across patenting 
activity (i.e. some patents are very valuable while others are worthless).  A more promising 
avenue in which to investigate this question is to use the firm-level valuation of intangible assets 
to proxy the outcomes of SAS acquisitions.  This line of reasoning has its own set of potential 
issues (mainly data related) which are beyond the scope of this section. Finally, in event study 
methodology cumulative abnormal patenting results could potentially be biases by a small 
sample size (i.e. 10 or fewer observations). The sample size used here (around 80 firms) is 
adequate for producing valid event study results, but is still on the small side. 
Chapter 4 is also limited in several areas.  First, the generalizability of results from this study are 
questionable, again, due to the limited geographic scope of including a sole home and host 
country.  Second, this study was constrained by the lack of detailed data about each Canadian 
IPA in China.  If, for example, data were available on the intensity of activities in these IPAs, rather 
than simply their presence, much better conclusions could have been drawn about the main 
determinants in developed economies creating an efficacious IPA in China.  Third, using FDI as 
the dependent variable will, most likely, only capture the main benefit of maintaining an IPA.   
IPAs, of course, also perform other tasks with other goals.  Measuring the efficacy of these other 
tasks would provide a holistic view of the efficacy of IPAs.  Fourth, in my study, I argue the large 
psychic distance between Chinese and developed economies lays the foundation for IPAs to 
lower transaction costs.  My study does not, however, have a comparative component (i.e. 
developed economy target).  This piece of research can therefore be extended in several 
meaningful directions.  A study which, for example, includes the IPAs of several developed 
economies in several different EM and developed economy FDI source countries and is able to 
gather highly detailed data on each IPA could dramatically increase the understanding of not only 
the efficacy of IPAs in generating FDI, but also the determinants to successful IPA FDI generation.  
Detailed case studies on where IPAs spend their time and money and related outcomes (i.e. 
increased FDI generation, raising home country exports, enhanced political visibility, etc.) would 
also be potentially rewarding research agenda. 
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While there are certainly more methodological and theoretical limitations to the work included 
in this thesis, it is hoped this section was upfront about the most pressing concerns.  I have full 
expectations of addressing many of these issues and other identified conceptual gaps in the 
literature in future research projects.  Indeed, the work in this thesis is seen to be the start of a 
productive academic research track in the area of Chinese MNE FDI. 
  
 164 
 
6. References 
Ahern, K. R. (2009). Sample selection and event study estimation. Journal of Empirical Finance, 
16(3), 466–482. Retrieved from 
http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S092753980900005X 
Alfaro, L., Chanda, A., Kalemli-Ozean, S., & Sayek, S. (2006). How does foreign direct investment 
promote economic growth? NBER Working Paper, 1–56. 
Alon, I., Child, J., Li, S., & McIntyre, J. R. (2011). Globalization of Chinese Firms: Theoretical 
Universalism or Particularism. Management and Organization Review, 7(2), 191–200. 
Alon, T. (2010). Institutional Analysis and the Dererminants of Chinese FDI. Multinational 
Business Review, 18(3), 1–11. 
Amighini, A. a., & Franco, C. (2013). A sector perspective on Chinese outward FDI: The 
automotive case. China Economic Review, 27, 148–161. Retrieved from 
http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1043951X13000771 
Amighini, A. a., Rabellotti, R., & Sanfilippo, M. (2013). Do Chinese state-owned and private 
enterprises differ in their internationalization strategies? China Economic Review, 27, 312–
325. doi:10.1016/j.chieco.2013.02.003 
Amit, R., & Schoemaker, P. J. H. (1993). Strategic assets and organizational rent. Strategic 
Management Journal, 14(1), 33–46. Retrieved from 
http://doi.wiley.com/10.1002/smj.4250140105 
Armstrong, S. (2011). Assessing the Scale and Potential of Chinese Investment Overseas: An 
Econometric Approach. China & World Economy, 19(4), 22–37. Retrieved from 
http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1749-124X.2011.01248.x 
Athreye, S., & Kapur, S. (2009). The internationalization of Chinese and Indian firms-trends, 
motivations and strategy. Industrial and Corporate Change, 18(2), 209–221. Retrieved 
from http://icc.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/doi/10.1093/icc/dtp007 
Aybar, B., & Ficici, A. (2009). Cross-border acquisitions and firm value: An analysis of emerging-
market multinationals. Journal of International Business Studies, 40(8), 1317–1338. 
Retrieved from http://www.palgrave-journals.com/doifinder/10.1057/jibs.2009.15 
Baltagi, B. H., Bresson, G., & Pirotte, A. (2005). Adaptive Estimation of Heteroskedastic Error 
Component Models. Econometric Reviews, 24(1), 39–58. Retrieved from 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1081/ETC-200049131 
BaWang International Group. (2011). Annual Report 2011 BaWang International Group. 
 165 
 
Beneito, P., Engracia-Rochina-Barrachina, M., & Sanchis-Llopis, A. (2009). The role of learning in 
innovation: in-house versus externally contracted R&D experience (pp. 1–41). 
Beugelsdijk, S., Hennart, J.-F., Slangen, A., & Smeets, R. (2010). Why and how FDI stocks are a 
biased measure of MNE affiliate activity. Journal of International Business Studies, 41(9), 
1444–1459. Retrieved from http://www.palgrave-
journals.com/doifinder/10.1057/jibs.2010.29 
Beule, F. De, & Bulcke, D. Van Den. (2012). Locational determinants of outward foreign direct 
Investment : an analysis of Chinese and Indian greenfield investments. Transnational 
Corporations, 12(1), 1–34. 
Blomkvist, K., & Drogendijk, R. (2013). The Impact of Psychic Distance on Chinese Outward 
Foreign Direct Investments. Management International Review, 53(5), 659–686. Retrieved 
from http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11575-012-0147-y 
Blonigen, B. a. (2005). A Review of the Empirical Literature on FDI Determinants. Atlantic 
Economic Journal, 33(4), 383–403. Retrieved from 
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11293-005-2868-9 
Bobonis, G. J., & Shatz, H. J. (2007). Agglomeration, Adjustment, and State Policies in the 
Location of Foreign Direct Investment in the United States. The Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 89(1), 30–43. 
Boisot, M., & Meyer, M. W. (2008). Which Way through the Open Door? Reflections on the 
Internationalization of Chinese Firms. Management and Organization Review, 4(3), 349–
365. Retrieved from http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1740-8784.2008.00116.x 
Branstetter, L. (2006). Is foreign direct investment a channel of knowledge spillovers? Evidence 
from Japan’s FDI in the United States. Journal of International Economics, 68(2), 325–344. 
Retrieved from http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0022199605000565 
Brouthers, K. D. (2002). Institutional, Cultural and Transaction Cost Influences on Entry Mode 
Choice and Performance. Journal of International Business Studies, 33(2), 203–221. 
Brouthers, K. D., & Hennart, J.-F. (2007). Boundaries of the firm: Insights from international 
entry mode research. Journal of Management, 33(3), 395–425. 
Brown, J. P., Florax, R. J. G. M., & Mcnamara, K. T. (2009). Determinants of Investment Flows in 
U.S. Manufacturing. The Review of Regional Studies, 39(3), 269–286. 
Buckley, P. J., & Casson, M. (1981). The optimal timing of a foreign direct investment. The 
Economic Journal, 91(361), 75–87. 
 166 
 
Buckley, P. J., Clegg, L. J., Cross, A. R., Liu, X., Voss, H., & Zheng, P. (2007). The Determinants of 
Chinese Outward Foreign Direct Investment. Journal of International Business Studies, 
38(4), 499–518. 
Buckley, P. J., Cross, A. R., Tan, H., Xin, L., & Voss, H. (2009). Historic and Emergent Trends in 
Chinese Outward Direct Investment. Management International Review, 48(6), 715–748. 
Retrieved from http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11575-008-0104-y 
Buckley, P. J., Sutherland, D., Voss, H., & El-Gohair, A. (2013). The economic geography of 
offshore incorporation in tax havens and offshore financial centres: the case of Chinese 
MNEs. Journal of Economic Georgraphy, Forthcomin, 1–44. doi:10.1093/jeg/lbt040 
Cameron, A. C., & Trivedi, P. K. (2007). Essentials of count data regression. In A. C. Cameron & 
P. K. Trivedi (Eds.), A companion to theoretical econometrics (Second., pp. 331–348). New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
Cameron, A. C., & Trivedi, P. K. (2013). Regression analysis of count data. 
Canabal, A., & White, G. O. (2008). Entry mode research: Past and future. International Business 
Review, 17(3), 267–284. doi:10.1016/j.ibusrev.2008.01.003 
Cantwell, J. (2014). Revisiting international business theory: A capabilities-based theory of the 
MNE. Journal of International Business Studies, 45(1), 1–7. Retrieved from 
http://www.palgrave-journals.com/doifinder/10.1057/jibs.2013.61 
Cantwell, J., Dunning, J. H., & Lundan, S. M. (2009). An evolutionary approach to understanding 
international business activity: The co-evolution of MNEs and the institutional 
environment. Journal of International Business Studies, 41(4), 567–586. Retrieved from 
http://www.palgrave-journals.com/doifinder/10.1057/jibs.2009.95 
Chari, M. D. R. (2013). Business groups and foreign direct investments by developing country 
firms: An empirical test in India. Journal of World Business, 48(3), 349–359. Retrieved from 
http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1090951612000727 
Chen, S., Loayza, N. V., & Reynal-Querol, M. (2008). The Aftermath of Civil War. The World Bank 
Economic Review, 22(1), 63–85. Retrieved from 
http://wber.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/doi/10.1093/wber/lhn001 
Chen, S., & Tan, H. (2012). Region effects in the internationalization–performance relationship 
in Chinese firms. Journal of World Business, 47(1), 73–80. Retrieved from 
http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1090951610000799 
Cheng, L. K., & Ma, Z. (2007). China ’ s Outward FDI : Past and Future. NBER Working Papers, 
(July), 1–36. 
 167 
 
Cheng, L. K., & Ma, Z. (2010). China’s outward foreign direct investment. In R. C. Feenstra & S. 
Wei (Eds.), China’s Growing Role in World Trade (First., pp. 545–578). Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. 
Cheung, Y., & Qian, X. (2009). The empirics of China’s outward direct investment. CESifo 
Working Paper No. 2621, 1–45. 
Child, J., & Rodrigues, S. B. (2005). The Internationalization of Chinese Firms: A Case for 
Theoretical Extension? Management and Organization Review, 1(3), 381–410. Retrieved 
from http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1740-8784.2005.0020a.x 
China Agrotech Holdings Limited. (2008). Annual Report 2008 China Agrotech Holdings Limited. 
http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/SEHK/2008/1030/LTN20081030271.pdf (pp. 
1–100). 
China Sunergy. (2011). Annual Report 2011 China Sunergy. https://www.sec.gov/cgi-
bin/browse-
edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001396247&type=&dateb=&owner=include&start=40&c
ount=40. 
Chung, W., & Alcácer, J. (2002). Knowledge Seeking and Location Choice of Foreign Direct 
Investment in the United States. Management Science, 48(12), 1534–1154. 
Clegg, J., & Voss, H. (2011). Inside the China-EU FDI Bond. China & World Economy, 19(4), 92–
108. Retrieved from http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1749-124X.2011.01252.x 
Contractor, F. J. (2013). “Punching above their weight” The sources of competitive advantage 
for emerging market multinationals. International Journal of Emerging Markets, 8(4), 304–
328. doi:10.1108/IJoEM-06-2013-0102 
Corrado, C. J. (2011). Event studies : A methodology review. Accounting & Finance, 51(1), 207–
234. 
Coughlin, C. C. (2012). Extensive and Intensive Trade Margins: A State-by-State View. Federal 
Reserve Bank Working Paper, (January), 1–60. 
Coughlin, C. C., Terza, J. V., & Arromdee, V. (1990). State Government Effects on the Location of 
Foreign Direct Investment. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 20(1), 194–207. 
Coughlin, C., & Segev, E. (2000). Location Determinants of New Foreign-owned Manufacturing 
Plants. Journal of Regional Science, 40(2), 323–351. 
 168 
 
Crossan, M. M., & Apaydin, M. (2010). A Multi-Dimensional Framework of Organizational 
Innovation: A Systematic Review of the Literature. Journal of Management Studies, 47(6), 
1154–1191. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6486.2009.00880.x 
Cuervo-Cazurra, A. (2012). Extending theory by analyzing developing country multinational 
companies: Solving the Goldilocks debate. Global Strategy Journal, 2(3), 153–167. 
doi:10.1111/j.2042-5805.2012.01039.x 
Cuervo-Cazurra, A., & Genc, M. (2008). Transforming disadvantages into advantages - 
developing-country MNEs in the least developed countries.pdf. Journal of International 
Business Studies, 39, 957–979. 
Cui, L., & Jiang, F. (2012). State ownership effect on firms’ FDI ownership decisions under 
institutional pressure: a study of Chinese outward-investing firms. Journal of International 
Business Studies, 43(3), 264–284. doi:10.1057/jibs.2012.1 
De Beule, F., & Duanmu, J.-L. (2012). Locational determinants of internationalization: A firm-
level analysis of Chinese and Indian acquisitions. European Management Journal, 30(3), 
264–277. doi:10.1016/j.emj.2012.03.006 
Deng, P. (2007). Investing for strategic resources and its rationale: The case of outward FDI 
from Chinese companies. Business Horizons, 50(1), 71–81. 
doi:10.1016/j.bushor.2006.07.001 
Deng, P. (2009). Why do Chinese firms tend to acquire strategic assets in international 
expansion? Journal of World Business, 44(1), 74–84. doi:10.1016/j.jwb.2008.03.014 
Deng, P. (2012). The Internationalization of Chinese Firms: A Critical Review and Future 
Research. International Journal of Management Reviews, 14(4), 408–427. 
doi:10.1111/j.1468-2370.2011.00323.x 
Deng, P. (2013). Chinese Outward Direct Investment Research: Theoretical Integration and 
Recommendations. Management and Organization Review, 9(3), 513–539. 
doi:10.1111/more.12030 
Dhanaraj, C., Lyles, M. a, Steensma, H. K., & Tihanyi, L. (2004). Managing tacit and explicit 
knowledge transfer in IJVs: the role of relational embeddedness and the impact on 
performance. Journal of International Business Studies, 35(5), 428–442. 
doi:10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8400098 
Dikova, D., & Brouthers, K. D. (2009). Establishment Mode Choice: Acquisition versus Greenfield 
Entry. In M. Kotabe & K. Helsen (Eds.), The SAGE Handbook of International Marketing 
(First., pp. 218–237). London: SAGE Publications. 
 169 
 
Dodd, P., & Warner, J. (1983). On corporate governance: A study of proxy contests. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 11(1), 401–435. 
Doukas, J., & Travlos, N. G. (1988). The effect of corporate multinationalism on shareholders’ 
wealth: Evidence from international acquisitions. The Journal of Finance, 43(5), 1161–
1175. 
Duanmu, J.-L. (2012). Firm heterogeneity and location choice of Chinese Multinational 
Enterprises (MNEs). Journal of World Business, 47(1), 64–72. 
doi:10.1016/j.jwb.2010.10.021 
Duanmu, J.-L., & Guney, Y. (2009). A Panel Data Analysis of Locational Determinants of Chinese 
and Indian Outward Foreign Direct Investment. Journal of Asia Business Studies, 3(2), 1–15. 
doi:10.1108/15587890980001512 
Dunning, J. H. (1988). The Eclectic Paradigm of International Production: A Restatement and 
Some Possible Extensions. Journal of International Business Studies, 19(1), 1–31. 
Dunning, J. H. (2006). Comment on Dragon multinationals: New players in 21st century 
globalization. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 23(3), 139–141. 
Dunning, J. H. (2009). Location and the multinational enterprise: A neglected factor? Journal of 
International Business Studies, 40(1), 5–19. doi:10.1057/jibs.2008.74 
Dunning, J. H., & Lundan, S. M. (2008). Institutions and the OLI paradigm of the multinational 
enterprise. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 25(4), 573–593. doi:10.1007/s10490-007-
9074-z 
Education, T. H. (2012). World University Rankings. 
http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/world-university-rankings/. 
Eichengreen, B., Park, D., & Shin, K. (2012). When Fast-Growing Economies Slow Down: 
International Evidence and Implications for China. Asian Economic Papers, 11(1), 42–87. 
doi:10.1162/ASEP_a_00118 
Ellis, P. D. (2008). Does psychic distance moderate the market size–entry sequence 
relationship? Journal of International Business Studies, 39(3), 351–369. 
doi:10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8400360 
Estrin, S., & Meyer, K. E. (2011). Brownfield Acquisitions. Management International Review, 
51(4), 483–509. doi:10.1007/s11575-011-0088-x 
Extrawell Pharmaceutical Holdings Limited. (2011). Annual Report 2011 Extrawell 
Pharmaceutical (pp. 1–86). 
 170 
 
Firecomms. (2010). Pioneering investment deal confirmed as Chinese ZJF Group Acquires Irish 
High-tech Company, Firecomms. http://www.firecomms.com/PR-ZJF_Acquisition.html. 
Fortanier, F., & Tulder, R. V. (2009). Internationalization trajectories: a cross-country 
comparison-Are large Chinese and Indian companies different? Industrial and Corporate 
Change, 18(2), 223–247. doi:10.1093/icc/dtp003 
Fortune Magizine. (2004). 2003 World Fortune 500 Rankings. Fortune Magazine. Retrieved 
from http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500_archive/full/2003/ 
Fox, S. E. (1996). The influence of political conditions on foreign firm location decisions in the 
American states (1974-1989). Political Reserach Quarterly, 49(1), 51–75. 
Friedman, J., Gerlowski, D. A., & Silberman, J. (1992). What attracts foreign multinational 
corporations? Evidence from branch plant location in the United States. Journal of 
Regional Science, 32(4), 403–418. 
Fung, H.-G., Yau, J., & Zhang, G. (2010). Reported trade figure discrepancy, regulatory arbitrage, 
and round-tripping: Evidence from the China–Hong Kong trade data. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 42(1), 152–176. doi:10.1057/jibs.2010.35 
Giroud, A., & Scott-Kennel, J. (2009). MNE linkages in international business: A framework for 
analysis. International Business Review, 18(6), 555–566. doi:10.1016/j.ibusrev.2009.07.004 
Granger, C. W. (1969). Investigating Causal Relations by Econometric Models and Cross-spectral 
Methods. Econometrica, 37(3), 424–438. 
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1986). The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical 
and Lateral Integration. Journal of Political Economy, 94(4), 691–719. 
Guillen, M., & Carcia-Canal, E. (2009). The American Model of the Multinational Firm and the 
“New” Multinationals From Emerging Economies. Academy of Management Perspectives, 
23(2), 23–36. doi:10.5465/AMP.2009.39985538 
Halvorsen, T. (2012). Size, Location and Agglomeration of Inward Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) in the United States. Regional Studies, 46(5), 669–682. 
Harrison, A. (1994). The role of multinationals in economic development: The benefits of FDI. 
Journal of World Business, 29(4), 6–11. 
He, W., & Lyles, M. a. (2008). China’s outward foreign direct investment. Business Horizons, 
51(6), 485–491. doi:10.1016/j.bushor.2008.06.006 
 171 
 
Head, C. K., Ries, J. C., & Swenson, D. L. (1999). Attracting foreign manufacturing: Investment 
promotion and agglomeration. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 29(2), 197–218. 
doi:10.1016/S0166-0462(98)00029-5 
Head, K., & Ries, J. (2010). Do trade missions increase trade? Canadian Journal of Economics, 
43(3), 754–775. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5982.2010.01593.x 
Head, K., Ries, J., & Swensonb, D. (1995). Agglomeration benefits and location choice: Evidence 
from Japanese manufacturing investments in the United States. Journal of International 
Economics, 38(3-4), 223–247. 
Hennart, J.-F. (2009). Down with MNE-centric theories! Market entry and expansion as the 
bundling of MNE and local assets. Journal of International Business Studies, 40(9), 1432–
1454. doi:10.1057/jibs.2009.42 
Hennart, J.-F. (2012). Emerging market multinationals and the theory of the multinational 
enterprise. Global Strategy Journal, 2(3), 168–187. doi:10.1111/j.2042-5805.2012.01038.x 
Hennart, J.-F., & Park, Y.-R. (1993). Greenfield vs . Acquisition: The Strategy of Japanese 
Investors in the United States. Management Science, 39(9), 1054–1070. 
Hennart, J.-F., & Reddy, S. (1997). The Choice between mergers/acquisitions and joint ventures: 
the case of Japanese investors in the United States. Strategic Management Journal, 
18(April 1993), 1–12. 
Hilbe, J. M. (2011). Negative Binomial Regression Second Edition. (J. M. Hilbe, Ed.) (Second.). 
New York: Cambridge Univesrity Press. 
Holtbrügge, D., & Kreppel, H. (2012). Determinants of outward foreign direct investment from 
BRIC countries: an explorative study. International Journal of Emerging Markets, 7(1), 4–
30. doi:10.1108/17468801211197897 
Hornby, L. (2013). Oil, Record imports make China World’s top importer of crude. Financial 
Times. Retrieved from http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/75d94744-332b-11e3-bf1b-
00144feab7de.html#axzz3D84aMBal 
Hoskisson, R. E., Wright, M., Filatotchev, I., & Peng, M. W. (2013). Emerging Multinationals from 
Mid-Range Economies: The Influence of Institutions and Factor Markets. Journal of 
Management Studies, 50(7), 1295–1321. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6486.2012.01085.x 
Huallacháin, B. Ó., & Reidb, N. (1997). Acquisition versus Greenfield Investment: The Location 
and Growth of Japanese Manufacturers in the United States. Regional Studies, 31(4), 403–
416. 
 172 
 
Huang, Y., & Wang, B. (2011). Chinese Outward Direct Investment: Is There a China Model? 
China & World Economy, 19(4), 1–21. doi:10.1111/j.1749-124X.2011.01254.x 
Hurst, L. (2011). Comparative Analysis of the Determinants of China’s State-owned Outward 
Direct Investment in OECD and Non-OECD Countries. China & World Economy, 19(4), 74–
91. doi:10.1111/j.1749-124X.2011.01251.x 
International Monetary Fund. (2011). World Economic and Financial Surveys. World Economic 
Outlook. Retrieved from 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/01/weodata/index.aspx 
Invest in British Columbia. (2010). Success Stories: Matching investors to B.C. mining 
opportunities. Invest in British Columbia. Retrieved from www.britishcolumbia.ca 
Invest in Ontario. (2012). Success Stories - Ontario provides gateway to Canadian market for 
China UnionPay. Success Stories - Ontario provides gateway to Canadian market for China 
UnionPay. Retrieved from http://www.investinontario.com/ 
Investissement Québec. (2013). Investissement Québec. Investissement Québec. Retrieved from 
http://www.invest-quebec.com/international/en 
Jaffe, A. B., Trajtenberg, M., & Henderson, R. (1993). Geographic Localization of Knowledge 
Spillovers as Evidenced by Patent Citations. The Quarterly Jounral of Economics, 108(3), 
577–598. 
Johanson, J., & Vahlne, J.-E. (1977). The Internationalization Process of the Firm-A Model of 
Knowledge Development and Increasing Foreign Market Commitments. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 8(1), 23–32. 
Johanson, J., & Vahlne, J.-E. (2009). The Uppsala internationalization process model revisited: 
From liability of foreignness to liability of outsidership. Journal of International Business 
Studies, 40(9), 1411–1431. doi:10.1057/jibs.2009.24 
Kang, Y., & Jiang, F. (2012). FDI location choice of Chinese multinationals in East and Southeast 
Asia: Traditional economic factors and institutional perspective. Journal of World Business, 
47(1), 45–53. doi:10.1016/j.jwb.2010.10.019 
Kedia, B., Gaffney, N., & Clampit, J. (2012). EMNEs and Knowledge-seeking FDI. Management 
International Review, 52(2), 155–173. doi:10.1007/s11575-012-0132-5 
Khanna, T., & Palepu, K. (2010). Emerging Giants Competing at Home How Emerging Market-
Based Companies Can Build Competitive Advantage at Home. (T. Khanna & K. Palepu, Eds.) 
(First., pp. 1–53). Boston: Harvard Business Press. 
 173 
 
Kolstad, I., & Wiig, A. (2012). What determines Chinese outward FDI? Journal of World Business, 
47(1), 26–34. doi:10.1016/j.jwb.2010.10.017 
Kornecki, L., & Ekanayake, E. M. (2011). Inward FDI Stock in the U.S. Economy and State Based 
Determinants. Advances in Management, 4(6), 1–24. 
Kostova, T., & Zaheer, S. (1999). Organizational legitimacy under conditions of complexity: The 
case of the multinational enterprise. Academy of Management Review, 24(1), 64–81. 
Kotabe, M. (1993). The promotional roles of the state government and Japanese manufacturing 
direct investment in the United States. Journal of Business Research, 27(2), 131–146. 
doi:10.1016/0148-2963(93)90019-L 
Lertwachara, K., & Cochran, J. J. (2007). An Event Study of the Economic Impact of Professional 
Sport Franchises on Local U.S. Economies. Journal of Sports Economics, 8(3), 244–254. 
doi:10.1177/1527002506286774 
Li, J., Chen, D., & Shapiro, D. M. (2009). Product Innovations in Emerging Economies: The Role 
of Foreign Knowledge Access Channels and Internal Efforts in Chinese Firms. Management 
and Organization Review, 6(2), 243–266. doi:10.1111/j.1740-8784.2009.00155.x 
Li, J., Chen, D., & Shapiro, D. M. (2013). FDI Spillovers at the National and Subnational Level: The 
Impact on Product Innovations by Chinese Firms. Management and Organization Review, 
9(3), 413–435. doi:10.1111/more.12025 
Li, J., & Kozhikode, R. K. (2008). Knowledge management and innovation strategy: The 
challenge for latecomers in emerging economies. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 
25(3), 429–450. doi:10.1007/s10490-007-9076-x 
Lim, S.-H. (2008). How investment promotion affects attracting foreign direct investment: 
Analytical argument and empirical analyses. International Business Review, 17(1), 39–53. 
doi:10.1016/j.ibusrev.2007.09.001 
Lin, X. (2010). State versus private MNCs from China: initial conceptualizations. International 
Marketing Review, 27(3), 366–380. doi:10.1108/02651331011048023 
Liu, H., & Li, K. (2002). Strategic Implications of Emerging Chinese Multinationals: The Haier 
Case Study. European Management Journal, 20(6), 699–706. 
Liu, J., & Scott-Kennel, J. (2011). Asset-Seeking Investment by Chinese Multinationals: Firm 
Ownership, Location, and Entry Mode. Asia Pacific and Globalization Review, 1(1), 16–36. 
 174 
 
Liu, X., & Buck, T. (2007). Innovation performance and channels for international technology 
spillovers: Evidence from Chinese high-tech industries. Research Policy, 36(3), 355–366. 
doi:10.1016/j.respol.2006.12.003 
Liu, X., Buck, T., & Shu, C. (2005). Chinese economic development, the next stage: outward FDI? 
International Business Review, 14(1), 97–115. doi:10.1016/j.ibusrev.2004.12.003 
Liu, X., & Zou, H. (2008). The impact of greenfield FDI and mergers and acquisitions on 
innovation in Chinese high-tech industries. Journal of World Business, 43(3), 352–364. 
doi:10.1016/j.jwb.2007.11.004 
Longcheer Holdings Limited. (2012). Annual Report 2012 Longcheer Holdings Limited (pp. 1–
125). Retrieved from 
http://quicktake.morningstar.com/stocknet/secdocuments.aspx?symbol=lgchf 
Lu, J., Liu, X., & Wang, H. (2011). Motives for Outward FDI of Chinese Private Firms: Firm 
Resources, Industry Dynamics, and Government Policies. Management and Organization 
Review, 7(2), 223–248. doi:10.1111/j.1740-8784.2010.00184.x 
Luo, Y., & Rui, H. (2009). An Ambidexterity Perspective Toward Multinational Enterprises From 
Emerging Economies. Academy of Management, 49–71. 
Luo, Y., & Tung, R. L. (2007). International Expansion of Emerging Market Enterprises: A 
Springboard Perspective. Journal of International Business Studies, 38(4), 481–498. 
Luo, Y., & Wang, S. L. (2012). Foreign direct investment strategies by developing country 
multinationals: A diagnostic model for home country effects. Global Strategy Journal, 2(3), 
244–261. doi:10.1111/j.2042-5805.2012.01036.x 
Luo, Y., Xue, Q., & Han, B. (2010). How emerging market governments promote outward FDI: 
Experience from China. Journal of World Business, 45(1), 68–79. 
doi:10.1016/j.jwb.2009.04.003 
Makino, S., Lau, C.-M., & Yeh, R.-S. (2002). Asset-Exploitation versus Asset-Seeking: Implications 
for Foreign Location Choice of Foreign Direct Investment from Newly Industrialized 
Economies. Journal of International Business Studies, 33(3), 403–421. 
Martin, D. (2003). What do Foreign Trade Offices do Best? International Journal of Commerce & 
Management, 13(2), 54–73. 
Mathews, J. A. (2002). Dragon Multinational: A New Model of Global Growth. (J. A. Mathews, 
Ed.) (First., pp. 1–272). New York: Oxford University Press. 
 175 
 
Mathews, J. A. (2006). Dragon multinationals: New players in 21st century globalization. Asia 
Pacific Journal of Management, 23(1), 5–27. doi:10.1007/s10490-006-6113-0 
McAllister, G. A., & Sauvant, K. P. (2013). Foreign Direct Investment by Emerging Economy 
Multinationals: Coping with the Global Crisis. In M. A. Marinov & S. T. Marinova (Eds.), 
Emerging Economies and Firms in the Global Crisis (First., pp. 14–46). New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
McWilliams, A., & Siegel, D. (1997). Event studies in management research: Theoretical and 
empirical issues. Academy of Management Journal, 40(3), 626–657. 
Meuer, J., Wang, T., Wang, B., & Reinmoeller, P. (2012). Firm-Government dynamics in outward 
M&A - Effectiveness of China’s Going Global Policy in orchestrating overseas investments. 
In China Goes Global Conference. Cambridge, MA. 
Meyer, K. E. (2014). What the Fox Says, How the Fox Works: Deep Contextualization as a Source 
of New Research Agendas and Theoretical Insights. Management and Organization 
Review, Forthcomin, 1–12. doi:10.1111/more.12066 
Meyer, K. E., Ding, Y., Li, J., & Zhang, H. (2014). Overcoming distrust: How state-owned 
enterprises adapt their foreign entries to institutional pressures abroad. Journal of 
International Business Studies, Forthcomin. 
Meyer, K. E., & Estrin, S. (2001). Brownfield entry in emerging markets. Journal of International 
Business Studies, 32(3), 575–584. 
Meyer, K. E., & Estrin, S. (2014). Local Context and Global Strategy: Extending the Integration 
Responsiveness Framework to Subsidiary Strategy. Global Strategy Journal, 4(1), 1–38. 
Mindray Medical International Limited. (2011). Mindray Medical International Limited - Form 
20 United States Commission, Securities and Exchange. Mindray Medical International 
Limited - Form 20 United States Commission, Securities and Exchange. Retrieved from 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1373060/000119312512194979/d293110d20f.h
tm 
Mingfa Group International. (2009). Mingfa Group (International) Company Limited Annual 
Report 2009 (pp. 1–132). Retrieved from 
http://quicktake.morningstar.com/stocknet/secdocuments.aspx?symbol=00846&country=
hkg 
Mody, A. (2004). What Is an Emerging Market? IMF Working Paper, 177(4), 1–23. Retrieved 
from https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2004/wp04177.pdf 
 176 
 
Morck, R., Yeung, B., & Zhao, M. (2008). Perspectives on China’s outward foreign direct 
investment. Journal of International Business Studies, 39(3), 337–350. 
doi:10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8400366 
Morisset, J. (2003). Does a country need a promotion agency to attract foreign direct 
investment? A small analytical model applied to 58 countries. World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper, 1–23. 
Narula, R. (2012). Do we need different frameworks to explain infant MNEs from developing 
countries? Global Strategy Journal, 2(3), 188–204. doi:10.1111/j.2042-5805.2012.01035.x 
Narula, R., & Dunning, J. H. (2010). Multinational Enterprises, Development and Globalization: 
Some Clarifications and a Research Agenda. Oxford Development Studies, 38(3), 263–287. 
doi:10.1080/13600818.2010.505684 
National Science Foundation. (2011). R&D expenditures for United States, EU, and 10 Asian 
economies: 1996-2009. http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind12/slides.htm. 
Nielsen, R. J., & Vedsmand, T. (1999). User participation and institutional change in fisheries 
management: a viable alternative to the failures of “top-down” driven control? Ocean & 
Coastal Management, 42(1), 19–37. 
Ning, L., & Sutherland, D. (2012). Internationalization of China ’ s Private-Sector MNEs: An 
Analysis of the Motivations for Foreign Affiliate Formation. Thunderbird International 
Business Review, 44(2), 169–182. doi:10.1002/tie 
Nocke, V., & Yeaple, S. (2007). Cross-border mergers and acquisitions vs. greenfield foreign 
direct investment: The role of firm heterogeneity. Journal of International Economics, 
72(2), 336–365. doi:10.1016/j.jinteco.2006.09.003 
Nolan, P. (2002). China and the Global Business Revolution. (P. Nolan, Ed.) (First., pp. 1–1136). 
Houndmills: Palgrave. 
Nolan, P. (2012). Is China Buying the World (pp. 1–120). 
NYSE. (2012). Indices. New York Stock Exchange Indicies. Retrieved from 
https://www.nyse.com/index 
OECD. (1996). OECD Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment - Third Edition (pp. 1–
56). Retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/investment/investment-policy/2090148.pdf 
OECD. (2008). OECD Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment – FOURTH EDITION – 
2008. (OECD, Ed.) (First., pp. 1–250). OECD. Retrieved from 
http://www.lb.lt/n22873/benchmark_fdi_4-en.pdf 
 177 
 
OECD. (2012). GLOSSARY OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT TERMS AND DEFINITIONS (pp. 1–
15). 
Office of the Press Secretary. (1990). Order on the China National Aero-Technology Import and 
Export Corporation Divestiture of MAMCO Manufacturing, Incorporated. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu. 
Peng, M. W. (2012). The global strategy of emerging multinationals from China. Global Strategy 
Journal, 2, 97–107. doi:10.1111/j.2042-5805.2012.01030.x 
Peng, M. W. (2013). An institution-based view of IPR protection. Business Horizons, 56(2), 135–
139. doi:10.1016/j.bushor.2012.10.002 
Peng, M. W., Sun, S. L., Pinkham, B., & Chen, H. (2009). The Institution-Based View as a Third 
Leg for a Strategy Tripod. Academy of Management Journal, 23(3), 63–82. 
Peng, M. W., Wang, D. Y. L., & Jiang, Y. (2008). An institution-based view of international 
business strategy: a focus on emerging economies. Journal of International Business 
Studies, 39(5), 920–936. doi:10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8400377 
Pradhan, J. P. (2009). Emerging multinationals from India and China: Origin, impetus and 
growth. In ICES conference (pp. 1–32). 
Puthusserry, P. N., Child, J., & Rodrigues, S. B. (2013). Psychic Distance, its Business Impact and 
Modes of Coping: A Study of British and Indian Partner SMEs. Management International 
Review, 54(1), 1–29. doi:10.1007/s11575-013-0183-2 
Ramamurti, R. (2008). Insights from a Multi-Country Research Project. In R. Ramamurti & J. 
Singh (Eds.), Emerging Multinationals: Outward FDI from Emerging and Developing 
Economies (First., pp. 1–39). Boston: Cambridge University Press. 
Ramamurti, R. (2012a). Competing with emerging market multinationals. Business Horizons, 
55(3), 241–249. doi:10.1016/j.bushor.2012.01.001 
Ramamurti, R. (2012b). What is really different about emerging market multinationals? Global 
Strategy Journal, 47, 41–47. doi:10.1111/j.2042-5805.2011.01025.x 
Ramasamy, B., Yeung, M., & Laforet, S. (2012). China’s outward foreign direct investment: 
Location choice and firm ownership. Journal of World Business, 47(1), 17–25. 
doi:10.1016/j.jwb.2010.10.016 
Rasiah, R., & Shari, I. (2001). Market, government and Malaysia’s new economic policy. 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, 25, 57–78. 
 178 
 
Rodríguez, C., & Bustillo, R. (2011). A critical revision of the empirical literature on Chinese 
outward investment: A new proposal. Panoeconomicus, 58(5), 715–733. 
doi:10.2298/PAN1105715R 
Ronen, S., & Shenkar, O. (2013). Mapping world cultures: Cluster formation, sources and 
implications. Journal of International Business Studies, 44(9), 867–897. 
Rosen, D. H., & Hanemann, T. (2011). AN AMERICAN OPEN DOOR? Maximizing the Benefits of 
Chinese Foreign Direct Investment. Asia Society, 1–93. 
Rugman, A. M. (2009). Theoretical aspects of MNEs from emerging countries. In R. Ramamurti 
& J. Singh (Eds.), Emerging Multinationals in Emerging Markets (First., pp. 42–63). Boston: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Rugman, A. M., & Li, J. (2007). Will China’s Multinationals Succeed Globally or Regionally? 
European Management Journal, 25(5), 333–343. doi:10.1016/j.emj.2007.07.005 
Rui, H., & Yip, G. S. (2008). Foreign acquisitions by Chinese firms: A strategic intent perspective. 
Journal of World Business, 43(2), 213–226. doi:10.1016/j.jwb.2007.11.006 
Salidjanova, N. (2011). Going Out: An Overview of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment. 
U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission, March 30, 1–41. 
Sanfilippo, M. (2010). Chinese FDI to Africa: What Is the Nexus with Foreign Economic 
Cooperation? African Development Review, 22(S1), 599–614. 
Sauvant, K. P., Maschek, W. A., & McAllister, G. A. (2010). Foreign direct investments from 
emerging markets: the challenges ahead. (K. P. Sauvant, W. A. Maschek, & G. A. McAllister, 
Eds.) (First., pp. 1–469). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Shaver, J. M., & Flyer, F. (2000). Agglomeration economies, firm heterogeneity, and foreign 
direct investment in the United States. Strategic Management Journal, 21(12), 1175–1193. 
Shimizu, K., Hitt, M. a, Vaidyanath, D., & Pisano, V. (2004). Theoretical foundations of cross-
border mergers and acquisitions: A review of current research and recommendations for 
the future. Journal of International Management, 10(3), 307–353. 
doi:10.1016/j.intman.2004.05.005 
Shimpalee, P. L., & Breuer, J. B. (2006). Currency crises and institutions. Journal of International 
Money and Finance, 25(1), 125–145. doi:10.1016/j.jimonfin.2005.10.008 
Slangen, A., & Hennart, J.-F. (2007). Greenfield or acquisition entry: A review of the empirical 
foreign establishment mode literature. Journal of International Management, 13(4), 403–
429. doi:10.1016/j.intman.2007.08.001 
 179 
 
Stan, C. V., Peng, M. W., & Bruton, G. D. (2013). Slack and the performance of state-owned 
enterprises. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 31(2), 473–495. doi:10.1007/s10490-013-
9347-7 
Sun, S. L., Peng, M. W., Lee, R. P., & Tan, W. (2014). Institutional open access at home and 
outward internationalization. Journal of World Business, Forthcomin, 1–13. 
doi:10.1016/j.jwb.2014.04.003 
Sun, S. L., Peng, M. W., Ren, B., & Yan, D. (2012). A comparative ownership advantage 
framework for cross-border M&As: The rise of Chinese and Indian MNEs. Journal of World 
Business, 47(1), 4–16. doi:10.1016/j.jwb.2010.10.015 
Sutherland, D. (2009). Do China’s “national team” business groups undertake strategic-asset-
seeking OFDI? Chinese Management Studies, 3(1), 11–24. 
doi:10.1108/17506140910946115 
Sutherland, D., & Ning, L. (2011). Exploring “onward-journey”ODI strategies in China’s private 
sector businesses. Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies, 9(1), 43–65. 
Taylor, R. (2002). Globalization Strategies of Chinese Companies: Current Developments and 
Future Prospects. Asian Business & Management, 1(2), 209–225. 
doi:10.1057/palgrave.abm.9200011 
Teece, D. J. (2014). A dynamic capabilities-based entrepreneurial theory of the multinational 
enterprise. Journal of International Business Studies, 45(1), 8–37. doi:10.1057/jibs.2013.54 
Teece, D. J., Pisano, G., & Shuen, A. (1997). Dynamic capabilities and strategic management. 
Strategic Management Journal, 18(7), 509–533. 
The World Bank. (2013). China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative Society. (The 
World Bank, Ed.) (First., pp. 1–442). Washtington DC: The World Bank. Retrieved from 
http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/China-2030-
complete.pdf 
UNCTAD. (2013a). UNCTAD UNCTADstat. 
http://unctadstat.unctad.org/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx. 
UNCTAD. (2013b). UNCTADSTAT: Countries, Economic groupings. UNCTADSTAT, July, 1–34. 
UNCTAD. (2013c). World Investment Report 2013 (pp. 1–264). 
Wade, R. (2009). From global imbalances to global reorganisations. Cambridge Journal of 
Economics, 33(4), 539–562. doi:10.1093/cje/bep032 
 180 
 
Wang, C., Hong, J., Kafouros, M., & Wright, M. (2012). Exploring the role of government 
involvement in outward FDI from emerging economies. Journal of International Business 
Studies, 43(7), 655–676. doi:10.1057/jibs.2012.18 
Wang, C., & Kafouros, M. I. (2009). What factors determine innovation performance in 
emerging economies? Evidence from China. International Business Review, 18(6), 606–616. 
doi:10.1016/j.ibusrev.2009.07.009 
Wang, S. L., Luo, Y., Lu, X., Sun, J., & Maksimov, V. (2014). Autonomy delegation to foreign 
subsidiaries: An enabling mechanism for emerging-market multinationals. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 45(2), 111–130. 
Wang, Y. (2002). The motivations behind China’s government-initiated industrial investments 
overseas. Pacific Affairs, 75(2), 187–206. 
Warner, M., Hong, N. S., & Xu, X. (2004). “Late development”experience and the evolution of 
transnational firms in the People’s Republic of China. Asia Pacific Business Review, 10(3-4), 
324–345. 
Wei, Z. (2010). The Literature on Chinese Outward FDI. Multinational Business Review, 18(3), 
73–112. doi:10.1108/1525383X201000016 
Wells, L. T., & Wint, A. G. (1990). Marketing a country: Promotion as a Tool for Attracting 
Foreign Investment (pp. 1–82). The World Bank. doi:10.1596/0-8213-4659-8 
Wells, L. T., & Wint, A. G. (2001). Marketing a country, revisited. (L. T. Wells & A. G. Wint, Eds.) 
(First., pp. 1–256). Washtington DC: Foreign Investment Advisory Service. 
Wilkinson, T. J., & Brouthers, L. E. (2000). An Evaluation of State Sponsored Promotion 
Programs. Journal of Business Research, 47(3), 229–236. doi:10.1016/S0148-
2963(99)00097-1 
Wint, A. G., & Williams, D. a. (2002). Attracting FDI to developing countries: A changing role for 
government? International Journal of Public Sector Management, 15(5), 361–374. 
doi:10.1108/09513550210435719 
WIPO. (2012). World Intellectual Property Organization Intellectual Property Statistics. WIPO. 
Retrieved from http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/ 
Witt, M. a, & Lewin, A. Y. (2007). Outward foreign direct investment as escape response to 
home country institutional constraints. Journal of International Business Studies, 38(4), 
579–594. doi:10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8400285 
 181 
 
Woo, W. T. (2012). China meets the middle-income trap: the large potholes in the road to 
catching-up. Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies, 10(4), 313–336. 
Woodward, D. P. (1992). Locational Determinants of Japanese Manufacturing Start-ups in the 
United States. Southern Economic Journal, 58(3), 690–708. 
Wooldridge, J. (2002a). Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data. (J. Wooldridge, 
Ed.) (Second., pp. 1–752). Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
Wooldridge, J. (2002b). Quasi-Likelihood Methods for Count Data. In P. K. Trivedi (Ed.), 
Regression Analysis of Count Data (Second., pp. 1–566). New York: Cambridge Univesrity 
Press. 
Wu, H.-L., & Chen, C.-H. (2001). An Assessment of Outward Foreign Direct Investment from 
China’s Transitional Economy. Europe-Asia Studies, 53(8), 1235–1254. 
doi:10.1080/09668130120093219 
Xu, D., & Meyer, K. E. (2012). Linking Theory and Context: “Strategy Research in Emerging 
Economies” after Wright et al. (2005). Journal of Management Studies, 1–25. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-6486.2012.01051.x 
Yang, H., Sun, S. L., Lin, Z., & Peng, M. W. (2010). Behind M&As in China and the United States: 
Networks, learning, and institutions. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 28(2), 239–255. 
doi:10.1007/s10490-009-9188-6 
Yang, X., & Stoltenberg, C. (2014). A review of institutional influences on the rise of made-in-
China multinationals. International Journal of Emerging Markets, 9(2), 162–180. 
Yao, S., Sutherland, D., & Chen, J. (2010). China’s Outward FDI and Resource-Seeking Strategy: A 
Case Study on Chinalco and Rio Tinto. Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics, 17, 
313–326. 
Yiping, H., & Bijun, W. (2013). Investing Overseas Without Moving Factories Abroad: The Case 
of Chinese Outward Direct Investment. Asian Development Review, 30(11), 85–107. 
Yiu, D. W., Lau, C., & Bruton, G. D. (2007). International venturing by emerging economy firms: 
The effects of firm capabilities, home country networks, and corporate entrepreneurship, 
38(4), 519–540. 
Zaheer, S. (1995). Overcoming the Liability of Foreignness. Academy of Management Journal, 
38(2), 341–363. 
 182 
 
Zhang, J., Zhou, C., & Ebbers, H. (2011). Completion of Chinese overseas acquisitions: 
Institutional perspectives and evidence. International Business Review, 20(2), 226–238. 
doi:10.1016/j.ibusrev.2010.07.003 
Zhang, X., & Daly, K. (2011). The determinants of China’s outward foreign direct investment. 
Emerging Markets Review, 12(4), 389–398. doi:10.1016/j.ememar.2011.06.001 
Zhou, C., Delios, A., & Yang, J. (2002). Locational Determinants of Japanese Foreign Direct 
Investment in China. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 19(1), 63–86. 
Zhu, Y., Lynch, R., & Jin, Z. (2011). Playing the game of catching-up: global strategy building in a 
Chinese company. Asia Pacific Business Review, 17(4), 511–533. 
Zweig, D., & Bi, J. (2005). China’ s Global Hunt for Energy. Foreign Affairs, 84(5), 24–38. 
 
  
 183 
 
7. Appendix 
 
Appendix A 
Table 21: Extending the Chinese Patent Event Window to 16 Quarters 
Chinese Acquiror Results 
Quarters CAAP (t-stat) GS+ GS- Pos:Neg 95% Sig 
Abnormal Patents Estimated using Mean Estimated Return--28 Events 
4 5.99* (1.71) 3.31*** -2.88*** 15:6* 8***:0 
4-5 13.63*** (2.76) 4.60*** -4.01*** 18:3*** 11***:0 
4-6 20.88*** (3.45) 5.03*** -4.01*** 19:3*** 16***:0 
4-7 26.26*** (3.75) 5.03*** -4.01*** 19:3*** 16***:0 
4-8 32.76*** (4.19) 5.89*** -4.39*** 21:2*** 16***:0 
4-9 40.72*** (4.75) 5.89*** -4.39*** 21:2*** 16***:0 
4-10 44.78*** (4.84) 6.32*** -4.77*** 22:1*** 16***:0 
4-11 52.31*** (5.29) 6.32*** -4.39*** 22:2*** 16***:0 
4-12 59.02*** (5.62) 6.75*** -4.39*** 23:2*** 16***:0 
4-13 65.12*** (5.89) 6.75*** -4.39*** 23:2*** 16***:0 
4-14 70.94*** (6.11) 6.75*** -4.39*** 23:2*** 16***:0 
4-15 76.93*** (6.35) 6.75*** -4.39*** 23:2*** 17***:0 
4-16 84.04*** (6.66) 6.75*** -4.39*** 23:2*** 17***:0 
***=p<.01 ; **=p<.05; *=p<.10 
Estimation window ranges 0 to 12 quarters before merger 
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Appendix B 
Table 22: Event Study Results Dropping Events in which Chinese Companies Acquired Multiple 
Firms 
Chinese Acquiror Results Keeping Multiple Event Companies 
Quarters@ CAAP (t-stat) GS+ GS-# Pos:Neg 95% Sig^ 
Abnormal Patents Estimated using Mean Estimated Return--49 Events 
4 8.69* (1.81) 5.98*** -4.26*** 30:10*** 15***:0 
4-5 15.84** (2.34) 7.31*** -5.41*** 34:6*** 20***:1 
4-6 25.27*** (3.04) 7.97*** -5.41*** 36:6*** 26***:1 
4-7 32.61*** (3.4) 7.97*** -5.41*** 36:6*** 27***:0 
4-8 39.95*** (3.73) 8.97*** -5.69*** 39:5*** 28***:0 
Chinese Aquiror Results Dropping Multiple Event Companies 
Quarters CAAP (t-stat) GS+ GS- Pos:Neg 95% Sig 
Abnormal Patents Estimated using Mean Estimated Return--44 Events 
4 7.22* (1.8) 5.63*** -3.83*** 26:9*** 13***:0 
4-5 14.56** (2.57) 6.7*** -4.73*** 29:6*** 18***:1 
4-6 24.01*** (3.46) 7.41*** -4.73*** 31:6*** 23***:1 
4-7 30.87*** (3.85) 7.41*** -4.73*** 31:6*** 23***:0 
4-8 37.55*** (4.19) 8.48*** -5.03*** 34:5*** 24***:0 
***=p<.01 ; **=p<.05; *=p<.10 
Estimation Window Rangers 0 to 12 quarters before merger 
@ The event window begins 4 quarters after an event; the median time between application and approval for 
patents in China in my data.  4-7 indicates the cumulative abnormal patents from 4 quarters to 7 quarters 
after a merger is announced. 
# A negative t-statistic on the generalized sign test indicates the opposite of the sign in question.  A negative t-
statistic for the negative generalized sign test indicates that significantly less negative CAPs were observe 
than predicted—this indicates there were significantly more positive CAPs than predicted. 
^ Denotes the number of events that are significant at the 95% level; both positive and negative 
(Positive:Negative) 
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Appendix C 
Table 23: Event Study Results using Varying Event Windows for Foreign Patents 
Foreign Target Results 
Quarters CAAP (t-stat) GS+ GS-# Pos:Neg 95% Sig^ 
Quarters 4 to 8 in Event Window--70 Events 
4 -0.23 (-0.43) -2.18** 1.70* 5:39*** 2:1 
4-5 -0.26 (-0.35) -1.23 1.22 8:37*** 5*:3 
4-6 -0.47 (-0.5) -0.91 0.98 9:36*** 3:3 
4-7 -0.71 (-0.66) -1.23 1.46 8:38*** 3:3 
4-8 -0.79 (-0.65) -0.59 0.98 10:36*** 3:6** 
Quarters 6 to 10 in Event Window--58 Events 
6 -0.27 (-0.49) -2.24** 1.71* 3:32*** 1:00 
6-7 -0.50 (-0.65) -1.16 1.18 6:30*** 1:02 
6-8 -0.53 (-0.56) -0.44 0.92 8:29*** 1:04 
6-9 -0.65 (-0.59) -0.44 1.18 8:30*** 1:5** 
6-10 -0.95 (-0.78) -0.80 1.44 7:31*** 1:6*** 
Abnormal Patents Estimated using Mean Estimated Return--37 Events 
11 -0.15 (-0.40) -0.90 0.94 3:20*** 1:0 
11-12 -0.30 (-0.57) -0.41 0.61 4:19*** 2:1 
11-13 -0.40 (-0.62) -0.41 0.61 4:19*** 1:1 
11-14 -0.63 (-0.85) -0.41 0.61 4:19*** 1:3* 
11-15 -0.81 (-0.97) -0.41 0.61 4:19*** 1:3* 
***=p<.01 ; **=p<.05; *=p<.10 
Estimation window ranges 0 to 12 quarters before merger 
# A negative t-statistic on the generalized sign test indicates the opposite of the sign in question.  A negative t-
statistic for the negative generalized sign test indicates that significantly less negative CAPs were observe 
than predicted—this indicates there were significantly more positive CAPs than predicted. 
^ Denotes the number of events that are significant at the 95% level; both positive and negative 
(Positive:Negative) 
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Appendix D 
Table 24: Event Study Code Used in Stata (adapted from original written by Sean Severe) 
#delimit; 
clear; 
set matsize 3000; 
set more off; 
gen qtr=yq(year,quarter); 
/*Initial Setup for Event Study, Here we will rename variables so we do not rewrite script 
later*/; rename qtr date;     
/*$Put our date variable in place of yyy*/; rename merge event;    
/*Put our event dummy variable in place of zzz*/; rename patents_granted price;    
/*Put company stock price data in place of aaa*/; rename market_patents_domestic sp;   
/*Put S&P500 variable in place of qqq if used, if not code this line out*/; scalar 
start_event_win=(4);   
*Enter how many days before the event you want to compute in event window*/; scalar 
stop_event_win=(8);    
/*Enter how many days after the event you want to compute in event window*/; scalar 
start_norm=(-12);   
/*Enter how many days before the event window you want to start computing average normal 
return*/; scalar stop_norm=(0);   
/*Enter how many days before the event window you want to stop computing for average 
normal return*/; *drop if drop==1; local soe=0; /*0 includes all events; 1 only SOEs, 2 only Non-
SOEs*/;   
/*   Min Patent Time Between Application and Grant for China is 60 Days, 89 Days for U.S.  Thus 
1 quarter is minimum window after merger that patents could go through so stop estimation 
window at 0 for both.  For China, mean is 463=5.14 quarters, median is 344=3.82 quarters, sd is 
370=4.11 quarters and max is 3044=33.82 quarters.  For US, mean is 1012=11.24 quarters, 
median is 959=10.65 quarters, sd is 497=5.52 quarters and max is 4018=44.64 quarters.*/; 
/*related_industry previous_investor high_tech_target diversified_conglomerate*/;egen 
date1=group(date); 
/*drop if region~="EU"; if `soe'==1 {;drop if soe==0;}; else if `soe'==2 {;drop if soe==1;}; gen 
event1=event;  
/*Drops company if no events*/; sort company date; egen id=group(company); by id, sort: egen 
total=total(event); drop if total==0; drop total;  
/*Drops events if in event window or estimation window for another event*/; drop id; egen 
id=group(company); sum id; scalar minid=r(min); scalar maxid=r(max); egen 
compid=group(company); gen n=1; sort company date; by company: gen time1=sum(n); local 
x=minid; while `x'<=maxid {; sum event1 if id==`x'; if r(N)>=2 {; sort id time1; by id, sort: gen 
fats1=sum(event1); replace fats1=event1 if event1==.; sum fats1 if id==`x'; scalar 
maxfats=r(max); local y=1; while `y'<maxfats {;sum time1 if id==`x' & fats1==`y'+1; scalar 
risk=r(mean); gen timr=.; replace timr=1 if time1<risk & time1>=risk+start_norm; sum event1 if 
id==`x' & timr==1; if r(N)>0 {;replace event=. if id==`x' & fats1==`y'+1;drop timr;}; else {;drop 
timr;}; sum time1 if id==`x' & fats1==`y'; scalar risk=r(mean); gen timr=.; replace timr=1 if 
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time1<=risk+stop_event_win & time1>risk; sum event1 if id==`x' & timr==1; if r(N)>0 {; replace 
event=. if id==`x' & fats1==`y'; replace event=. if id==`x' & fats1==`y'+1; local y=`y'+1; drop 
timr;}; else {; drop timr;}; local y=`y'+1;}; local x=`x'+1; drop fats1;}; else {;local x=`x'+1;}; 
/*Final Set Up Time and ID, allowing for multiple events per firm*/;drop id; egen 
id=group(company); drop n; gen n=1; sort company date; by company: gen time2=sum(n); sum 
id; scalar minid=r(min); scalar maxid=r(max); scalar maxx=maxid; local x=minid; while `x'<=maxx 
{;scalar count=`x'; sum event if id==`x'; if r(N)==0 {;drop if id==`x'; local x=`x'+1;}; else if r(N)>=2 
{;sort id time2; by id, sort: gen fats=sum(event); replace fats=event if event==.; sum fats if 
id==`x'; scalar maxfats=r(max); local y=2; while `y'<=maxfats {; gen timer=.; sum time2 if 
id==count & fats==`y'-1; replace timer=1 if id==count & time2>=r(max)+stop_event_win+1; 
replace id=maxid+1 if timer==1; scalar maxid=maxid+1; local y=`y'+1; if `y'>2 {; scalar 
count=maxid; drop timer;}; else {;drop timer;};};local x=`x'+1;drop fats;};else {;local x=`x'+1;};}; 
/*Creates time for event window with 0 being event date, also generates dummy for event 
window*/; sort id date; by id: gen datenum=_n; by id: gen target=datenum if event==1; egen 
td=min(target), by(id); drop if td==.; gen time=datenum-td; label var time "days before and 
after event:0=event date"; drop td target datenum; scalar max=r(max); by id, sort: egen 
mint=min(time); drop if mint>start_norm; if `z'==3 {;sum year if sp==.; drop if year>=r(min);}; 
else {;}; by id, sort: egen maxt=max(time); drop if maxt<stop_event_win; drop id; egen 
id=group(company); 
/*Creates time for event window with 0 being event date, also generates dummy for event 
window*/; gen event_window=0; replace event_window=1 if time>=start_event_win & 
time<=stop_event_win; label var event_window "Dummy variable for abnormal return period"; 
gen est_window=0; replace est_window=1 if time>=start_norm & time<=stop_norm; label var 
est_window "Dummy variable for non-event period estimation window"; 
/*generates stock returns*/; xtset id time; *replace price=price+1;*gen return=(price/l.price)-1; 
gen return=price; label var return "company stock return"; 
/*Estimates Normal Returns using mean average method*/; gen norm_return1=.; label var 
norm_return1 "mean average normal return"; local x=minid; while `x'<=maxid {;sum return if 
id==`x' & est_window==1; replace norm_return1=r(mean) if id==`x'; local x=`x'+1;}; 
/*Estimates Normal Returns using Market Adjusted Return Method (S&P500 Return) and 
Abnormal Returns*/; sort id time;/*gen norm_return2=0; sum year; scalar minyear=r(min); 
scalar maxyear=r(max); local fff=minyear+1; while `fff'<=maxyear {; sum sp if year==`fff'; replace 
norm_return2=r(mean) if year==`fff'; sum sp if year==`fff'-1; replace 
norm_return2=norm_return2/r(mean)-1 if year==`fff'; local fff=`fff'+1;}*/; gen 
norm_return2=sp; label var norm_return2 "S&P 500 is normal return"; 
/*Estimates Normal Returns from Fama et al. (1969) R{it}=a{i}+b{i}R{mt}+u{it} i=firm, 
m=market, t=time*/; egen id3=group(id); drop id; sum id3; scalar maxid3=r(max); egen 
id4=group(company); local x=1; gen norm_return3=.; sum id4; scalar maxid4=r(max); while 
`x'<=maxid3 {;reg return norm_return2 if id3==`x' & est_window==1; predict yhat; replace 
norm_return3 = yhat if id3==`x'; drop yhat; local x=`x'+1;}; gen AR=(return-norm_return`z'); 
label var AR "abnormal return=company return minus normal return"; gen AR2=AR^2; sum id3; 
scalar maxxx=r(max); local x=1; gen ARstddev=.; while `x'<=maxxx {; sum AR2 if id3==`x' & 
est_window==1; replace ARstddev=(r(sum)/(stop_norm-start_norm-1))^(1/2) if id3==`x';local 
x=`x'+1;}; sum ARstddev; gen AARstddev=r(mean); 
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/*generates standard deviation for AR and t-stats for Null Hypothesis tests*/; gen AAR=.; label 
var AAR "average abnormal return"; label var AARstddev "Std Dev of abnormal returns"; local 
x=start_event_win; while `x'<=stop_event_win {;sum AR if time==`x';replace AAR=r(mean) if 
time==`x'; local x=`x'+1;}; gen AARtstat=AAR/AARstddev; gen signpos=0; gen signneg=0; sum 
event; scalar numevents=r(N); replace signpos=numevents if AR>0; sum signpos if 
est_window==1; scalar nppos=r(mean); replace signneg=numevents if AR<0; sum signneg if 
est_window==1; scalar npneg=r(mean); drop if AAR==.; 
/*Generates Cumulative Abnormal Returns*/; bysort id3 : gen CAR=sum(AR) if 
event_window==1; label var CAR "company cumulative abnormal returns"; gen CAAR=.; label 
var CAAR "cumulative abnormal return"; gen CARstddev=.; gen CAARstddev=.; label var 
CARstddev "Std Dev of cumulative abnormal returns"; local x=start_event_win; while 
`x'<=stop_event_win {;sum CAR if time==`x'; replace CAAR=r(mean) if time==`x'; replace 
CARstddev=(`x'-start_event_win+1)^(1/2)*ARstddev if time==`x'; sum CARstddev if time==`x'; 
replace CAARstddev=r(mean) if time==`x'; local x=`x'+1;}; gen CAARtstat=CAAR/CAARstddev; if 
numevents-2>=100 {;local sig=-1.660;}; else if numevents-2>=80 {;local sig=-1.664;}; else if 
numevents-2>=60 {;local sig=-1.671;}; else if numevents-2>=50 {;local sig=-1.676;}; else if 
numevents-2>=40 {;local sig=-1.684;}; else if numevents-2>=30 {;local sig=-1.697;}; else if 
numevents-2>=29 {;local sig=-1.699;}; else if numevents-2>=28 {;local sig=-1.701;}; else if 
numevents-2>=27 {;local sig=-1.703;}; else if numevents-2>=26 {;local sig=-1.706;}; else if 
numevents-2>=25 {;local sig=-1.708;}; else if numevents-2>=24 {;local sig=-1.711;}; else if 
numevents-2>=23 {;local sig=-1.714;}; else if numevents-2>=22 {;local sig=-1.717;}; else if 
numevents-2>=21 {;local sig=-1.721;}; else if numevents-2>=20 {;local sig=-1.725;}; else if 
numevents-2>=19 {;local sig=-1.729;}; else if numevents-2>=18 {;local sig=-1.734;}; else if 
numevents-2>=17 {;local sig=-1.740;}; else if numevents-2>=16 {;local sig=-1.746;}; else if 
numevents-2>=15 {;local sig=-1.753;}; else if numevents-2>=14 {;local sig=-1.761;}; else if 
numevents-2>=13 {;local sig=-1.771;}; else if numevents-2>=12 {;local sig=-1.782;}; else if 
numevents-2>=11 {;local sig=-1.796;}; else if numevents-2>=10 {;local sig=-1.812;}; else if 
numevents-2>=9 {;local sig=-1.833;}; else if numevents-2>=8 {;local sig=-1.860;}; else if 
numevents-2>=7 {;local sig=-1.895;}; else if numevents-2>=6 {;local sig=-1.943;}; else if 
numevents-2>=5 {;local sig=-2.015;}; else if numevents-2>=4 {;local sig=-2.132;}; else if 
numevents-1>=3 {;local sig=-2.353;}; else if numevents-2>=2 {;local sig=-2.920;}; else {;local 
sig=-6.314;}; 
/* Tests the number of significan events*/; gen indARtstat=AR/ARstddev; gen 
indCARtstat=CAR/CARstddev; gen sigAR=0; gen sigCARpos=0; gen sigCARneg=0; replace 
sigAR=numevents if indARtstat<=`sig'; replace sigCARpos=numevents if indCARtstat>=-`sig'; 
replace sigCARpos=0 if indCARtstat==.; replace sigCARneg=numevents if indCARtstat<=`sig'; 
replace sigCARneg=0 if indCARtstat==.; 
/*Performs Generalized Sign Test for CARs*/; gen wpos=0; replace wpos=1 if CAR>0; by time, 
sort: egen csign1pos=total(wpos); sort id3 time; by id3, sort: gen csignpos=sum(csign1pos); gen 
csignpoststat=(csign1pos-nppos)/((nppos*(1-nppos/numevents))^(1/2)); gen wneg=0; replace 
wneg=1 if CAR<0; by time, sort: egen csign1neg=total(wneg); sort id3 time; by id3, sort: gen 
csignneg=sum(csign1neg); gen csignnegtstat=(csign1neg-npneg)/((npneg*(1-
npneg/numevents))^(1/2)); mat A=J((stop_event_win-start_event_win+1),8,.); local 
vars="CAAR CAARtstat csignpoststat csignnegtstat"; local x=1; foreach b of local vars {;local a=1; 
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local y=start_event_win; while `y'<=stop_event_win {;sum `b' if time==`y'; mat [`a',`x']=r(mean); 
local y=`y'+1;local a=`a'+1;}; local x=`x'+1;}; local x=5; local vars="csign1pos csign1neg"; foreach 
b of local vars {;local a=1;local y=start_event_win; while `y'<=stop_event_win {;sum `b' if 
time==`y';mat A[`a',`x']=r(mean);local y=`y'+1;local a=`a'+1;};local x=`x'+1;}; local x=7; local 
vars="sigCARpos sigCARneg";foreach b of local vars {;local a=1; local y=start_event_win; while 
`y'<=stop_event_win {;sum `b' if time==`y';mat A[`a',`x']=r(mean);local y=`y'+1;local a=`a'+1;}; 
local x=`x'+1;}; egen compid1=group(company); sum compid1; scalar numfirms=r(max); mat 
c=J(1,2*(stop_event_win-start_event_win+1),.); local a=1; local b=start_event_win; 
while `b'<=stop_event_win {;mat c[1,`a']=`b';local a=`a'+2;local b=`b'+1;};mat colnames A=CAAR 
CAARtstat gentest+ gentest- pos neg indsigCAR+ indsigCAR- ; 
/*mat rownames A=-2 . -1 . 0 . 1 . 2 . 3 . 4 . 5 . 6 . 7 . 8 . 9 . 10 . 11 . 12 . 13 . 14 .*/;mat list A; disp 
numevents; disp numfirms; sort id3 time;*by time, sort: reg CAR soe; 
 
Source: Sean Severe (Drake University, USA)  
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Appendix E 
Table 25: Event Study Results using Percentage Change in Patents 
Foreign Target Results 
Quarters@ CAAP (t-stat) GS+ GS-# Pos:Neg 95% Sig^ 
Abnormal Patents Estimated using Mean Estimated Return--70 Events 
4 -0.12 (-0.26) -1.7* 1.25 6:39*** 1:0 
4-5 -0.05 (-0.08) 0.25 0.06 12:34*** 4:0 
4-6 -0.17 (-0.22) 0.25 0.06 12:34*** 0:0 
4-7 -0.27 (-0.29) -0.08 0.53 11:36*** 1:0 
4-8 -0.25 (-0.24) 0.9 -0.18 14:33*** 0:0 
Chinese Acquiror Results 
Quarters CAAP (t-stat) GS+ GS- Pos:Neg 95% Sig 
Abnormal Patents Estimated using Mean Estimated Return--49 Events 
4 -0.03 (-0.02) 1.96* -1.08 17:22 3:01 
4-5 -0.05 (-0.03) 1.96* -0.51 17:24 3:02 
4-6 0.35 -0.16 2.64** -0.51 19:24 3:00 
4-7 0.24 -0.09 2.64** -0.51 19:24 4:00 
4-8 0.01 0 3.66*** -0.79 22:23 3:00 
***=p<.01 ; **=p<.05; *=p<.10 
Estimation Window Rangers 0 to 12 quarters before merger 
@ The event window begins 4 quarters after an event; the median time between application and 
approval for patents in China in my data.  4-7 indicates the cumulative abnormal patents from 4 quarters 
to 7 quarters after a merger is announced. 
# A negative t-statistic on the generalized sign test indicates the opposite of the sign in question.  A 
negative t-statistic for the negative generalized sign test indicates that significantly less negative CAPs 
were observe than predicted—this indicates there were significantly more positive CAPs than predicted. 
^ Denotes the number of events that are significant at the 95% level; both positive and negative 
(Positive:Negative) 
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Appendix F 
Table 26: Sectorial distribution of Chinese FDI in Canada by count of greenfield transactions 
from 2003-2011 
Sector Count Percentage 
Metals 7 22.58% 
Communications 6 19.35% 
Financial Services 5 16.13% 
Business Services 2 6.45% 
Medical Devices 2 6.45% 
Food & Tobacco 2 6.45% 
Chemicals 1 3.23% 
Engines & Turbines 1 3.23% 
Alternative/Renewable energy 1 3.23% 
Transportation 1 3.23% 
Industrial Machinery, Equipment & Tools 1 3.23% 
Electronic Components 1 3.23% 
Ceramics & Glass 1 3.23% 
Source: FT fDi Markets 
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Appendix G 
Table 27: Sectorial distribution of Chinese FDI in Canada by value of greenfield transactions from 
2003-2011 
Sector 
Value 
(millions) Percentage 
Metals $950.4 66.24% 
Communications 241.2 16.81% 
Financial Services 88 6.13% 
Chemicals 65.5 4.57% 
Electronic Components 25.91 1.81% 
Business Services 25.5 1.78% 
Medical Devices 12.4 0.86% 
Engines & Turbines 8.6 0.60% 
Alternative/Renewable energy 5.17 0.36% 
Food & Tobacco 5 0.35% 
Industrial Machinery, Equipment & Tools 4.6 0.32% 
Transportation 2 0.14% 
Ceramics & Glass 0.45 0.03% 
Source: FT fDi Markets 
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Appendix H 
Table 28: Sectorial distribution of Chinese FDI in Canada by count of acquisition transactions 
from 2003-2011 
Sector Count Percentage 
Mining: Energy and Power 17 62.73% 
Mining: Materials 69 15.45% 
Telecommunications 1 4.55% 
Industrials 5 4.55% 
Healthcare 3 3.64% 
High Technology 4 2.73% 
Financials 5 2.73% 
Consumer Products and Services 3 1.82% 
Consumer Staples 2 0.91% 
Retail 1 0.91% 
Source: Thomson ONE 
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Appendix I 
Table 29: Sectorial distribution of Chinese FDI in Canada by value of acquisition transactions 
from 2003-2011 
Sector 
Value 
(millions) Percentage 
Mining: Energy and Power $32,034.132 79.37% 
Mining: Materials 7714.301 19.11% 
Industrials 5.25 0.59% 
Financials 238.813 0.44% 
High Technology 12.188 0.32% 
Consumer Staples 130.764 0.06% 
Retail 176.946 0.03% 
Healthcare 10.645 0.03% 
Consumer Products and Services 25.18 0.03% 
Telecommunications 14.112 0.01% 
Source: Thomson ONE 
 
 
 
 
